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ABSTRACT 
Previous disaster management studies allude to the problems of coordination and the 
difficulties that may be associated with the implementation of recovery programmes in 
New Zealand. These studies have also indicated opportunities for improving the current 
recovery and reconstruction framework in advance of a major disaster. They have shown 
that much existing legislation were not drafted to cope with wide-scale devastations and 
were not developed to operate under the conditions that will inevitably prevail in the 
aftermath of a severe disaster.   
This thesis therefore explores improvements that could be made to legislative provisions so 
that they facilitate large-scale recovery management in New Zealand. Three legislative 
documents are in view: Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act, Resource 
Management Act (RMA) and Building Act (BA). The research investigations involved 
qualitative research methodology using multi-methods to determine the practical 
implication of implementing current reconstruction arrangement under these legislative 
documents. The methods employed include: interviews, document analysis, focus group 
study, surveys, and the use of subject matter experts for research verification. 
Results show that the three legislative documents may become sources of vulnerability in 
post disaster reconstruction because of their influence on the timely achievement of 
recovery objectives. The impediments posed by these legislative documents are mainly in 
the form of procedural constraints; ambiguities in rights and responsibilities for recovery 
management; and deficiencies in the intents and purposes of the legislative documents. 
More general results show that pre-planning the management of disaster resources; and 
collaborative arrangements for response and recovery programmes are a pre-cursor to 
effective and efficient management of reconstruction in New Zealand. 
The research concludes by providing useful recommendations that are specific to the three 
legislative documents and other general recommendations. It is hoped the implementation 
of these recommendations could improve the robustness of the current reconstruction 
framework so that it is able to cater for the complex needs of rebuilding for resilience in 
New Zealand.  
xii 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The rising scale and magnitude of natural disasters in the world is unprecedented. 
For example in 2007, there were 414 natural disasters that caused an average of 
US$74.9 billion damage with an average of 16,800 lives lost during the period 
(2008). The same study indicates a future upward trend in the number of extreme 
disaster events due to changes in global climate, urbanisation and increases in 
population. Vulnerabilities to natural disasters and environmental emergencies are 
on the increase and it is predicted that disasters will affect more people in coming 
years.  
In New Zealand and countries in the Pacific region the scale of destruction from 
cyclones, earthquakes and tsunamis are in line with global phenomenon and are a 
harsh reality. This means that the focus of disaster management activities at every 
level of intervention should be to reduce the inevitable impacts of natural 
disasters. For these vulnerable countries like New Zealand, there needs to be 
preparations across the 4R’s of Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery. A 
prepared community mitigates its risk to disasters and is poised to implement 
recovery, if it has a plan in place. According to Ye, (2004) pre-planning activities 
will help to alleviate the scale of devastation and destruction that follows large 
catastrophes and will allow recovery from the event to be accelerated.  
For disaster management activities to be successfully implemented, pre-planning 
in one form or another needs to be carried out (Cousins, 2004). One aspect of pre-
planning is the need to constitute viable policies and procedural arrangements that 
will facilitate recovery after disasters. Thus the formulation of public policies for 
reduction, readiness, response and recovery should be the rational starting point 
for disaster management (Comerio, 2004). These public policies have to be 
coupled with a strong commitment by national governments for their successful 
implementation. 
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The current study focuses on the regulatory policies that stipulate the participatory 
roles of disaster management stakeholders during the recovery phase of a disaster; 
and other regulatory policies that directly impact on the reconstruction of physical 
assets. The former category of regulatory policies assign authorities and 
responsibilities to the disaster management stakeholders; with indications on how 
disaster activities are to be coordinated to achieve collective and individual 
recovery objectives. In New Zealand, the Civil Defence Emergency Management 
(CDEM) Act 2002 is the key document that prescribes the activities of disaster 
management agencies. While the regulatory policies that directly impact the 
reconstruction of physical assets in New Zealand, which the current study focuses 
on include: the Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991, and the Building Act 
(BA) 2004. The study believes these three legislative documents/Acts must be 
made robust enough to facilitate the implementation of recovery policies. Studies 
conducted in Nepal have shown that legislation drives the implementation of 
recovery policies, especially where special powers, rights or responsibilities need 
to be defined (ACTIONAID Nepal, 2004). Spence (2004) suggests that legislation 
and regulatory frameworks have to be appropriate, so that the frameworks provide 
suitable environment for the interaction and interrelationship of disaster 
management stakeholders during response and subsequent recovery activities.  
The organisation and coordination of recovery is usually complex because a wide 
range of activities occur simultaneously with an equally wide range of needs that 
have to be met. Experiences from past disaster management arrangements (even 
in advanced economies), are indicative of the continuous struggle to meet the 
recovery needs of all stakeholders. Some advanced countries are being caught off-
guard in spite of their previously acclaimed disaster management policies (Chan 
et al., 2006; Kouzmin, Jarman, & Rosenthal, 1995; Mitchell, 2006; S. K. 
Schneider, 1995; W. Smith & Dowell, 2000). Several contributory factors may 
account for the achievement or non-achievement of disaster management goals 
and objectives. These may include: 
• pre-disaster trends and levels of preparedness which is linked to vulnerability 
(McEntire, 2001). Wisner (2004) describes a pressure and release (PAR) 
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effect where the level of vulnerability to disasters is the result of underlying 
causal factors that existed before the disaster event. 
• the extent of damage resulting from the disaster in terms of its magnitude and 
geographical spread (Mitchell, 2006);  
• availability and accessibility to the required resources for both response and 
recovery (capability or coping ability); and 
• the prevailing political will and governmental interests in disaster 
management activities.  Rolfe & Britton (1995) are of the opinion that the 
pace of reconstruction is severely impacted by political and cultural conflicts 
over recovery plans, thus the successful achievement of disaster management 
goals will depend on the political environment. 
The current study approaches effective and efficient implementation of post-
disaster reconstruction from the viewpoint of legislation and regulations; 
believing that legislation and regulatory provisions significantly influence the 
organisation for long-term recovery after natural disasters. The study shows that 
particular attention needs to be paid to changes that should be put in place to 
facilitate reconstruction programmes at all ownership levels. Without developed 
frameworks, reconstruction and re-development programmes may be carried out 
on an ad-hoc basis with little regard for the needs of an affected community.   
The study provides a description of the operational procedure for post-disaster 
recovery as suggested by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (MCDEM) in New Zealand. It evaluates key disaster-related 
legislation and regulations that provide the framework for the implementation of 
recovery, specifically the CDEM Act, RMA and BA, to discover if they are in 
tandem with the demands for the reconstruction of physical facilities in a major 
natural disaster in New Zealand. A robust regulatory framework would enable the 
achievement of CDEM’s objective of ‘community resilience’ in New Zealand. In 
other words, the regulatory framework should be enabling of rebuilding 
programmes for damaged physical facilities and consequently contribute to the 
overall well-being of the affected community. Therefore the pertinent question 
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that is consistently addressed throughout the current study and which underpins 
the research programme is: 
What improvements can be made to existing disaster-related legislation 
and regulatory provisions so that they facilitate the implementation of 
significant reconstruction programmes in New Zealand?  
1.2  Statement of the Research Problem 
There is no doubt that New Zealand communities are exposed to risks from 
natural hazards of one form or another. The question often posed at conferences 
and symposia is not ‘if a disaster will happen’ but ‘when a major one will happen’ 
(J. O. B. Rotimi, Le Masurier, & Wilkinson, 2006) ? With a follow-on question of 
‘are we ready’? The frequency with which different disaster emergencies have 
been declared are proof of New Zealand’s disposition to natural disasters. Table 
1.1 presents an outline of recent disaster events (2000-2007) that have 
necessitated the declaration of states of emergencies around the affected areas in 
New Zealand. The table presents a high disposition to rainfall related hazards 
(floods and landslips) since the turn of the century; but these events have been 
largely confined to rural areas and are of low-magnitude. Relative to other world 
disasters, these local events had low scope of impact in terms of their physical and 
societal dislocations.  
However, these low-magnitude events do not negate the real risks that New 
Zealand communities are faced with and neither does it reduce the importance of 
disaster risk management strategies. New Zealand has had its share of 
significantly large natural disasters in its history. The Ministry for Culture and 
Heritage gives a dateline of major natural disasters that happened in New Zealand 
history (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2009). Some examples of these are: 
the Taupo landslide of 7 May 1846 with about 60 deaths including Ngati 
Tuwharetoa leader Mananui Te Heuheu Tukino II; the 1855 Wairarapa earthquake 
that altered the landscape of the Wellington region with 5 to 9 recorded deaths in 
Wellington, Manawatu and Wairarapa; and the deadliest earthquake in the 
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Hawke’s Bay (Napier) region of 1931. The official death toll as a result of the 
Napier earthquake was put at about 256. 
Table 1.1 - Emergency declarations in New Zealand (2000 – 2007) 
Source: Adapted from www.civildefence.govt.nz 
Date Declared Date 
Terminated 
Geographical 
area/region affected 
Nature of 
Emergency 
2007    
21st Dec 22nd Dec Gisborne Earthquake 
30th July 31st July Milton Flooding 
10th July 13th July Far North DC Flooding 
05th July 07th July Taranaki District Tornado 
2006    
07th July 08th July Rangitikei District Flooding 
2005    
17th May 30th May Whakatane District Flooding, Landslips 
18th May 20th May Tauranga District Flooding, Landslips 
2004    
17th July 30th July Whakatane District Flooding, Landslips 
17th July 23rd July Opotiki District Flooding, Landslips 
17th Feb 25th Feb Manawatu-Wanganui Flooding 
17th Feb 18th Feb Marlborough District Flooding 
17th Feb 27th Feb South Taranaki District Flooding 
16th Feb 17th Feb Manawatu District Flooding 
16th Feb 17th Feb Rangitikei District Flooding 
2003    
04th Oct 09th Oct Kapiti Coast District Flooding 
2002    
21st June 23rd June South Waikato District Flooding 
21st June 24th June Thames District Flooding 
 
Large scale natural disasters have been few and far between and it can be 
concluded that New Zealand is relatively inexperienced in the management of it 
(catastrophes) and that such events may require extensive preparatory work than 
the usual. Hopkins, Lanigan and Shephard (1999) hold similar view, they 
conclude that large-scale disasters would pose considerable economic, physical 
and social challenges that could make the task of recovery and reconstruction 
extensive in New Zealand.  
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In terms of legislation and regulation there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that 
there is little provision in legislation to facilitate large scale reconstruction 
programmes in New Zealand.  Feast (1995) for example, identified several issues 
in relation to planning and construction legislation that would impede 
reconstruction of Wellington, following a major earthquake. Feast’s study 
suggested that much of the legislation (in particular RMA and BA) that existed 
during the period were neither drafted to cope with an emergency situation nor 
developed to operate under the conditions that will inevitably prevail in the 
aftermath of a severe seismic event. Commenting on the RMA, Feast explains that 
its consultation procedure may be precluded by the problems of meeting the 
reconstruction requirements of a devastated city within a reasonable period (Feast, 
1995).  
Since Feast’s analysis, the Civil Defence Act 1983 and BA 1991 have been 
revised, with amendments made to the RMA (review and realignment of the RMA 
is ongoing, which this study has provided input into). However these legislative 
documents still portend considerable obstacles to post disaster reconstruction, as 
will be examined within this thesis. An example of the scale of the problem being 
experienced under RMA provisions was summed up by the Minister for 
Environment in his first reading to Parliament about the need to reform the RMA.  
Extract of his comments made on 19 February 2009 follows:  
...since the RMA became law there has been growing criticism about the 
slow and costly plan preparation and consenting processes. Decision making 
processes under the RMA must become more efficient. The amendments in 
this Bill will provide timely and welcome support to other government 
measures to stimulate the economy (N. Smith, 2009).  
Recovery under procedural burdens may become an endless process of partially 
fulfilled expectations. This will most certainly be exacerbated by poor planning 
and unsustainable policies. Such poor planning activities result in increases in 
vulnerability of disaster-affected individuals or groups and could lead to a 
recurring disaster-poverty cycle, as were experienced in the Latur 1993 
earthquake (Jigyasu, 2004) and the Gujarat 2001 earthquake (Shaw, Gupta, & 
Sarma, 2003) where reconstruction objectives were largely unmet. Failed 
recovery after the Latur and Gujarat earthquakes could be considered extreme and 
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unlikely in the New Zealand context, but it is clear that every post-disaster 
management programme requires deliberate and sustained approaches that are 
built upon well grounded policies and strategic frameworks (Coghlan, 2004; 
Comerio, 2004).  
Four studies (AELG, 2005; Harper, 2006; MWH, 2004; Page, 2005) that were 
commissioned locally provide valuable comments on the adequacy of some 
disaster-related legislation and the regulatory framework in New Zealand. Some of 
the key conclusions from these reports justify the current research, which seeks 
improvement to current legislation. Specific references have been made to these 
commissioned reports within the thesis.  
Few changes have been made in the intervening period since the release of these 
four reports. Although the RMA and BA are experiencing symptomatic review, of 
which this research has provided input to, more considerations of the impact of 
legislative provisions on post-disaster reconstruction is needed. Recently, Becker, 
Saunders, Hopkins, Wright, & Kerr (2008) reported that New Zealand’s recovery 
arrangements have been approached haphazardly with little forethought to long-
term consequences. Response arrangements during the snowstorms in the 
Canterbury region were ineffective and are indicative that more ground needs to 
be covered in the realm of emergency management. During the Canterbury 
snowstorms the affected areas experienced electricity outages of upwards of three 
weeks after the event (Hendrikx, 2006). A catastrophe in the magnitude of the 
New Orleans disaster that followed hurricane Katrina in 2005 or the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami in 2006 would pose significant challenges for reconstruction works in 
New Zealand, and rebuilding programmes would find it hard to cope with its 
legislative framework. 
If reconstruction is to proceed at the speed most often desired for an early recovery 
from disasters, improvements to implementation guidelines and changes to 
legislative provisions are needed. These improvements may take the form of 
reviews, repeals and or waivers to the subsisting legislation and regulatory 
frameworks. A cursory review of studies on world disaster events show the 
importance of implementing enabling legislation and regulatory frameworks for 
 8 
disaster recovery (Burby, Salvesen, & Creed, 2006; Meese III, Butler, & Holmes, 
2005; Nigg, Barnshaw, & Torres, 2006). These studies make it clear that physical 
development and other environmental regulations have become restrictive and 
burdensome and do not allow for flexibility in decision making.  
There is continuous tension between strictly applying reconstruction regulations 
which aim at preventing a recurrence of the previous community vulnerabilities; 
and allowing an affected community to move back to its former habitation quickly. 
Clearly, the quicker communities return to habitability of as many of their homes as 
possible, the better it will be for restoring a sense of normality (recovery). 
According to Kennedy, Ashmore, Babister, & Kelman (2008) disaster management 
activities should aim to ‘build back safer’. For example, McDonald (2004) from a 
planning perspective explains that the redevelopment programme in Napier, New 
Zealand still portend similar vulnerability levels  as was experienced during the 
1931 earthquake. The city was largely rebuilt using previous planning parameters 
(the current study therefore does not recommend speedy reconstruction at the 
expense of quality of delivery but proposes enabling legislation that will facilitate 
robust planning processes for early recovery after a major disaster).  
Decisions on the implementation of reconstruction regulations have to make trade-
offs between idealistic goals and expediency. The current study believes there are 
opportunities for improving existing legislation and regulatory provisions, 
specifically the CDEM Act, RMA and BA to guide the performance of 
reconstruction programmes towards the achievement of resilience in New 
Zealand. This can be achieved without compromising the benefits inherent in 
these development and environmental legislation.  
The study supports and focuses on a greater imperative to have appropriate 
systems in place in advance of any significant disaster event. This would provide 
for a more pro-active approach to disaster management planning and 
implementation in New Zealand. Past recovery and reconstruction activities have 
involved the modification of routine construction processes on an ad hoc basis 
(Reid, Brunsdon, Fitzharris, & Oughton, 2004). The current study shows that 
whilst such ad hoc arrangements may work reasonably well for small-scale 
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disasters, effectiveness would be improved by modifying the legislative and 
regulatory framework in advance of a disaster. Pre-planning allows for expedient 
reconstruction programmes. The study highlights the importance of making 
improvements in the recovery framework in larger scale disasters by ensuring that 
reconstruction programmes are robust and within an enhanced civil defence 
emergency management framework.  
1.3 Statement of Research Objectives 
The principal focus of the study is to improve existing legislation and regulatory 
frameworks for reconstruction so that they facilitate the effective and efficient 
implementation of reconstruction programmes after large-scale natural disasters in 
New Zealand. The following outlines the research objectives pursued throughout 
the study: 
1) To review New Zealand’s emergency management framework; its guidelines on 
recovery operations; and related emergency management legislation. This 
presents an overview of existing reconstruction strategies and procedures and 
locates its legislative provisions within the overall recovery spectrum. This 
objective is largely met through an analysis of existing legislation and 
government policy documents.  
2) To identify constraints that may be posed by existing legislative and regulatory 
provisions, in particular those contained in the CDEM Act, RMA and the BA, 
to the realisation of reconstruction objectives. Reconstruction problem 
identification is achieved through information gathered from research reports, 
interviews, focus groups, recovery case studies and the evaluation of 
legislative documents.  
3) To investigate whether building and development control officers, and other 
disaster management practitioners, envisage problems in the post-disaster 
recovery process that are specifically caused by deficiencies in legislation. This 
objective is achieved through a survey designed to understand and propose the 
means by which post-disaster reconstruction problems could be minimised. The 
 10 
survey results are verified using subject matter experts to comment on the 
feasibility of improvements to the deficient parts of legislation.   
4) To suggest improvements to recovery-related legislation and regulatory 
provisions. The suggested improvements include reference to parts of the 
CDEM Act, RMA and BA that could be reviewed and realigned to allow for the 
implementation of significant reconstruction programmes in New Zealand. The 
research seeks to make specific influence on government’s post-disaster 
reconstruction policy. 
1.4 Scope and Limitations 
This research study falls under the ambit of research initiatives pursued under 
Objective 3 of the Resilient Organisations (ResOrgs) project, which is funded by 
the Foundation for Research Science and Technology (FRST) in New Zealand. 
The key research question addressed by this study is ‘what improvements can be 
made to existing disaster-related legislation and regulatory provisions so that 
they facilitate the implementation of significant reconstruction programmes in 
New Zealand? This research question was agreeable to high level industry and 
research participants at a workshop organised by ResOrgs in April 2006. Details 
of the research priorities identified by the workshop are included at Appendix A3, 
this serves to show where the current research sits within the Objective 3 
(ResOrgs) research programme. 
The intent of this research is to improve emergency management practice in New 
Zealand through research output that is both relevant to industry and practice 
needs. The Author has worked in collaboration with members of the supervisory 
committee and other researchers to produce intermediate research outputs. A list 
of publications resulting from this synergy of knowledge and copies of some of 
the Author’s key articles are included at Appendices C and D1 to D7 respectively.  
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1.5 Synopsis (Organisation of Thesis) 
Chapter one introduces the research project and provides background information 
on the magnitude of the research problem. It goes on to justify the need for the 
study with a commentary on previous studies around the problem area. The 
research question is presented and the steps taken (in the form of research 
objectives) to address the research question. 
Chapter two presents fundamental concepts connected with disaster management 
and post-disaster reconstruction. It goes on to review the structure of civil defence 
emergency management in New Zealand. The chapter provides the conceptual 
foundation to the study’s approach to disaster management. 
Chapter three reviews the legislative and regulatory framework for post-disaster 
reconstruction in New Zealand. It collates information on potential problems to 
implementing subsisting regulatory provisions from a review of three Acts (the 
CDEM Act, RMA and BA), government documents and recovery reports and case 
studies. 
Chapter four describes the research methodology. It describes the qualitative and 
quantitative research methods employed for data collection; the development of 
the theoretical framework and; the methods used in the analysis of survey data. 
The chapter also outlines the ethical process and ethical issues considered by the 
study. 
Chapter five presents the results and outcome of a workshop (focus group); an 
opinion survey of building and environmental control officers and disaster 
practitioners in New Zealand; and the result of a research verification using 
subject matter experts. The analyses of the data obtained is presented and 
discussed within the context of the research objectives.  
Chapter six presents a synthesis of the research findings by comparing the outputs 
of prior investigations discussed in the previous chapters with the opinions held 
by subject matter experts. Thematic analyses of the research findings bring 
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research closure. The chapter sieves through the key findings of the research and 
paves way for the recommendations in chapter seven. 
Chapter Seven concludes the study by integrating all the parts of the thesis into a 
meaningful conclusion. The chapter provides a list of recommendations for the 
improvement of legislative and regulatory provisions that could enable the 
implementation of large scale reconstruction programmes in New Zealand. 
Essentially the study is divided into four conceptual parts: Problem Identification 
covered in chapter one to three; Data Collection and Analyses, covering chapter 
four and five; Research Synthesis in chapter six; and finally the Conclusion in 
chapter seven. These four conceptual parts are depicted in Figure 1.1 below. 
 Figure 1.1 - Thesis Outline 
 Chapter One  Background Readings 
   Literature Review  
 Chapter Two  Problem Identification Document Analysis  
   Case Study Evaluation 
 Chapter Three   
 
    
 Chapter Four     Data Collection Statement of Methods 
          & Analysis  Results Presentation  
 Chapter Five   Discussions 
    
 Chapter Six    Research Synthesis  Triangulation 
 
 
 Chapter Seven         Conclusion Conclusion  
   Recommendations 
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Chapter Two 
Disasters and Disaster Recovery Fundamentals 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter describes some of the fundamental concepts connected with disaster 
management and other aspects which relate with the current study. It provides a 
review of background readings around the subject area. Some explanatory notes 
and working definitions that are reinforced throughout the study are presented 
within the context of the current study. There is a discussion on the social 
dimensions to recovery, to underscore the importance of recovery as not just a 
process of reinstating damaged physical facilities but of harnessing individuals 
and communities to avoid a rolling series of repercussion that could impede 
overall recovery. The chapter also highlights the importance of coordinating the 
reconstruction activities of stakeholders in post disaster management. 
The chapter concludes with the relationship between disaster management and 
legislation. It gives an overview of the civil defence emergency management 
(CDEM) framework in New Zealand, as a pre-cursor to the presentation of 
building and environmental legislation that is covered in more detail in chapter 
three. 
2.1 Understanding Disasters  
It is important to begin with an understanding of what a disaster is. Without this 
conceptualization it will be difficult to know what needs to be recovered from and 
the magnitude of the problems that are associated with the management of 
disasters. Disasters have undergone several transformation of meanings and a 
variety of definitions (McEntire, 2001). According to Drabek (1991) the old and 
primitive view was that disasters were acts of God, and so the casualties 
associated with catastrophic events were considered some sort of punishment by 
supernatural beings. However with increased scientific understanding of the 
earth’s physical environment, disasters became synonymous with their causative 
agents. Such a conceptualisation placed greater emphasis on disasters as naturally 
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occurring, while downplaying the contributory (and critical) role of humans 
towards the disasters (McEntire, 2001; Weichselgartner, 2001). 
Present day understanding of disasters give disasters as not only naturally 
occurring; but unnatural and man-made too. The attack on the World Trade 
Center in New York City in 2001; coordinated bombings of public transport 
systems (Madrid, 2004; London, 2005; Mumbai 2006) or the changing face of 
political and territorial disagreements/disturbances are indicators of the magnitude 
of the new wave of man-made disasters that present day societies have to contend 
with (BBC News, 2004, 2005, 2006; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, 2004). Therefore an all-inclusive definition of disaster 
was offered by the UN-DHA internationally agreed glossary of basic terms as: 
A serious disruption of the functioning of society, causing widespread 
human, material or environmental losses which exceed the ability of 
affected society to cope using only its own resources. Disasters are often 
classified according to their cause (natural or manmade). (UN-DHA, 1992 
p.27).  
This definition provides a holistic view of disasters because it provides greater 
understanding of the different causes of disasters, the catalytic processes that are 
involved, and the interaction of disasters with the physical environment. Some 
disasters may overwhelm local capacity and necessitate external assistance from 
national or international levels, while others could be contained and effectively 
managed locally. Though disasters are often caused by nature, disasters can have 
human origins. Wars and civil disturbances that destroy communities and displace 
people are included among the causes of disasters. Other causes could be: 
building collapse, blizzard, drought, earthquake, explosion, fire, flood, epidemic, 
hazardous material or transportation incident (such as chemical spills), hurricane, 
nuclear incident, tornado, or volcanoes. This shows that a number of technology 
and social systems are connected to every disaster event (McEntire, 2001).  
As noted there are limitless number of causes of disasters (triggering agents); 
many occur infrequently and impact small populations, while others may involve 
widespread emergencies such as health epidemics and other bio-security problems 
(MCDEM, 2002). The UNDP (1992) explain that some other hazards may occur 
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in areas that are prepared to deal with them so that the level of destruction is 
insignificant. The triggering agents in any disaster therefore emanate from either 
the natural environment or human activities and in some cases a combination of 
the two.  
Lotke & Borosage (2006) and Comfort (2005) suggest for example that the 
disaster that followed ‘Hurricane Katrina’ was both natural and man-made. Nature 
created the devastation but human conservatism (demonstrated in the failure to 
prepare, respond and rebuild) created the catastrophe. The US national 
government and its disaster agencies have been accused of complacency despite 
the acknowledged risks and vulnerabilities posed by a break in the levee systems 
in New Orleans. It therefore goes without saying that the activities or inactivity of 
people are a great influence on the impact that a disaster will have on a 
community. This view is also shared by  Bolin and Stanford (1998) and Mileti 
(1999). 
The current research study focuses on the effect of natural disasters on the 
physical and built environment. These form of disasters are the consequences of 
natural events that occur when human activities and natural phenomenon become 
connected (Leon Abbott, 2005). Thus in areas where there are no human activities 
(and an absence of built facilities), a natural phenomenon will not constitute any 
hazard and is unlikely to result in a natural disaster (Eshghi & Larson, 2008). In 
other words natural disasters are the result of the interaction of triggering agents 
with the human population and their habitation. 
In chapter one, an indication of New Zealand’s vulnerability to natural disasters 
was presented in table 1.1. The table lists recently declared emergencies as a 
result of some natural events; although very few of these events had resulted in 
high casualties and widespread calamities. Compared to recent world catastrophes 
these local events may seem to be small-scale events, however considering the 
New Zealand setting and the impact that these events had on local response and 
recovery capacities, they could be considered significant. 
The impact of a hazard event on local capacities gives an indication of the scale of 
the disaster whether significant or not. A useful distinction between different 
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categories of disasters in relation to their magnitudes is offered by the University 
of Delaware’s Disaster Research Centre (Quarantelli, 2000). An outline of their 
categories compared to New Zealand’s emergency response classifications is 
given in the next paragraphs.  
An emergency refers to a local event with a small geographical spread that may be 
managed locally without the need for additional response measures or changes to 
organised emergency procedures. This may equate to New Zealand CDEM 
group’s classification of a Level 1 and 2 event type as indicated in Appendix A1 
(MCDEM, 2005a). Such small and localised events may not warrant a declaration 
of a state of disaster emergency.   
A disaster has a wider scale of impact than an emergency. Such an event requires 
more responding groups who would not normally interact in order to manage an 
emergency. Such an event will require the affected, to relinquish their usual 
autonomy and freedom to special response measures and organisation. The scale 
of this category of hazard event usually changes community dynamics thus 
requiring closer cooperation between public and private organizations to be able 
to respond and recover from the event. The magnitude of this hazard type 
necessitates the declaration of local state of emergencies which will be within the 
confines of a Territorial Authority’s responsibility. The New Zealand CDEM plan 
classifies this as a level 3 and 4 event type, which requires a higher level of 
governmental response than in an emergency event.  
A catastrophe is the largest scale of a hazard event that destroys most of a 
community. It prevents local officials performing their duties; causes most 
community functions to cease; and prevents adjacent communities from providing 
the necessary aid. Catastrophes will require some form of external aid and 
assistance beyond what a national economy can cater for. A catastrophe is an 
imminent state of national emergency classified as a level 5 event in Appendix A1 
(MCDEM, 2005a). A good example of this disaster type is the destruction that 
followed hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. The event was described by Mitchell 
(2006) as an urban catastrophe with a region wide devastation, that challenged the 
recovery capacity of the entire United States of America.    
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In the context of the above definitions, recent hazard events in New Zealand fall 
within the disaster category (levels 3 and 4). Local states of emergencies were 
declared to allow for response and initial recovery activities to take place. The 
management aspect of recovery (reconstruction) from disasters and major 
catastrophes are those for which this research desires to proffer solutions to. Such 
events impact the four facets of a community’s environment (to a greater or lesser 
extent). These community environments are the interrelated social, economic, 
natural and built environments expressed by the MCDEM (2005b) and depicted in 
figure 2.1. Good disaster recovery management strategies would aim at 
holistically addressing these four community facets (Natural Hazards Centre, 
2001). A further breakdown of the four community recovery facets is provided by 
MCDEM (2005c). For example the MCDEM document suggests breaking down 
the built environment facet to: residential housing; commercial or industrial 
property; public buildings and assets; rural farmland and lifeline utilities (see 
figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.1 – The holistic recovery system  
Source: MCDEM (2005b)  
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Figure 2.2 – Elements and sub-elements of a recovery system 
Source: After (MCDEM, 2005c p.8) 
This research considers how reconstruction work (and subsequent recovery) could 
be facilitated for especially the built environment through improved regulatory 
frameworks. It believes that considerations for post-disaster reconstruction should 
begin before a disaster occurs. These pre-planning activities should include 
making the existing regulatory framework robust enough to be implemented for a 
major disaster or catastrophe. 
2.2 Disasters and Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerability is the dependent component of disasters and catastrophes. For 
example it is conceptualised by McEntire (2001) as a function of the degree of 
risk, susceptibility, resistance and resilience of a community to a disaster. An 
alternative but not completely different expression of disaster vulnerability are 
those given by Benson and Clay (2003) and Turner et al. (2003). They see 
vulnerability as the interactive component of the exposure, sensitivity, reliance, 
reliability and resilience of any system that is experiencing a hazard event.  
Vulnerability has been expressed in many different forms. Cutter (1996) and 
Weichselgartner (2001) provide useful reviews of these wide range of expressions 
from different authors. Weichselgartner concludes that the discrepancies observed 
in the definitions arise from both epistemological orientations and methodological 
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practices. In simpler terms the differences stem from the perspective from which 
vulnerability is viewed. Three main themes have developed from vulnerability 
studies: vulnerability as the degree of exposure to risk or hazards which may be 
linked to pre-existing conditions; vulnerability as a social response; and 
vulnerability of places (S. Cutter, 1996).   
Disaster vulnerability as a result of pre-existing conditions is explained by the 
degree of exposure to the risk or hazard. Cutter (1996) gives a treatise of several 
studies that established the factors that determine disaster vulnerability due to pre-
existing conditions. These factors include: the source of the hazards; the 
magnitude, duration, impact frequency and rapidity of onset; the nature of human 
occupancy of the hazard zone; and disaster mitigating characteristics of the hazard 
zone (S. Cutter, 1996).  
Vulnerability as a social response refers to the coping responses of individuals or 
groups. Hence the susceptibility of social groups or individuals derive from their 
potential losses or sensitivity to losses as a result of any hazard event 
(Weichselgartner, 2001).  According to Dalziell & McManus (2004) this may 
have both spatial and non-spatial domains. Social vulnerability explains why 
some individuals or groups in a community are more prone to damage, loss and 
suffering than others. Such groups may be characterised by their socio-economic 
positions like class, ethnicity, gender, or age (Green, Gill, & Kleiner, 2006; 
MCDEM, 2005b). Khazai et al. (2006) explain that the Indian Ocean Tsunami had 
a selective effect on the different sections of the society in Sri Lanka. The poorer 
were more vulnerable than the affluent. Consequently reconstruction policies are 
more likely to be skewed in favour of persons with better socio-economic status.   
Vulnerability of places on another hand is more geographically centred. Mili’s 
(2003) definition suggests for example that the potential for loss (vulnerability) 
derives from the interaction of the society with biophysical conditions. 
Biophysical vulnerability relates more to the concept of hazard risk and is 
probabilistic (Brook, 2003). In other words, biophysical vulnerability is the 
probability of the occurrence of a hazard or that of the outcome, which is a 
function of the event risk and inherent or social vulnerabilities.    
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Two sets of dominant elements are common in these and other thread of 
vulnerability expressions. Vulnerability is a factor of either one or a combination 
of both of them. These are the triggering agent(s) on one hand; and/or the coping 
responses/abilities (resistance, degree of fragility or resilience) and adaptive 
capacities of those affected, on the other. It is envisaged in the current study that 
the resilience of New Zealand communities can be improved through enhanced 
reconstruction and recovery regulations. Thus bringing about a situation where 
communities can recover from a disaster event without the constraints imposed by 
legislation and regulations. This approach pre-supposes the triggering agents as a 
given, or that its occurrence is inevitable (but without ignoring the potential to 
reduce the risk). 
In recent times, the coping abilities of communities have become more adversely 
impaired than the prevalence of the triggering agents themselves. There is an 
alarmingly higher toll of losses, damage, destruction and other causalities from 
disasters worldwide. The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED) published staggering statistical results of world disaster occurrence and 
the toll of human casualties (Hoyois, Below, Scheuren, & Guha-Sapir, 2007).  
 
Figure 2.3 – Natural disaster occurrence (1987–2006)  
Source: Hoyois et al. (2007) 
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The number of natural disasters and catastrophes since the year 2000 to date have 
increased significantly by a multiple factor of about two (Figure 2.3). The pattern 
hitherto was fairly regular (the pattern varied between 200 and 250) between 1987 
and 1997.  
Figure 2.4 on the other hand, presents data on the number of victims (persons 
killed plus persons affected) of natural disasters. Though the pattern displays 
highly variable number of disaster victims during the period 1987 to 2006; the 
corrected linear time-trend (in dotted lines) shows clearly an increased trend 
during the corresponding period.  
From all indications emphasis in disaster management should be placed more on 
improving the resilience of vulnerable communities. This correlates with the 
‘International Strategy for Disaster Reduction’ developed by the United Nations 
(UN) in 2000 (Britton, 2006). The UN strategy stresses the importance of building 
disaster resilient communities by national governments through cooperative 
arrangements between all stakeholder agencies.  
 
Figure 2.4 – Numbers of victims of natural disasters (1987–2006) 
Source: Hoyois et al. (2007) 
Therefore greater emphasis should be accorded to local and national capacity for 
response and recovery as very little can be done to reduce the prevalence of 
natural hazard events. New Zealand for example is exposed to not less than 17 
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significant hazards varying from natural, technological to man-made hazards 
(ODESC, 2007). The list of hazards include: earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides, 
tsunamis, coastal hazards, floods, severe winds, snow, droughts, wildfires, animal 
and plant pests and diseases, infectious human disease pandemics, infrastructure 
failures, hazardous substance incidents, major transport accidents, terrorism and 
food safety. These hazards pose serious risks to its human population and 
infrastructures; however its vulnerability has increased not because of these 
hazards but its ability to recover from them. For example research evidences 
suggest that resource availability could constrain reconstruction efforts (Bhesram, 
2007; Hopkins et al., 1999). The current research study shows that in recent 
natural disasters in New Zealand, response and recovery capabilities could benefit 
from improved framework enabled by appropriate legislative provisions. This and 
other related aspects are covered in more detail in chapter three. 
The response and recovery capacity of New Zealand communities are further 
exacerbated by developmental growth patterns. According to ODESC (2007) a 
greater percentage of the population (86%) is vulnerable to significant hazards 
because they are located in its urban centres. This is why recent disasters in New 
Zealand have been significant. Since 40 years there have been more flooding 
incidents (table 1.1 depicts a more recent pattern of floods), rain-causing landslips 
and debris flows that have caused significant damage to properties and have 
necessitated the evacuation of people from their otherwise permanent abodes 
(ODESC, 2007). 
It is a general and widespread phenomenon for the human population in urban 
areas to expand into areas that have a high risk of being impacted by hazards. This 
pattern of development increases disaster risks and vulnerabilities. The situation is 
even more prevalent in developing countries (AUDMP & ADPC, 2003; 
Quarantelli, 2003) where new urban settlements and residential developments are 
located in landfill sites, hilly regions and industrial zones. Further are the so-
called ‘lifestyle’ properties springing up around coastal areas (which in many of 
the cases encroach subsisting coastal buffer zones) where urban growth and 
human activities have increased vulnerability to hazards. To reduce disaster 
vulnerability and also minimise the potential contribution of these development 
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activities to hazards; Brennan (2003) suggests merging both development 
planning processes and disaster risk management activities. In other words, 
development planning which incorporates the prior assessment of hazard risk 
levels may prove valuable to streamlining developmental growth in a manner that 
reduces exposure to disaster elements. This point will be made clearer in 
subsequent parts of this thesis.  
There are reported cases where development plans have been streamlined to 
reduce disaster vulnerabilities in New Zealand. A notable example is the creative 
urban design implemented in the Totara Park, Upper Hutt to reduce the impact of 
a Wellington earthquake (Saunders, 2008). The design involved a setback of 
critical assets away from the Wellington fault line, so that the degree of damage to 
these assets, in the event of an earthquake, is minimal. Other examples  include: 
Waitakere City Council’s ‘Project Twin Streams’ which reclaimed and converted 
at-risk land into riparian reserves; the relocation of Kelso Township in Otago; 
construction of risk mitigation structures in Matata after the 2005 floods (Becker 
et al., 2008). Becker et. al. (2008) conclude however that these schemes could 
benefit from more forward planning so that sensible and sustainable decisions 
could be made on future land uses. Good forward planning begins with an 
understanding of vulnerabilities (and risks) which feeds into planning and 
advocacy arrangements by responding agencies. The objectives of emergency 
management for structured and coordinated reduction (mitigation), readiness, 
response, and recovery are achievable when disaster vulnerability levels  are 
evaluated (Green et al., 2006). Such an evaluation is an effective hazard risk 
management strategy (Becker et al., 2008; de Guzman, 2003; Kasperson, 
Kasperson, & Dow, 2001) and one way of increasing community resiliency to 
hazards. Thus community resiliency is achieved through the alteration and 
subsequent reduction of a community’s vulnerabilities. 
It is useful to note that several factors act as catalysts to disaster vulnerabilities. 
Six major categories are outlined below in line with those suggested by McEntire 
(2001). 
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a) Physical factors: This refers to the proximity or exposure to the triggering 
agents. As previously explained urban centres have become more vulnerable 
because of their dense human population and accounts as a pertinent reason 
for the establishment of development and environmental regulations such as 
the Building and Resource Management Act.  
b) Social factors: vulnerabilities due to social factors are linked to the social 
structure, networks and systems that exist within a community. For instance 
the impact of the New Orleans disaster was felt more by groups that had 
fragmented social networks (J. Barnshaw & Trainor, 2007). Social factors 
may also be explained by the level of awareness and education about the 
hazard events. One objective of CDEM in New Zealand is to create awareness 
about disasters and make individuals and whole-of-community responsible for 
their activities that will reduce their vulnerabilities. 
c) Cultural factors: this is the level of acceptance or apathy of the public towards 
disasters. Others may include defiance or indifference to safety precautions 
and regulations; dependencies and absence of personal responsibilities. 
d) Political factors: may include lackadaisical support for disaster programmes 
by responsible governments and disaster agencies; inability to enforce or 
encourage steps for mitigation; over-centralisation of decision making; and 
isolated or weak disaster related institutions. Baca and Omer (2006) have 
expressed that prevailing policy approaches have an influence on both pre and 
post-disaster impact levels; and are also positively related to vulnerability. In 
the words of Gavidia and Crivellari (2006 p.84) the relationship between 
policy and vulnerability is ‘as real as a building with the wrong foundations’. 
In situations where there is an incoherent normative framework (political and 
institutional set up) and a corresponding capacity for policy implementation; 
there is a greater likelihood for coordinating organisations to under-perform. 
From Gavidia and Crivellari perspective, incoherencies in disaster 
management policies could create overlaps, gaps, and non-constructive 
competition amongst responding agencies.  
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e) Economic factors: example of this includes differential wealth distribution, 
lack of hazard insurance, sparse resources for the prevention, planning and 
management of disasters. The state of an affected economy (whether buoyant 
or poor) is positively related to vulnerability. According to Benson and Clay 
(2003), poor and socially disadvantaged groups are the most vulnerable to 
natural hazards.  
f) Technological factors: the list of technological factors include (but are not 
restricted to) lack of structural mitigation devices; environmental pollution; 
over-reliance on ineffective warning systems; and other poor technological 
judgements. 
Earlier on, it was mentioned that vulnerabilities can be reduced by first gaining an 
understanding of the hazard events. This is achieved through the assessment of 
disaster risk levels. Disaster risk assessment methodology and the development of 
loss estimation models have been reported in several disaster management studies 
(S. L. Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; S. L. Cutter & Emrich, 2006; de Guzman, 
2003; Greiving, Fleischhauer, & Lückenkötter, 2006; Pelling, 2007; Turner et al., 
2003), but these evaluative approaches are outside the scope of the current study.  
However it is worth noting that New Zealand has embraced risk and vulnerability 
assessment at all levels of public governance. Evidence of this is found in the 
National Hazardscope Report (ODESC, 2007) and regional CDEM Group Plans 
(MCDEM, 2005a). These documents contain risk matrices that were developed 
through a painstaking process of vulnerability and impact evaluations across the 
country. These exercises have no doubt contributed towards the objectives of 
CDEM in New Zealand and earned it a reputation of having a comprehensive 
framework that is worthy of emulation (Mitchell, 2006). The CDEM’s cardinal 
vision is for New Zealanders to understand and routinely act to reduce, avoid and 
prepare to manage the adverse effects of identified hazards because the 
communities are aware of the benefits of doing so. There seems to be a greater 
understanding of disaster vulnerabilities coupled with awareness through regular 
campaigns in communication media. The vision for resilience in New Zealand is 
 26 
encapsulated in the CDEM strategic report titled ‘National Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Strategy’ (MCDEM, 2004).   
There is little doubt from the foregoing that the coping and adaptive capacities 
(resilience) of a community are improved, if communities are made aware of the 
hazards that they need to prepare for. The communities need to be equipped as 
well, with all the resources (material, financial, social and psychological) 
necessary to prevent or respond effectively to a crisis. The latter is where disaster 
resilience stems from (Green et al., 2006).  
2.3 Disasters and their Impacts 
Vulnerabilities as described previously, largely determine the magnitude of the 
effects of disasters on individuals and groups. These effects are varied and 
typically are in the form of a rolling series of repercussions (secondary and ripple 
effects) shown in figure 2.5. Some of these impacts may be direct or indirect and 
positive or negative as suggested by Quarantelli (2006). 
 
Figure 2.5 – Process of disaster repercussion with multiple impacts  
Source: Gordon (2004 p.131)  
Direct impacts of disasters include death and injuries (physical, traumas or illness) 
to the human population; and or the destruction (in part or whole) of the physical 
environment, infrastructures, lifelines and services; or farmlands etc. In all of the 
cases the normal functioning of the affected community is impaired at the initial 
impact. Subsequently other indirect impacts may be experienced such as those on 
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the environment, political system, social structure, the economy and other 
developmental programmes. The magnitude of the effects of the triggering agents 
on a community is largely dependent on activities undertaken before, during and 
after the hazard event (Becker et al., 2008; McEntire, 2001). These are the realms 
of opportunities where good national recovery policies underpinned by legislation 
could play pivotal roles. Prior to any disaster or catastrophe, hazard mitigation 
practices and emergency preparedness activities could help to reduce the adverse 
effects of hazards; while after the event the effectiveness and efficiency of 
response and recovery programmes that are implemented (coupled with 
community recovery resources and any extra-community assistance); will 
determine how quickly normalcy is restored into the affected community (Lindell 
& Prater, 2003; Natural Hazards Centre, 2001).  
Several factors contribute to the magnitude of destruction caused by different 
disasters. Some of these are described in line with Singh’s (2007) research study 
below: 
a) The size and situation of an economy before the event. For example, under-
developed economies have more potential to suffer greater damages from 
disasters. (Benson & Clay, 2003; Pelling, 2003); 
b) The structure of production or the nature and scale of the phenomenon (the 
triggering agent). Different types of disasters produce different impacts 
(Hoyois et al., 2007); 
c) The moment (time and duration) at which the disaster takes place. The low 
level of damages recorded during the 2007 Gisborne earthquake in New 
Zealand, could be attributed to the fact that the quake took place after normal 
work hours; 
d) The degree of social organization and participation (Gordon, 2004). The 
fragmented nature of the social networks that existed in New Orleans 
accounted for the impact the disaster had on the populace (J. A. Barnshaw, 
2006); 
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e) Political and institutional capacity; and  
f) The manner in which the affected government, the wider society and the 
international community respond to the disaster.  
Part of the ripple effects generated by a disaster may include the disruption of 
ongoing developmental initiatives within a community (Lindell & Prater, 2003). 
There is a cause-effect relationship between disasters and development. 
Developmental initiatives may be impacted through: the shortening of the life of 
development investments because of loss of resource inputs and or diversion of 
available resources into unplanned disaster management programmes; general 
disincentives to invest further; unemployment and loss of income; and political 
instability (Asgary, Badri, Rafieian, & Hajinejad, 2006; Lindell & Prater, 2003). 
Disasters significantly impact communities’ social structures and systems, either 
in the short-term or over a relatively longer time frame. This often manifests as 
unique social problems (Drabek & McEntire, 2003). Lindell and Prater (2003) 
have expressed social impacts in the form of psychosocial, socio-demographic, 
socio-economic and socio-political impacts. These distort existing social bonds 
within a system thus individual and group roles may become discarded in favour 
of improvised responses to the immediate disaster threat (Gordon, 2004). Dalziell 
& McManus (2004) suggest similar de-bonding of group systems within business 
organisations. 
Two patterns of responses may be exhibited by individuals and groups after a 
disaster; these are emotion-focused coping or problem-focused coping responses 
(Lindell & Prater, 2003). The former response pattern causes emotional and 
behavioural situations like fatigue, depression, anxiety, nightmare etc, which 
could continue over a longer-term; while the problem-focused coping responses 
positively gear individuals or groups to address the disaster event. The latter 
response pattern explains why individuals or groups demonstrate altruism and 
cooperation in order to organise rescue operations and to seek a restoration to pre-
disaster normalcy (Drabek, 1986). According to Mileti (1999) this response 
pattern sees victims becoming rescuers, bursting into action, usually in a 
controlled and rational manner, providing or seeking help with some skill, 
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competence and effectiveness. In the same vein, Auf De Heide (1989) opined that 
altruism is exhibited when different organisations begin to share tasks and 
resources across jurisdictional boundaries, oftentimes without any form of 
standardisation. Altruism is individuals’ and groups’ innate strategy for surviving 
a hazard. According to Gordon (2004) every system requires systematically 
organised bonds and relationships to function effectively, therefore in spite of an 
initial de-bonding caused by a hazard, a need to re-bond is eventually evoked. 
Damages caused by disasters ultimately result in economic losses (whether direct 
or indirect). Natural disasters in themselves are a reflection of negative economic 
impacts they have on the society and its other productive assets (Andersen, 2003). 
The economic losses from a disaster are exacerbated by a combination of the 
increase in the frequency of natural and man-made hazards and of inherent 
vulnerabilities that are previously described in this chapter. 
In conclusion, disaster impacts are varied but could be summed up to include 
physical, socio-cultural, economic and psychological aspects. It is important that 
any recovery management activity that is implemented by coordinating agencies 
take a holistic approach that will cater for all of the different impacts 
aforementioned.   
2.4 Disaster Response, Recovery and Reconstruction  
The occurrence of a disaster elicits response at different levels within a 
community (or a system). Individuals or groups (whether directly affected or not); 
organisations and businesses; responding agencies and external aid agencies; and 
in fact every facet of the community will be expected to play a role in alleviating 
the impacts of the disaster event. The following sections describe the nature of 
response, recovery and reconstruction at post-impact, within the context of the 
current research study. 
2.4.1 Disaster Response 
Response is what takes place at the immediate post-disaster impact and is 
generally in line with seminal studies reported by Haas, Kates and Bowden (1977) 
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on the entire recovery timeframe. Response is a transition phase towards more 
sustained recovery activities that will return the affected community to situations 
of normalcy. Response is considered the first phase of a series of four overlapping 
sequence of post-disaster recovery activities (Kates & Pijawka, 1977; Sullivan, 
2003; Vale & Campanella, 2005) as indicated in figure 2.6 below. Each 
succeeding phase takes approximately ten times longer than the preceding phase; 
but a simultaneous programme of activities could shorten the entire recovery 
timeframe (Sullivan, 2003). The response phase corresponds to the emergency or 
crises period when normal, social and economic activities either cease or are 
drastically affected. It is more often characterised by chaos and disorganised 
response. The end state of response is when no more search and rescue operation 
and all safety evacuations are completed (as indicated in figure 2.6). 
Usually, the focus of responding agencies at this post-disaster stage will be on 
mitigating the effects of the disaster on the human population and the provision of 
suitable shelter after the devastation. Responding agencies go through four sub-
phases of response as suggested by Harrald (2006) These are ‘storming/forming’, 
‘norming’, ‘performing’ and ‘transition’ phases shown in figure 2.7. This 
response pattern is similar to individual or group/community reactions described 
by Drabek (1986); or response of social systems suggested by Gordon (2004). 
Response is initially altruistic and disorganised but over time becomes more 
orderly. Response is mostly activity-focused involving all-of-community action 
towards assisting the affected.  
Initial disaster response takes the form of ‘storming’ the place of impact (ground 
zero) with all the resources available, while other external resources are being 
mobilised (Harrald, 2006). This initial phase is often characterised by chaos, but 
the ability to transcend this sub-phase depends to a great extent on pre-planned 
response arrangements. Harrald suggest three other phases that follow the initial 
chaotic response phase.  
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Figure 2.6 - Sequence of post-disaster activities  
 Source: Vale & Campanella (2005)  
The second phase sees a normalised form of response programme, which may be 
taken over (especially in significant events) by larger organisational arrangements 
capable of identifying response needs and providing services that are beyond the 
capability and capacity of the first responders. If mobilization and integration are 
successful, a ‘performing’ or production phase is reached where larger response 
organisation becomes fully operational and their activities become routinised. At 
this fourth and final phase of response, the external presence in disasters becomes 
diminished during a demobilization and transition to recovery stage. Harrald 
suggests however that significantly large external recovery organisation may 
remain for an extended period of time in extreme disaster events. 
From the foregoing it is clear that pre-planning activities are central to disaster 
response. This will determine how long the initial response will take before the 
final transition to the disaster recovery stage. The following factors (Harrald, 
2006) are critical to the success of disaster response initiatives at the response 
phase.  
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Figure 2.7 – Stages in organisational disaster response  
Adapted from Harrald (2006) 
• The availability of resources that will guarantee initial life and safety 
responses. 
• Accurate assessment of needs for people, funds, and equipment so that 
resource mobilisation is enhanced.  
• Effective gathering of situation awareness information and sharing these 
across disaster organisational networks that may be involved in coordination 
and response to the hazard event; and  
• Prior planning of organisational structures and processes to guarantee resource 
mobilisation.  
The latter factor especially reinforces the case for advance preparation for disaster 
events and of the cardinal responsibilities of any coordinating unit/organisation. 
Therefore, setting up of a responding agency for coordinating emergency 
activities is a first step. Preparing the agency and whole-of-community for 
adequate disaster response through training, educational and public awareness 
campaigns; scenario planning and disaster exercises is another veritable pre-
planning tool (Comerio, 2004).  
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Delayed response to disasters need to be avoided as this may result in emotional 
problems such as anger, resentment and bitterness when it becomes apparent that 
responding agencies are unable to meet the needs of the affected (Scurfield, 
2006). Delayed response can be avoided by creating an enabling environment for 
all response activities to be effectively performed.  
This is the perspective view of the current study, which believes that underpinning 
response and recovery policies with robust legislative and regulatory frameworks 
would help address post-disaster needs. There is no gainsaying the benefits of 
planning ahead for a good disaster response. To fail to plan is to plan to fail at this 
most critical phase of a disaster event. The response phase is the time in the entire 
disaster recovery phase that gauges prior planning arrangements in relation to 
their adequacy. The response phase also presents the most opportunistic time to 
plan for the implementation of subsequent recovery activities.  
2.4.2 Disaster Recovery  
Recovery is a term that has been used interchangeably with reconstruction, 
restoration, rehabilitation and restitution (Quarantelli, 2006). Its description 
depends on the context within which it is defined. Rolfe and Britton (1995) 
describe recovery as a time for repair and reconstruction of the physical 
infrastructure damaged after a disaster and as a healing process for communities 
and their residents.  
Similarly Mitchell (2006) describes recovery as the process whereby a stricken 
community binds up its wounds, reasserts order, and acquires or reacquires 
preoccupations. In these contexts, recovery is synonymous with both 
reconstruction i.e. the post-impact rebuilding of physical structures; and 
psychosocial recovery (recuperation from emotional, health problems that deal 
with the well-being of individuals and the affected community).  
Aysan and Davis (1993) see recovery as that period following the emergency 
phase, when actions are taken to enable victims to resume their normal lives and 
means of livelihood, and to restore infrastructure, services and the economy in a 
manner appropriate to long-term needs and defined development objectives. 
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These definitions denote that recovery is all encompassing of rehabilitation, 
reconstruction, restoration, restitution and reinstatements with the objective of 
bringing the affected community back to either pre-disaster or improved levels of 
functioning. Recovery builds on the initial response after a disaster event. 
Putting the above into perspective, the working definition adopted throughout the 
study is that of recovery ‘as the totality of activities; carried out at the post-impact 
stage at some point after the initial crisis time period of disasters; to progressively 
reinstate damages made to every facet of a community’s  environment’. It is an 
incremental process that terminates when the community’s capacity for self-help 
has been restored. Sullivan (2003) explains that recovery activities come to an end 
when an assisted community reaches levels of functioning where it can sustain 
itself without further external interventions.  
Recovery involves a series of complex social and developmental procedures that 
are achievable through a high degree of self-determination (Emergency 
Management Australia, 2004). The set of procedures involved are multi-faceted 
but require holistic approaches which have to be sustained over a spate of time (B. 
D. Phillips, 2004). Every post-disaster recovery programme should aim at 
returning every facet of an affected community and the elements of its 
environment, as early as possible to original levels (status quo); or to a time 
accelerated and performance improved situation. These conditions are depicted in 
figure 2.8 as case A and B with the graphs equating to or above initial 
performance levels respectively. It is quite possible also (in the worst case 
scenario) that an affected community, group or individuals may never recover 
from the event to the extent that final performance levels generally fall below pre-
disaster states (as depicted in case C). In any case, communities rarely return to 
their pre-disaster states (Angus, 2004), but the desire is for such communities to 
incorporate at least all the essentials of satisfactory living hitherto experienced 
with at least some level of improvement.  
Olshansky (2005) explains that the key success parameters for every recovery 
effort are speed and quality. The earlier situations can return to normalcy the 
better for overall recovery. In terms of quality of recovery, Mitchell (2004) 
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suggest that recovery be increasingly focussed towards a designed future rather 
than a recovered past. Hence recovery should present opportunities for improving 
on pre-disaster performance levels of communities. 
Hazard mitigation and risk reduction strategies are able to be integrated into 
recovery decision making process so that the communities’ adaptive capacity is 
improved and they become more resilient to future disasters (Brennan, 2003; 
Ingram, Franco, Rio, & Khazai, 2006). It may be possible for other developmental 
and growth goals that may have been missed as a result of the disaster event, to be 
recaptured as future developmental initiatives during recovery (Bolin & Stanford, 
1998).  
 
Figure 2.8 – Schematic of recovery  
Source: Miles & Chang (2006) 
There is therefore a two way relation between pre and post-disaster activities. For 
example an effective recovery process affects future planning activities and in 
turn is affected by prior plans and contingency provisions. This complex 
interrelationship is depicted as a web of activities on a more integrative variant of 
the recovery process in figure 2.9 (referred to as the Charlottes’ Doughnut). The 
doughnut shows that recovery activities and considerations do not actually 
commence after disasters but before. This view is also expressed by Rubin, 
Saperstein, & Barbee (1985) who take the view that recovery activities are a series 
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of illogical sequences. In a similar vein, Schwab, Topping, Eadie, Deyle, and 
Smith (1998) and Sullivan, (2003) submit that the recovery model developed from  
Haas, Kates, and Bowden seminal study are an approximation of the reality. 
Sullivan (2003) explains that post-disaster activities do not take place in a 
sequential order but in concert, in a certain continuum that incorporates the 
broader emergency management elements of prevention, preparedness and 
response to emergencies and disaster events. These elements are interwoven as a 
network of activities as depicted on the Charlottes’ diagram. Preventative and 
preparedness activities play significant roles in the entire recovery process and 
vice versa. This explains why communities with prior plans in place are able to 
recover faster than those without any form of plan.  
 
Figure 2.9 – Charlottes Doughnut 
Source: Sullivan (2003) 
According to Davies (2006) recovery should portend an experiential learning cycle 
so that the experiences gained during the period are analysed and become action 
plans for future recovery programmes. To be successful on post-disaster recovery 
programmes, certain principles need to be followed. Sullivan (2003) suggests some 
of the following principles: 
 
 
 37 
2.4.2.1 The fundamentals of a recovery process  
a) Consultation and communication are central to the success of recovery 
activities. Stakeholders need to be included in every decision that is made so 
that both understanding and commitment is guaranteed. Sullivan refers to a 
community-centric approach vital to all planning and management 
arrangements for recovery. Such an approach (community-centric approach) 
enables collective decision making (Rubin et al., 1985) and mutually 
supportive partnership among disaster stakeholders (Mitchell, 2006). 
Consultation and communication are important recovery policy initiatives.  
b) An entire recovery process must be enabling and supportive, designed to 
assist the affected community to attain an appropriate level of 
functioning/performance (Lizarralde, 2004; Sullivan, 2003).  
c) The recovery process must be flexible and amenable to changes. This is 
easily facilitated through integration and information exchange among all 
stakeholders to the process.  
d) Recovery begins at impact but a comprehensive consideration of recovery 
management needs to be cultivated well before an event actually occurs. 
e) Recovery needs to be supported by training programmes and scenario 
exercises to ensure that personnel/agencies are adequately prepared to 
perform their roles. 
f) Finally the recovery process has to be comprehensive, integrated, timely, 
equitable, fair and flexible.  There has to be a link between a recovery plan 
and actual delivery. 
The complexity of relationships or interdependences between what happens 
before and after a disaster are recognized by the current study. The study 
anticipates that the learning oriented evaluations that will be undertaken of past 
disaster recovery/reconstruction arrangements would yield useful insights for 
future planning activities in New Zealand. This is one of the objectives of the 
research study. 
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2.4.3  The Disaster Reconstruction Process 
Reconstruction is a subset of recovery and according to Quarantelli (2006) it refers 
to the post impact rebuilding of the physical structures destroyed or damaged in a 
disaster. Disaster reconstruction passes through five key stages/processes as is 
conceptualised by Brunsdon and Smith (2004). The following paragraphs are 
loosely based on their reconstruction process model which is presented as figure 
2.10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10 – The Post-Disaster Reconstruction Process 
 Source: Brunsdon & Smith (2004)  
a) Impact Assessment - The first set of activities usually undertaken towards the 
reconstruction of damaged facilities is the assessment of damages and impact. 
This begins after the initial emergency/crises phase (when search and rescue 
operations and evacuation operations have been completed). At this stage 
information is collated on the magnitude of the disaster event on individuals, 
community(s) and the physical environment. The planning of all recovery 
operations also commences. The result of the impact assessment exercise 
becomes the basis for future reconstruction works. This exercise lends itself to 
reviews and updating to take account of new information at later stages. Every 
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stakeholder in the reconstruction process is enlisted so that a comprehensive 
Needs Assessment report is prepared through inspection and survey of the 
damage. The success of this exercise is greatly enhanced by information 
gathering, collation and dissemination approaches; coupled with the level of 
interaction and planning arrangements that exist between the different disaster 
stakeholders.  
b) Restoration proposal - After the initial needs assessment exercise, decisions 
have to be taken on whether to repair, replace or demolish affected properties. 
Subsisting development regulations will determine what needs to be done in 
regard to repairing, replacing or demolishing affected properties. Restoration 
Proposals give an outline of the anticipated reconstruction needs. They are 
usually submitted to finance institutions as one of the requirements for funding; 
and to physical development control departments to meet compliance 
requirements.  
c) Funding – Reconstruction funds may be raised privately; through Insurance 
companies; and from external donor agencies or charities. In New Zealand for 
example, residential property owners are insured by the Earthquake 
Commission (EQC), which is the primary provider of natural disaster 
insurance. The EQC insurance covers damages caused by earthquake, natural 
landslips, volcanic eruption, hydrothermal activity, and tsunami. The outcome 
of funding and other statutory compliance applications may necessitate 
adjustments to initial restoration plans, hence the feedback arrows shown on 
the diagram. Some other factors apart from economic considerations may 
impact on restoration programmes. These may include structural integrity, 
safety, and functional/historical/cultural significance of the property to the 
owner. 
d) Statutory Compliance - When funding arrangements are ongoing or concluded, 
the next stage in the reconstruction process involves the application for 
resource consents and building approvals. This phase in the reconstruction 
process is usually painstaking for both the party(s) seeking approvals and the 
approving authorities. Approving authorities need to ensure that performance 
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quality and safety provisions are not compromised. It is necessary to ensure 
that a considerable level of resilience is incorporated in all post-disaster 
development proposals. New knowledge gained from disaster events should 
facilitate the adjustment of subsisting design concepts so as to mitigate future 
disaster risk.  
Statutory application and documentation procedures have been known to slow 
down reconstruction programmes (Burby et al., 2006). The entire process is 
worsened by the absence of skilled designers and processing officials. 
According to AELG (2005) resource unavailability is likely to affect New 
Zealand’s reconstruction capacity in the event of a large-scale destruction of 
physical infrastructure.  
Thus the period when statutory compliances/consents are pursued is usually 
characterised by disillusionment of affected individuals and the community. 
This is because of delays/failures in planning and other inefficient support 
systems which may ultimately result in unfulfilled hopes (Lotke & Borosage, 
2006; Scurfield, 2006).   
e) Reconstruction - The final phase is the actual implementation of the 
reconstruction works. This is the reinstatement and regeneration stage in the 
entire recovery programme where conscious efforts are made to reinstate the 
built environment and other facets (natural, social and economic environments) 
to normalcy.  
The time period for complete reconstruction is relatively indefinite. It could last 
months, years, decades after the disaster event. It is quite possible also that the 
community or individuals may never recover from the event or that performance 
levels after recovery may exceed pre-disaster levels (as depicted previously in see 
figure 2.7). What is certain however is that with the right organisational 
arrangements some semblance of early recovery could be attained. The sooner this 
is achieved, the better for overall recovery. Suffice to mention that the 
reconstruction process may not be as straightforward as those presented above, 
and certainly the logistics of implementation results in many complex dilemmas.  
In the words of Davies’ (2006):  
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…many [disaster dilemmas] concern the relentless pressure for rapid 
recovery from all quarters which is set against the normal demands for 
prudent planning, detailed consultation, reviews of safety requirements etc. 
There is also the demand for reform to be balanced with another pressure for 
realism or a return to pre-disaster norms. In facing most dilemmas both 
issues are needed and need to be balanced and integrated into a unified 
policy and in many cases the resolution of such dilemmas may be addressed 
through parallel initiatives using ‘action-planning’ approaches (p. 18). 
These dilemmatic reconstruction decisions are social, physical and political in 
nature. They result in conflicts between implementing a speedy recovery and the 
needs for safety or quality (which reduces initial vulnerabilities); or even speed 
versus wider community participation in decision making. These are the 
complexities associated with disaster reconstruction and recovery. Ingram et al. 
(2006) conclude that relief and short-term recovery efforts can be urgent and 
rapid; but longer term recovery would have to be cautiously implemented. Long 
term recovery programmes have to be based upon comprehensive assessments of 
risk and vulnerabilities; and balanced with overall recovery needs. At the center of 
all recovery decisions are the stakeholders whose recovery needs have to be 
continuously recognized throughout the process. Wider consultations with disaster 
management agencies on recovery decisions (directions) cannot be overstated. 
Political dilemmas are traceable to faulty decision making and implementation 
strategies by policy makers. Burby (2006) presents two disaster paradoxes to 
explain national or local governments’ complacencies in throughput 
reconstruction programmes. The first is the safe development paradox where 
governments choose a cautious approach to nationally-driven (re)development 
programmes. Such safe policies could fail to reduce the potential for future 
catastrophic destructions and economic losses from disasters. The second paradox 
is the local government paradox which occurs at the lowest level of government 
hierarchy. In both cases insufficient attention is given to policies that will limit 
vulnerabilities. Public policy decisions on disaster management at all levels of 
governance can be short sighted, by adopting quick-fix solutions that may not 
stand the test of time. Burby’s paradoxes were evident in the New Orleans disaster 
of 2005. There was both a lack of foresight on the consequences of a break in the 
levee system and also of policy for response and recovery from the event. Clearly 
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hasty reconstruction programmes have longer-term impacts that may be difficult 
to undo and could generate further increase in disaster vulnerabilities (Ingram et 
al., 2006). Reconstruction decisions should therefore be a trade-off between 
idealistic goals and expediency. Post-disaster reconstruction decisions should result 
from well articulated, coordinated and implemented policies which is the subject 
covered in the next section.  
2.5 The Primacy of a Coordinated Post-Disaster Reconstruction  
Earlier the study reviewed the dilemmatic problems associated with post disaster 
management giving reasons for the importance of coordinating reconstruction 
activities to achieve desired objectives. Post disaster reconstruction decisions can 
have either good or bad consequences  but a lot depends on how activities are 
planned and implemented (Weichselgartner, 2001). The cause-effect relationship 
between pre and post-disaster activities (decisions) cannot be overstated. The 
Charlottes’ diagram presented previously (see figure 2.8) demonstrates the 
complex web of disaster activities that will have to be coordinated to achieve 
useful objectives. Chief amongst post disaster management objectives is to enable 
a community to recover from the event whilst also future-proofing the community 
and its physical facilities against similar disaster events. This increases its 
resilience, reduces vulnerability and ultimately prevent a secondary post disaster 
tragedy (Brewster, 2005). 
In the pursuit of reconstruction objectives, it is not unusual for conflicts (resulting 
from conflicting priorities for example) and discord to ensue between affected 
groups, government, and recovery providers during the recovery spectrum 
(Drabek, 1986). Such a situation affects morale and people become susceptible to 
depression, despondency and emotional exhaustion. Gordon (2004) suggests that 
the situation leads to misunderstanding and alienation at all levels of a 
community’s social fabric. A number of factors may account for discords amongst 
stakeholders during reconstruction and recovery. Auf De Heide (1989) gives three 
of these factors to include: 
a) scarcity of information and or breakdown in communication among recovery 
stakeholders; 
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b) challenges posed by the management of limited recovery resources; and 
c) excessive response and recovery provisions by external aid agencies and 
outsiders. As they say too many cooks spoil the broth. 
Schneider (1992) suggest that stakeholder conflicts may also result from the 
emergence of new social norms after a disaster event which may not mesh well 
with traditional norms. From an individual or group perspective, stakeholders then 
struggle to re-establish or maintain their previously recognised roles, 
responsibilities and boundaries during the recovery phase. So that new groups that 
emerge after a disaster event may have difficulty working together with already 
established ones (Quarantelli, 2006).  
Whatever are the reasons for discord, the issues have to be properly managed 
otherwise they could have lasting effects on individuals and the community at 
large. Typically the effects may be long-term chronic social and psychological 
effects (manifested through cognitive, behavioural and adaptive responses); or be 
short-term in the form of restiveness and in-cohesiveness in community 
partnerships. Picou, Marshall, and Gill (2004) study suggest that the scale of 
litigations among stakeholders during the implementation of reconstruction 
programmes could become very extensive because of disaffection with the 
recovery process (and when recovery needs are unmet).  
Reconstruction and recovery as a whole would therefore gain immeasurably from 
being implemented as a fully integrated process. Vulnerable individuals and 
groups need to be prepared for imminent post-disaster complexities through both 
pre and post-event arrangements. The approaches have to be conscious; 
concerted; strategic (Lizarralde, 2004; S. K. Schneider, 1995) and sustainable 
(Monday, 2002; Ye, 2004) enough to accelerate the process of reinstating the 
disaster-affected communities. An all-hands-on deck approach cannot be 
overstated to stem the disaster from overwhelming recovery capacities. 
The position taken by the current study (and which is reinforced throughout) is 
that the rational starting point should be the implementation of robust recovery 
and reconstruction framework that is underpinned by enabling legislation. The 
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formation and implementation of viable regulatory framework will help guide the 
interaction and interrelationship of all recovery stakeholders and will be a vital tool 
for coordinating future post-disaster reconstruction activities (Parker, 1992; Spence, 
2004). Consideration would need to be given to special powers, rights or 
responsibilities of all disaster stakeholders. These rights and responsibilities have 
to be well defined, during the implementation of disaster management policies 
and programmes.  
Legislation provides the legal sanction on disaster policies and action plans 
(ACTIONAID Nepal, 2004) especially as they will need to be integrated with 
other national or local development planning policies by respective government 
hierarchies. New Zealand could benefit from a thorough review of its legislation 
and regulatory arrangements in advance of a significant disaster event. Pre-
planning the implementation of enabling recovery-related legislation and 
regulatory provisions should therefore facilitate the achievement of its disaster 
management goals and objectives. In conclusion, Schwab et al. (1998) provides 
useful arguments to support the need for pre-planning for recovery. These include: 
• Prior plans reduce the chances for making short term decisions that could limit 
future options. ‘A plan can identify options and define priorities ahead of  
time, ensuring that the first decisions following the disaster represent the 
community’s long-term wishes’ (Olshansky, 2005 p. 8). 
• Plans prevent public officials from making ‘pressure of the moment’ decisions 
that could result in failed opportunities to achieve improved community 
recovery. 
• The pre-planning process itself is a valuable tool for building consensus 
around a vision before a disaster. In this way all stakeholders have common 
objectives and shared commitments towards previously determined rebuilding 
decisions.  
• Plans position a community to access post-disaster funding because the 
planning process provides officials opportunities to examine a wide range of 
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funding options and to decide on the best way to source and apply for funding 
before a disaster event.       
2.6 Civil Defence and Emergency Coordination in New Zealand 
In this section the emergency management framework of New Zealand is 
discussed. The section traces its evolution from a response-oriented system to its 
current pro-active system of emergency management. All emergency management 
activities are largely coordinated by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (MCDEM) in New Zealand. The Ministry’s activities are guided by 
the provisions of the CDEM Act which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
three. However the development of CDEM activities could be traced back to the 
first introduction of an Emergency Precautions Scheme (EPS) in 1939 (Lee, 
1990). The focus at inception was to protect the public in the event of war and 
hostilities but this has been progressively developed to an all-hazards coordinating 
role. Table 2.1 summarises the developmental milestones of New Zealand’s 
CDEM up to its current form.  
Current CDEM arrangements evolved from the lessons gained from significant 
world disaster phenomena. First were the disaster management experiences of the 
Northridge (California) earthquake in 1994, where the need to develop more 
effective coordination between lifeline utilities and emergency services were 
identified (Britton, 2006). Angus (2005) explains that around this period in New 
Zealand, hazard and resource management work was variable and isolated, and 
carried out at the local community levels by the various local authorities. The 
New Zealand Fire Service provided much of the manpower with the Police as the 
law and order authority. This earlier approach had significant gaps and 
deficiencies with respect to dealing with major ‘nationally significant’ disasters in 
the category of the Northridge earthquake, and needed reviewing. Secondly, other 
world disaster phenomena like the Kobe (Japan) earthquake which occurred in 
1995 triggered world-wide reaction and brought about alternative approaches to 
disaster reduction activities in vulnerable communities. Notably the ‘Yokohama 
Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World’ was developed in response to 
disasters in the magnitude of the Kobe earthquake (Angus, 2005).  
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Table 2.1 – The Development of the CDEM Act (Major Milestones).  
Source: Culled from Britton (2006) and Lee (1990)  
S/No Civil Defence Act/Legislation Year  
1 Emergency Precautions Act 
The Emergency Precautions Scheme (EPS) with focus on 
protecting the public in the event of war 
1939 
2 Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act 
The introduction of powers and functions to local governments 
to respond to both natural disasters and war-like threats. 
1953 
3 Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act  
Previous Act reviewed to reflect the possibility of direct 
attacks with nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. This led to the 
formation of a Ministry of Civil Defence in 1959 
1958 
 
4 Civil Defence Act 
Public protection against major disaster, nuclear or other 
armed attack. 
1962 
5 Civil Defence Act 
An update of the previous  
1983 
6 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 
Reviewed based on recommendations of the following reports: 
Law Commissions 1991; CAE 1991; and Civil Defence review panel 
1992. The Act takes cognisance of New Zealand’s increased 
vulnerabilities to natural disasters, public sector reforms and 
modern realities. More impetus for the review came after the 
Wellington after the Quake Conference, 1995.   
2002 
 
The ‘International Strategy for Disaster Reduction’ (ISDR) was a policy initiative 
developed afterwards to change world emphasis from reactive disaster 
management approaches to disaster reduction as an integral part of sustainable 
development (EM-DAT, 2006). Britton, (2006) explains that the launch of the 
ISDR by the United Nations (UN) in 2000 coincides with changing emphasis 
towards holistic approaches to disaster research and practice. The UN document 
suggested strategies for the implementation of cooperative arrangements between 
individual national governments and their sub-governments; and with other 
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stakeholder agencies. Significant contributions made by these declarations and 
which has impacted CDEM activities in New Zealand is that of a paradigm shift  
to the management of risks as opposed to earlier focus on the management of 
hazards alone (Coles & Buckle, 2004). Building and environmental development 
legislation in New Zealand have embedded appreciable degree of risk 
considerations along those of the management of disaster risks.  
Systematically and progressively, New Zealand’s disaster management system 
moved from conventional response-oriented system for small local emergencies to 
more pro-active multi-agency approaches across the 4Rs of reduction/mitigation, 
readiness/preparedness, response and recovery (Angus, 2005; Britton, 2006). 
Britton (2006) sums up the different approaches that several national government 
have taken since the holistic disaster concepts were developed, to include: 
• the development of public policies for the protection of lives, the economy 
and natural resources from the hazard events, 
• enhanced community and stakeholder involvements, 
• establishment of nodal agencies that are responsible for inter-institutional 
coordination and arrangements, 
• legal and regulatory provisions, and 
• overarching strategic frameworks that outline how disaster management links 
with other essential governance requirements.  
Britton (2006) goes further to outline some of the differences in attributes between 
New Zealand’s emergency management system and other countries (Japan and the 
Philippines). These differences are presented in tabular format in Table 2.2. It 
would seem from his analysis that New Zealand’s disaster management system 
has a more holistic approach and more in tune with the concepts proposed or 
recommended in world disaster strategic documents. New Zealand’s current 
disaster policy agenda therefore is to build resilience in its communities through 
their understanding of their vulnerabilities (MCDEM, 2005b). This philosophy is 
explained further in the following section.
 TABLE 2.2 – Disaster Management in Three National Systems 
Source: Adapted from Britton (Britton, 2006) 
                                     
COUNTRY                                  
ATTRIBUTES 
JAPAN 
 
NEW ZEALAND 
 
THE PHILLIPINES 
Overall Approach • Centralised/Directive 
• Fragmented 
• Reactive 
• Decentralised/Cooperative 
•  Inclusive/Nationwide      approach 
• Proactive 
• Centralised/Hierarchical 
• Fragmented 
• Reactive 
Supporting Platform Incremental “Greenfield’s Approach” to develop best fit Ad hoc 
Legislation 
Characteristics 
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act 
(1961) 
• 15 Generic Acts 
• 28 Hazard-specific Acts 
• Reactive 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
Act (2002) 
• Risk–based 
• Proactive 
• Empowering 
Presidential Decree  1566 (1978) 
• Reactive 
Disaster Management 
Approach 
• Product-focus 
• Impact-based 
• Technical research/ response 
• Process-focus 
• Consequence-based 
• Mitigation/response 
• Task-focus 
• Impact-based 
• Response-focus 
Decision-making Style • Reactive • Proactive • Static-reactive 
Level of Specificity • Hazard-specific 
• Structural mitigation dominates 
• All-hazard 
• Integrated mitigation 
• Promote risk reduction 
• Non-specific 
Focal Agency 
Attributes 
• Cabinet Office 
• Non-military Head 
• Policy-advice 
• Operational advice 
• Ministry within the Department of Internal 
Affairs 
• Non-military Head 
• Policy advice 
• Operational control 
• Warning advice responsibility 
• Department of Defence 
• Military Head 
• Operational control (OCD) 
• Policy coordination (NDCC) 
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2.6.1 New Zealand CDEM Philosophy 
As stated previously, the philosophy behind the current New Zealand CDEM 
approach is that of community engagement and increasing awareness to the 
different risks and hazards that communities may be exposed to. This community-
centric approach was depicted in figure 2.1. New Zealand expects its citizens to 
understand the hazards that they face and routinely act to reduce and avoid their 
adverse effects because they value the enduring social, economic, cultural and 
environmental benefits of doing so (Angus, 2005). This is encapsulated in the 
CDEM vision statement as ‘resilient New Zealand – communities understanding 
and managing their hazards’. There are four related goals that make up the 
national CDEM strategy as follows (MCDEM, 2005b): 
Goal 1: To increase community awareness, understanding and their participation 
in CDEM activities 
Goal 2: To reduce the risks from hazards to New Zealand 
Goal 3: To enhance New Zealand’s capability to manage emergencies, and 
Goal 4: To enhance New Zealand’s capability to recover from disasters. 
The key drivers in New Zealand’s disaster management are for an all-hazards and 
multi-agency approach which will guarantee reduction (mitigation), readiness 
(preparedness), response and recovery from any hazard event. The four key 
elements: reduction, readiness, response and recovery which are referred to as the 
4Rs are described in line with Angus (2005) below: 
a) Reduction: The identification and analyses of the long-term risks to human 
life and property by both natural and man-made hazards. Hazard reduction 
activities would include taking steps to eliminate the risks posed by the 
hazard, where practicable and where not, reduce the probability of its 
occurrence and the magnitude of its impact. 
b) Readiness: involves developing operational systems and capabilities before an 
emergency happens. Angus (2005) lists readiness activities to include self-
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help and response programmes for the general public, as well as specific 
programmes for emergency services, utilities and other agencies. 
c) Response: As previously explained response activities are actions taken at the 
immediate post-impact to save lives and property and to help communities to 
recover from a hazard event. Where there is a prior knowledge of the hazard 
occurring, response may include activities taken to prepare for response 
immediately before or during the event. 
d) Recovery: Activities beginning after initial disaster impact has been stabilised 
and extending until the community’s capacity for self-help has been restored. 
A further definition provided by the MCDEM (2005b) is that recovery 
involves the coordination of efforts and processes necessary to effect the 
immediate, medium and long-term holistic regeneration of communities after 
a disaster. 
2.6.2 New Zealand CDEM Recovery Structure  
A feature of the national recovery structure (pictorially represented in figure 2.11) 
is that all recovery activities are delivered through a continuum of central, 
regional, community and personal structures (Angus, 2004). Planning and 
coordination is achieved at all levels by the MCDEM and cluster groups of 
agencies. The lead agency at all government tiers, for operational planning is the 
MCDEM together with these cluster groups of agencies. The cluster groups 
suggested by the MCDEM include lifelines, health, research, welfare/recovery, 
agriculture and rural, emergency services etc. The goals of the clusters and related 
disaster management agencies are to (MCDEM, No date-b): 
• clarify goals, responsibilities and roles for disaster management 
• identify gaps in capabilities and capacities; and 
• address the gaps through action plans. 
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Depending on the national significance of an emergency a Domestic and External 
Security Committee (DES) and or an Officials Domestic and External Security 
Coordination (ODESC) group (see figure 2.11) may be set up for a whole of 
government response and to provide strategic oversight. The structure provides 
for the formation of parallel task groups at each level of government (local, 
regional and national) in line with the four environments that recovery activities 
have to cater for i.e. the social, built, economic and natural environments. The 
generic structure may be expanded through the creation of subtask groups 
corresponding to the magnitude or geographical spread of a disaster event.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11 – Generic national recovery management structure 
Source: MCDEM (2005c) 
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The structure allows for the appointment of a Recovery Coordinator to act as a 
liaison between all the hierarchical levels involved in the recovery efforts, in case 
CDEM groups are unable to perform recovery functions because of the scale of a 
disaster.  
The disaster management system in New Zealand is devolved and decentralised 
so that initial response and subsequent recovery initiatives are based at the local 
levels. This system of disaster management responsibilities takes the view that 
communities are the ones affected and should act reasonably because they value 
the enduring social, economic, cultural and environmental benefits of tackling any 
hazard event (Angus, 2005). Higher level of involvement is activated when a 
disaster event is beyond local response capacities. An indication of the levels of 
response to different scale of events is presented in Appendix A1 (This in line 
with those suggested by the CDEM group plans). Essentially the chart explains 
how higher levels of response are being activated from single level local response 
(Level 1) to a multi-agency state or national response (Level 5) corresponding to 
the magnitude of a disaster event.  
A unique aspect of the New Zealand CDEM structure is that it does not provide 
for a specific stand-alone organisation to manage its disasters. It behoves disaster 
stakeholders to plan together on how they will coordinate a multi-agency 
approach that will be successful, in addition to their traditional activities. Typical 
reconstruction stakeholders include: 
• Asset owners (may be private or public and the business community); 
• Lifeline agencies (i.e. transportation, utilities, telecommunication etc.); 
• Civil defence and emergency management groups (national, territorial, and 
local government departments, police. Fire brigade, relief and welfare 
agencies, health and safety personnel etc.); 
• Insurance companies; 
• Non-governmental agencies (charities, funding organisations etc.); 
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• Construction and reinstatement organisations. 
There has to be a robust regulatory framework that will promote interactions and 
foster mutual relationships amongst these stakeholders. Without such a 
framework, the disaster stakeholders may have difficulty in working together 
(Quarantelli, 2006). Rolfe and Britton (1995) have suggested that the management 
of recovery may become competitive between central, regional and local levels of 
government for control of the process. Among other considerations for a viable 
framework, is an understanding that stakeholders’ priorities are bound to differ 
while they struggle to re-establish or maintain their recognised roles, 
responsibilities and boundaries after a disaster event.  
The regulatory provisions that will be suggested by the current study would take 
cognisance of these issues and seek means of promoting stakeholder interactions 
in the best possible manner. It is hoped that the framework will provide an 
enabling structure for reconstruction to progress irrespective of the magnitude of 
the event. An important perspective from which the current study looks at 
legislation and regulatory provisions is that of the individual house owners. 
Individual house owners would have to rebuild their damaged properties on their 
own. It is unlikely that government will be directly involved in the rebuilding 
process beyond providing insurance funds through the Earthquake Commission 
(EQC) in the event of a naturally occurring disaster. The study believes that 
building and statutory requirements must facilitate the reconstruction process for 
this category of owners too. There has to be a trade off between a strict regime of 
compliances and the consequences in terms of delayed recovery. Regulations are 
desirable (necessary evils) during normal times but may become unbearable 
burdens during rebuilding programmes for this category of owners. Whilst not 
recommending outright deregulation of the reconstruction process, the study 
believes some degree of flexibility or perhaps pragmatism will benefit recovery 
(particularly for individual house owner reconstruction efforts). 
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2.7 Concluding Statements  
The chapter has presented some key concepts surrounding disaster management 
literature especially as they relate to the current study. It presents the relationships 
between disasters and vulnerabilities; response and subsequent recovery. It has 
shown how vital a coordinated response and reconstruction arrangements will be to 
whole-of-community recovery. Underpinning the conceptual approaches to disaster 
management is the setting up and implementation of policies that will promote the 
interaction of the different facets of an affected community.  
The legislative and regulatory environment has a great influence on post disaster 
activities. The study’s position is that the legislative environment must be enabling, 
otherwise disaster management will pose an onerous challenge to all stakeholders. 
The CDEM framework in New Zealand has seemingly evolved to meet some of the 
complex demands associated with more significant disaster events. Its all-hazards 
approach has been commended in literature, however studies have shown that there 
is room for its improvement around the area of disaster recovery. Its disaster 
recovery framework needs to be underpinned by enabling legislation that will 
facilitate an early recovery from a significant natural disaster. Reconstruction work 
should not be hindered in any foreseeable way.  
The next chapter therefore will review existing recovery-related legislation with a 
view to identifying potential impediments to the realisation of New Zealand’s 
reconstruction objectives. It builds on the conceptual foundation that is laid by this 
chapter.   
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Chapter Three 
Legislation and Post-Disaster Reconstruction 
3.0 Introduction 
Having presented some fundamental concepts surrounding disaster management 
and given a description of the structure of civil defence and emergency 
management arrangements in New Zealand. The current chapter reviews some of 
the legal and regulatory guidelines that surround the disaster management process 
and its implementation. These are the Civil Defence Emergency Management 
(CDEM) Act 2002, Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991 and the Building Act 
(BA) 2004 Particular emphasis is given to post-disaster reconstruction in New 
Zealand and a presentation of the constraints that may be posed by existing 
legislative and regulatory arrangements to the realisation of recovery and 
reconstruction objectives. Information used for this chapter was pooled from 
government documents, official reports of past recovery and reconstruction 
programmes, and other useful academic articles. Essentially the chapter focuses 
on the first and second research objectives that were outlined in section 1.3 of 
chapter one. 
There are other pieces of legislation that could influence recovery and the re-
development of the built environment, apart from the three mentioned above, but 
only casual references are made to them within these chapter. Some of the 
relevant New Zealand legislation includes: District and Local Council Plans; 
Local Government Act (2002); Earthquake Commission Act (1993); Housing 
Improvement Regulations (1947); Historic Places Act (1993); Soil Conservation 
and Rivers Control Act (1941).  
3.1 Legislative and Regulatory Considerations Post Disaster 
As highlighted in chapter two, legislation and regulatory requirements can have 
significant influence on the rate of recovery after a disaster event. It was made 
clear that the legislative and regulatory environment would have to be managed, 
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paying particular attention to changes that would need to be put in place 
beforehand to assist post-disaster reconstruction efforts. The overall desire is for 
legislation to enhance the recovery and reconstruction process so that it (presents 
opportunities) improves the functioning of an affected community and risks from 
future events can be reduced while the community becomes more resilient. 
Resilience in the context of the current study allows the community to be able to 
mitigate future disasters and recover rapidly.  
Opportunities for increased resiliency do not remain for long after disasters 
(Cousins, 2004). The desire to return to normalcy builds quickly after disasters, 
and with a good flow of external resources, the opportunities to introduce 
mitigating measures become limited over time (Berke & Campanella, 2006). 
Menoni (2001 p.105) notes that, “market forces put pressures to reconstruct as 
quickly as possible transportation networks to long distances and commercial and 
office buildings, hampering efforts to implement lessons learnt from the disaster 
in the attempt to reduce pre-earthquake vulnerability”. Speed of reconstruction is 
important, otherwise victims might begin to rebuild on their own ways and at 
locations that controlling agencies are unable to prevent (Olshansky, 2005).   
Pressures to rebuild key lifelines quickly are borne by national and local 
administration with the implication of reduced quality of delivery. This approach 
has led to even more disasters and the increased vulnerability of a poorly planned 
and designed built environment to future disasters (Jigyasu, 2004; Shaw et al., 
2003). For example buildings reconstructed in the same vulnerable locations 
create increased and additional risks (Wamsler, 2004). The clamour to rebuild 
quickly also amplifies the social, economic and environmental weaknesses that 
result in large-scale disasters (Ingram et al., 2006). Extra quality and embedded 
forethought can help reconstructed built assets and community to be more 
resilient, but there is inevitably a trade-off between time, cost and quality, which 
recovering communities have to make (Olshansky, 2005).  
In New Zealand there is an apparent emphasis on readiness and response 
activities, with little consideration given to planning for sustained recovery 
activities (Angus, 2005). Where recovery is considered, it seems to be for the 
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short term, as may be evident in emergency awareness campaigns that encourage 
communities to prepare for up to three days or more after an event (MCDEM). 
This demonstrates short-termism in planning for sustained disaster response and 
recovery. Recent emergency events clearly show that longer-term recovery plans 
would be required beyond seven days for the complexities associated with the 
rebuilding of damaged built assets. Routine construction processes have been 
observed to be modified on an ad hoc basis during the recovery phases in previous 
hazard events in New Zealand (Becker & Saunders, 2007; Le Masurier, Rotimi, & 
Wilkinson, 2006). Whilst such an approach can work reasonably well for small-
scale emergencies, the effectiveness of reconstruction could be improved by 
modifying the recovery framework in advance of a disaster. Feast (1995) noted 
during the ‘Wellington after the Quake’ conference, that some form of review of 
New Zealand legislation was needed so that it could cope with the challenges that 
may be posed by significant disaster events.  
Though significant progress has been made in reviewing disaster-related 
legislation (notably the development of the CDEM Act 2002 and amendments to 
building and development control legislation), there remain opportunities for 
improvement (J. O. B. Rotimi et al., 2006). Within the context of past experiences 
in New Zealand, there is an imperative to have revised systems in place before a 
larger scale disaster occurs. Larger scale disasters present different set of 
challenges beyond which New Zealand response organizations are familiar with. 
Pre-planning for reconstruction should therefore avoid any disaster event 
becoming protracted. In the words of the Chairman of the Earthquake 
Commission, Neville Young, ‘natural disasters are by definition unpredictable and 
it is much more difficult to plan response under the stress of post-disaster trauma 
than in the calm before the storm’ (Earthquake Commission, 2005). 
The discussion in this chapter intends to flag some of the problems connected 
with the implementation of current legislation. In other words it will present the 
aspects of legislation that could pose impediments to the realisation of 
reconstruction objectives, especially when a large-scale reconstruction programme 
is being pursued. 
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3.2 Improving Recovery through Legislation 
The current study takes the position that a well articulated and implemented 
legislation, should not only provide an effective means of reducing and containing 
vulnerabilities (disaster mitigation), but also become a means of facilitating better 
thought out and designed reconstruction programmes (recovery). Legislation should 
give legal backing to disaster management policies (ACTIONAID Nepal, 2004; 
Interworks, 1998).  
It is evident that coordinating authorities in New Zealand would be unable to cope 
with a high volume of demand for their services in the event of a significant 
hazard event (Hopkins, 1995). Resource availability is an issue because there is a 
high potential for shortfalls in resources (AELG, 2005; Hopkins, 1995; Lanigan, 
1995; Page, 2004; Singh, 2007). Overall community recovery would therefore be 
exacerbated by inadequate resources with the implication of a sustained recovery 
period beyond that anticipated. Evidences from literature on the recovery from the 
Bay of Plenty storm in New Zealand in 2005 provides valuable lessons on the 
complexity of issues that could impact disaster recovery efforts. Middleton’s 
(2008) situation report of the housing situation after the flood is presented in 
Table 3.1. At 300 days after the event, 35 households still required permanent re-
housing out of a total of 300 compulsory evacuations. At the same time nine 
households were still occupying temporary accommodation. Middleton (2008) 
suggests that the situation was traceable to the inadequacy of personnel to carry 
out building safety evaluations and the mandatory requirements for processing 
building and environmental consents. Processing of consents appeared to have 
been undertaken under a business-as-usual policy prescribed by existing 
legislation (J. O. Rotimi, Wilkinson, Myburgh, & Zuo, 2008).  
It is apparent that there was a gap between the process of identifying homes that 
are suitable or unsuitable to continue to be lived in by residents on one hand; and 
of helping them to recover from a disaster so that they get back to their normal 
life, on the other hand.  
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Table 3.1 - Temporary accommodation requirements after the Bay of 
Plenty storm. Source: Middleton (2008) 
 
Period in temporary 
accommodation  
Number of households 
permanently re-housed 
Number of households in 
temporary accommodation  
Up to 60 days 0 293 
60 – 150 days 71 222 
150 – 200 days 140 82 
200 – 300 days 38 44 
Over 300 days 35 9 
 Details not available after 16th March 2006 (303 days after the event) 
To address the resource problems in a disaster situation, there have to be 
guidelines on how to access available resources either internally or externally to 
assist recovery. The questions that readily come to mind are:  
a) whose responsibility is it to commandeer the needed resources for 
reconstruction works?  
b) Would such a person/entity have the legal backing to control resources?  
c) How would externally-sourced resources be integrated with local supply? For 
example, how would external damage assessors be trained on local building and 
environment regulation; and  
d) where will the needed reconstruction funds be sourced from?  
These are pertinent issues that should be included in a recovery plan and for 
which there should be enabling legislation to ensure their implementation.  
Recently the New Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineers (NZSEE) drafted new 
guidelines on building safety evaluations during a declared state of emergency 
(New Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineers, 2009). The NZSEE’s belief is 
that rapid evaluations undertaken during the emergency declaration period could 
help to start the process of recovery. Such guidelines show the need to harness 
human resources towards a successful recovery from disasters. With such 
revisions, it is hoped that the problem of damage evaluations and assessments 
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have been adequately addressed by the document. However the document fails to 
suggest how externally sourced personnel could be integrated into the re-building 
process (New Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineers, 2009).  
After damage assessments and evaluations, building and environmental legislation 
should not present impediments to actualising reconstruction and rebuilding 
programmes. Yet several post-disaster recovery literatures have indicated that the 
implementation of certain aspects of development legislation could hinder the 
realisation of reconstruction objectives (Marano & Fraser, 2006; Meese III et al., 
2005) and drag residential rehabilitation (Burby et al., 2006) after disasters. 
Locally, strict implementation of some provisions of the Earthquake Commissions 
(EQC) Act, 1993 could prevent some property owners from getting damage 
compensation (Page, 2005). Consequently the desire to reconstruct as quickly as 
possible would be affected by the absence of funds. A key provision of the EQC 
Act prevents property owners from transferring a large identified risk onto the 
EQC for settlement (Schedule 3 s3(d) of the EQC Act). It appears that this clause 
has not been strictly applied in past disaster events, otherwise buildings with s73 
(Building Act) notices would not have qualified for compensation. The EQC is 
increasingly seen by the public as a disaster recovery mechanism rather than the 
regular insurer of properties, hence its flexible and social responsibility approach 
to compensations (Earthquake Commission, 2005). 
There have been instances where the EQC have had to assess and administer 
claims which were outside its normal covered perils (Earthquake Commission, 
2005). Clearly private residential property owners with limited insurance options 
would be more vulnerable if stricter application of the EQC provisions were 
applied. 
Reference was made in a report commissioned by the Building Research, New 
Zealand to the conflicts that may exist in the interpretation and implementation of 
the RMA and BA (MWH, 2004). Such conflicts may cause impediments to post-
disaster reconstruction processes. For example the report identified two potential 
sources of conflict from these legislative documents that may impact on 
reconstruction projects. The first type of conflict relates to the processing of 
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consents under the BA and the RMA. It is noted that both Acts are coordinated by 
different agencies, the BA by the Department of Building and Housing (DBH) 
and the RMA by the Ministry for Environment (MfE). The MWH report suggests 
that coordinating the implementation of the two documents in a disaster situation 
may result in legal complications. Both documents may need to be streamlined 
with one another to avoid legal complications. The MWH report also identified a 
potential source of conflict in the interpretation of the substantive contents of both 
Acts. Some of these conflicting issues will be discussed under each legislative 
document in the later part of this chapter.   
The current study believes that efficiency in recovery and reconstruction 
programmes can be ensured through the pursuant of viable policies and 
guidelines. These policies would need to be underpinned by supportive and 
enabling legislation to ensure their smooth implementation. As was explained in 
previous chapters, legislation drives the implementation of recovery policies. 
Legislation defines powers, rights or responsibilities and promotes the interaction 
and interrelationship of disaster management stakeholders during initial response 
and subsequent recovery activities. Every stakeholder for example, would need to 
understand their individual and collective responsibilities which have been 
prescribed in recovery plans. The apparent division between those who, in 
practice, take responsibility for reconstruction and those who set policy and 
legislation create barriers that need to be overcome.  
Such divisions were evident in two recent disaster exercises where Resilient 
Organisations team members participated as Observers. These were the Capital 
Quake Exercise carried out in November 2006 and Exercise Ruamouko in March 
2008 (Resilient Organisations, 2008).  
The debriefing reports by team members after the exercises revealed that 
coordination was lacking from responsible agencies and it was apparent that there 
was a disconnect between emergency agencies and utility providers. Coordination 
was identified at both exercises, as keystone vulnerability. Lack of coordination 
prevents responding agencies from meeting recovery objectives, which is a 
consequence of a poor recovery framework. An excerpt of the debriefing report 
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for Exercise Ruamouko is given in the text box below. The report shows the 
opinions of three observers on the interaction of the major responders during the 
disaster role play. Generally both exercises reveal that response priorities between 
different response organisations were unrelated, with performance carried out 
within organisational silos. The two reports suggested more assertive coordination 
responsibilities by emergency management departments during future response 
and recovery activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Excerpt of Debrief Report on Exercise Ruamouko ‘08 
The problems in ineffective coordination may be traced to the bureaucratic 
tendencies of public officials (S. K. Schneider, 1995). An evaluative report (S. K. 
Schneider, 2005) on governmental response to Hurricane Katrina suggests that the 
How well did players understand and proactively manage keystone vulnerabilities? 
Observer 1:  
• Badly - they did not take an active role during the exercise, were reluctant to get 
involved and were very passive. The team had a relaxed approach waiting for requests 
from Transit NZ Auckland rather than being proactive and seeking information. 
• Not very well because most involved personnel did not really understand the dimensions 
and criticality of the event (or potential event).  
• I had the perception that many were only trying to be seen to act in case there was a 
review, rather than actually take part and benefit from the exercise. 
Observer 2:  
• Communication was one of the keystone vulnerabilities. The size of email files with 
attachments caused problems due to SPAM restrictions – information sharing was 
limited. 
• Issues with Auckland City not answering the phones. 
• Organisations were waiting for information rather than proactively seeking it.  
Observer 3: 
• As for the evacuation process, only BOP [Bay of Plenty] regional council was proactively 
seeking information on estimated arrival numbers and responding by directing the 
appropriate amount of evacuees to their respective welfare centres and feeding back 
this information to the Excon team in a timely manner for evaluation and coordination. 
All of the other regions were just reacting to the injects provided, some with no direct 
feedbacks at any level   
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problems encountered during response activities in the event were the result of 
administrative elements in the emergency management system. The thesis of this 
current study is that improved legislation and regulatory framework could help to 
break down organisational silos and promote proactive approach of response 
agencies to disaster recovery.  
The pertinent question that this study desires to address in relation to legislation 
and regulation is: what aspects of legislation require review or realignment so 
that they facilitate reconstruction programmes? This question recognises the 
importance of installing and implementing flexible but robust legislative 
requirements that will not hinder the achievement of recovery objectives.  
The next section discusses existing recovery-related legislation in New Zealand. It 
is an attempt to identify the issues that may have to be taken into consideration to 
facilitate post-disaster reconstruction in New Zealand. 
3.3  A Review of Recovery-Related Legislation 
The section reviews the three legislative documents that are the focus of the 
current study. Reference is made to key clauses and sections of the documents to 
put them in the context of the current study. The objectives of this legislative 
review are to reveal their practical implications to post-disaster reconstruction 
activities and to note particular aspects of these legislative documents that may 
constitute constraints to reconstruction after a significant disaster event in New 
Zealand. A brief introduction of the Acts is presented followed by a discussion of 
their practical implications to reconstruction. The review aims to further address 
objective two of the research. 
3.3.1 The Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002 
This is the Act that provides the foundation for civil defence and emergency 
management activities in New Zealand. The main purposes for promulgating the 
CDEM Act are contained in Part 1 s3(a)-(f) and include creating awareness of 
hazards; giving directions as to the management of those hazards; and the 
coordination of emergency activities across the areas of reduction, readiness, 
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response and recovery. To guide the implementation of the Act, a number of 
supportive documents were prepared by the coordinating ministry, MCDEM. 
Some of these documents give context to disaster recovery planning and 
management such as The Guide to the National CDEM Plan 2006; Focus on 
Recovery: A holistic framework for recovery; Recovery Planning; and Recovery 
Management. A complete list of MCDEM publications is available on the 
ministry’s website. This study presented the key aspects of New Zealand’s CDEM 
framework in chapter two.  
A significant development since the promulgation of the CDEM Act has been the 
production of a National CDEM Strategic Plan and other accompanying guides 
(s39-45). It would appear from these documents that New Zealand has a 
coordinated structure for local, regional and national support for both response 
and recovery. The CDEM Plan suggested a generic national recovery structure 
which is depicted in figure 2.11 of chapter two. The CDEM Act has also 
committed local councils to produce local and regional emergency plans in 
consonance with the national plan and with the work of other cluster agencies 
(s12-22). Some of the practical implications that the current study envisages in the 
implementing of certain provisions of the CDEM Act are presented below. These 
practical problems/issues are discussed in the light of the effect they could have 
on a large scale reconstruction programme in New Zealand.  
3.3.1.1 The CDEM Act and Reconstruction  
The establishment of the CDEM Act as an overarching policy guideline for 
CDEM in New Zealand is widely acclaimed. The document provides for the 
delivery of recovery and reconstruction through a continuum of central, regional, 
community and personal structures in New Zealand (Angus, 2004). Such 
hierarchical and horizontal arrangements are necessary in post disaster 
management, but would need to be coordinated to avoid failure. There is often a 
large number of participants in every rebuilding programme resulting in 
conflicting implementation priorities. Thus a high level of integration of all 
disaster stakeholders becomes an imperative for success (Rolfe & Britton, 1995). 
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All stakeholders will need to understand their individual and collective 
responsibilities at the post-disaster reconstruction phase. Such responsibilities 
have to be clearly delineated within the hierarchical arrangements suggested by 
the MCDEM.  
From a review of related literature and commentaries on the administration of the 
CDEM Act the following salient issues/questions are worthy of consideration. 
Who should take charge of what during reconstruction?  
The Act provides for the control of emergency management operations by the 
Director of CDEM (s9). These powers are delegated through the various CDEM 
hierarchies from a National Controller to a Recovery Coordinator (Dantas, 
Seville, & Nicholson, 2006). However s9 and other associated sections only grant 
the exercise of such powers during a declared state of emergency. At the 
expiration of an emergency period, these provisions cease to apply and routine 
procedural arrangements are reverted back to. Clearly a high level of integration 
and coordination will still be required after this period, between the different 
agencies and stakeholders to the recovery process. This should be extended for a 
longer period till some semblance of pre-disaster normality is apparent. The need 
for enabling powers by CDEM officials is demonstrated during the presentation of 
recovery experiences at previous local incidents (case studies) in later part of this 
chapter. 
There are shortcomings in the definition of emergency powers contained in s86 to 
s91 of the Act. There appears not to be specific provisions on how the powers 
delegated to a National Controller could be exercised for lifeline utilities for 
example (AELG, 2005). In any case, the appointment of Recovery Coordinator is 
discretionary and limited to a maximum of 28 days unless they are reappointed 
(s29 and s30). The power to coordinate is thus limited to a declared emergency 
period or 28 days, whichever is longer.  
Harper’s (2006) review of disaster legislation provide similar conclusions on the 
limited powers of both Local and Regional councils. The report indicates that the 
 66 
duties and obligations of these governmental bodies are not clearly expressed in 
legislative documents. Thus there is no control over the relationships between 
governmental bodies and other disaster stakeholders. The implication of these 
ambiguities, on who should take charge of what during recovery activities would 
be made clearer when the local case studies are presented later in the chapter. 
However it is clear that such ambiguities can lead to lack of responsibility and 
poor commitment (everyone’s responsibility is no one’s responsibility).   
Who coordinates reconstruction? 
As expressed earlier, CDEM agencies are able to direct reconstruction activities, 
assets and services to other organisations under the CDEM Act. However from 
experience there is a preference by MCDEM to coordinate and work with lifelines 
to set priorities instead (AELG, 2005). This is because the agencies do not 
generally have the resources and skills for these tasks. For example one of the 
duties of the Residential Housing Subtask Group that could be set up for the 
purposes of recovery is to “repair, reconstruct or relocate buildings – obtain fast-
track building and other consents; ensure sufficient builders and materials for 
construction works; coordinate skilled trades and their work standards” 
(MCDEM, 2005c p.20). This description of duties does not match what the 
Residential Housing task force can take on and do not appear to concur with what 
has happened in practice (J. O. B. Rotimi et al., 2006). Local authorities have been 
responsible for the coordination of activities through their appointed Recovery 
Managers (Tonkin and Taylor, 2005). If a CDEM agency were to direct activities 
under the provisions of the CDEM Act they would become responsible for the 
oversight and management of all resources and services. It would seem that such 
overarching control is necessary. 
At the micro-levels of reconstruction following previous disaster incidents in New 
Zealand individual property owners together with insurance companies largely 
undertook the management of reconstruction works on their damaged properties, 
while the EQC provided the statutory counterpart funds. The involvement of 
private insurance companies in reconstruction activities was largely undertaken as 
a social responsibility to customers. The efficiency of this arrangement in a large-
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scale disaster cannot be guaranteed. Page (2005) suggested that bulk 
reconstruction contracts could be awarded by the EQC to relieve residential 
property owners from sourcing and managing the reconstruction process directly. 
Thus a coordinated response may be worthy of consideration. The EQC employed 
this procurement approach after the Te Anau earthquake of 2003, using a large 
single contractor to coordinate and manage the recovery works (Earthquake 
Commission, 2005). The contractor also dealt with the local authority consent 
processes on the behalf of property owners. Definitive conclusions have not been 
made on the benefits of such an approach, but it was apparent that property 
owners who took up this procurement option were satisfied with the outcome 
(Earthquake Commission, 2005). One could assume that this procurement 
arrangement would be an improvement in time, cost and quality over 
arrangements where individual property owners competed for the services of a 
limited number of reconstruction resources. 
What are reconstruction needs and how are these prioritised?  
Contiguous to responsibilities and powers to coordinate activities under the Act 
are issues linked to the identification of recovery needs and their priorities. If 
CDEM agencies were to coordinate activities then reconstruction priorities would 
have to be set by them. However this has never been the case. The current 
recovery framework behoves organisations and individuals to determine their 
reconstruction needs and to set their own priorities assuming to a great extent that 
this will align with overall recovery objectives. Different stakeholders in a 
reconstruction process have their different priorities (with limitless ramifications). 
Coordination remains a significant barrier to achieving effective emergency 
management activities (McEntire, 2002). McEntire suggests that challenges in 
information collation and dissemination; poor communication between field and 
operations centre; equipment failures; language barriers and command and control 
mentality are some of the factors inhibiting the coordination of emergency 
functions by responsible agencies. 
Coordination becomes more complex when different stakeholders (organisations) 
are expected to determine their own recovery priorities. There are three particular 
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difficulties associated with the coordination of emergency organisations  
Quarantelli (1982) cited in Granot (1997).  
a) Diversity of the perspectives of public and private sector agencies in disasters 
b) Qualitative difference between routine coordination and disaster coordination, 
and 
c) Different connotations of coordination for different organisations and 
departments within the same organisation. 
Granot (1997) explains further that organisations have distinct cultures, values, 
beliefs, behavioural norms and expectations that make true inter-organisation 
cooperation difficult to achieve. Lack of cooperation between organisations and 
individuals is a form of ‘silo’ (Fenwick, Seville, & Brunsdon, 2009). Fenwick et 
al. (2009) describe ‘silo mentality’ as divisive individual and group mindsets 
which manifests as communication barriers that create disjointed, disconnected 
and detrimental ways of working.  
In emergency and disaster management, organisational silos have to be broken 
down to allow for cross exchange of information, shared commitment and 
proactive responses. Quarantelli (1988) describes how organisational silos could 
result in lack of consensus amongst disaster stakeholders. Silos cause breakdown 
in communication, co-operation and co-ordination between disaster stakeholders 
and consequently a reduction in organisational resilience to hazards (Fenwick et 
al., 2009). Wolensky & Wolensky (2005) observed similar silos in the 
performance of different government hierarchies in disaster management.  
Rolfe & Britton (1995) suggest that the identification of needs and priorities under 
existing recovery frameworks may be exacerbated by the scale of reconstruction 
programmes, especially where the event cuts across regional and geographical 
boundaries. There is the potential for political and cultural conflict, since 
reconstruction plans and organisational capabilities at local levels differ. AELG 
(2005) and WRLAWG (2004) have therefore suggested the need to facilitate 
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stakeholder relationships in New Zealand by establishing common reconstruction 
needs and priorities during reconstruction. 
3.3.2 The Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991 
The RMA was promulgated in 1991 but has undergone several amendments over 
time to improve its implementation across a range of environment planning and 
development issues. The RMA promotes the sustainable management of land, sea, 
air and water, so that New Zealand resources are protected for future generations 
(Skelton & Memon, 2002). The Act provides for the avoidance, remedy or 
mitigation of the adverse effects of proposed activities on the environment; and 
also ensures that environmental principles are provided for in every resource 
management planning and decision-making. The RMA adopts an effect-based 
approach to development planning with an emphasis on the biophysical 
environment (J. Dixon, 2005). An outline of the specific purposes for the 
development of the RMA is given in s5 of the RMA.  
Table 3.2 - Types of resource consents  
Source: Ministry for Environment (2006) 
Consent Types  Situational Examples 
Land-use 
consents 
To erect a building. 
To convert a garage in a residential neighbourhood into a shop. 
To establish papakainga housing. 
Subdivision 
consents 
To divide a property into two or more new titles, using fee simple 
or unit title mechanisms. 
Coastal permits To build a wharf on the coast below the mean high-water springs 
mark. 
To discharge stormwater into coastal waters. 
Water permits To take water from a stream for an irrigation scheme. 
To build a dam in the bed of a river. 
Discharge 
permits 
To discharge stormwater from a service station through a pipe 
directly into a lake. 
To discharge exhaust fumes from a wood-curing kiln into the air. 
 
The RMA is administered by respective local councils (s30-s36) but their 
activities are coordinated by the Ministry for Environment (MfE). The RMA is 
interpreted in line with respective regional policy statements (s63-s70) and district 
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plans (s72-s77) to ensure that the entire New Zealand environment is managed 
sustainably. Each local policy document identifies the environmental issues 
specific to its region or district; and set out the plans, objectives and methods for 
achieving the desired sustainable environmental results (J. Dixon, 2005). Table 
3.2 gives an indication of the different types of resource consents that can be 
applied for under the RMA, with examples of where the consents may be 
required.  
In the next section the practical implications of the RMA on post-disaster 
reconstruction activities are discussed. Information for this section was pooled 
from the analysis of the RMA and commentaries from other relevant literature. 
3.3.2.1 The RMA and Post-Disaster Reconstruction 
The reconstruction and rebuilding of damaged physical properties after a disaster 
may require the application of the RMA, as in normal developmental projects. 
However the need for urgency common to post disaster reconstruction projects 
may cause cumbersome delays in the implementation of certain aspects of the 
Act. It is not unusual for environmental legislation to become an impediment to 
the realisation of reconstruction objectives. Evidence suggests that the 
impediments may occur as a result of procedural constraints inherent in 
development legislation (Meese, Butler, & Holmes, 2005); and consequently they 
become sources of vulnerability (Gavidia & Crivellari, 2006).  
Some of the impediments envisaged during the implementation of the RMA in a 
significant reconstruction programme in New Zealand are discussed under the 
following paragraphs. 
Issues associated with bureaucracy and procedural requirements  
The RMA requires people to submit applications for a permit (resource planning 
consent) before their proposed physical (re)developments projects could proceed 
(s9-s23). Approval for such permits is granted by the councils (referred to as the 
Consent Authority in s30, s31) with consultation and agreement with the affected 
local community. This consent application process provides for an assessment of 
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any likely environmental impacts of the proposals and how these would be 
mitigated. The potential effects of any development proposal on the environment 
(whether minor or major) will determine whether the resource consent application 
should be publicly notified, require limited notification or non-notified (s93-s95). 
This requirement for public notification influences the processing time for 
resource consents. For example, the maximum time allowed for a non-notified 
consent decision to be reached is 20 working days from the date of lodgement of 
an application, while a notified consent decision will take a maximum of 50 
working days or 70 working days if a public hearing is necessary. A typical 
flowchart of the consent process is included as Appendix A2. Times for 
processing resource consents are indicative only; as the times may be extended in 
situations when higher than normal volumes of consent processing are 
encountered (Ministry for Environment, 2006).  
The implications of the consent process can be understood from the two-yearly 
survey conducted by the Ministry for Environment on local authorities. The 2007-
08 survey found that only 69% of consents were processed within the statutory 
time limits (Ministry for Environment, 2009). This figure is lower than 73% 
realised in 2005-06 survey period (Ministry for Environment, 2008). Some 
underlying issues pertaining these results were unmasked in an IPENZ position 
paper on the RMA (IPENZ, 2008). For example, IPENZ believes there is the need 
to address the non-compliant cases (31% that could not be processed within the 
statutory time) within reasonable timeframes to avoid a spike of workload on the 
consenting authorities. There is little doubt that consent applications would 
overwhelm local councils’ capacities during post-disaster recovery. There would 
be a spike of applications (above normal applications) which already has about 
31% backlog of unattended applications. Delayed processing causes unnecessary 
cost burdens to applicants, since their development projects will have to be put on 
hold till approval is granted. In New Zealand the issues associated with RMA 
consenting delays have always been protracted and never empty of resentments 
(McShane, 2003; Page, 2005).  
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Emergency Work Prioritisation Issues  
The RMA caters for redevelopment works that may be required under situations 
of urgency. Section 330 of the Act deals with works considered emergency which 
may have resulted from a disaster event. This is the key section that gives powers 
to a person or entity to undertake emergency works or to take preventative or 
remedial action without necessarily obtaining resource consents when one would 
normally have been required (Harper, 2006). Similarly the section gives backing 
to activities considered immediate, necessary and sufficient to remove the cause 
of, or mitigate any actual or likely adverse effect of, any emergency (s330(2)). 
Immediacy, necessity and sufficiency are the key qualifying conditions governing 
the application of s330 of the Act. However the person or entity that is granted the 
emergency powers must have the capacity to do so. Section 330 (a)–(c) gives 
three sets of qualifications for persons or entities to be able to carry out 
emergency activities under the Act. The practical application of s330 is that the 
proposed work must meet the emergency criteria before a bypass of the stipulated 
consent process can be activated, as long as the Consent Authority is advised 
within seven days that the emergency work was undertaken. In the event that the 
adverse effect and the emergency works continue, an application for resource 
consent must be made within 20 working days of any initial notification (s330B).  
In spite of s330 provisions, the RMA was considered burdensome and a source of 
frustration during reconstruction works in the Manawatu flood of 2004 (Tonkin 
and Taylor, 2005). Much valuable time was lost trying to develop an 
understanding with the Regional Council about emergency actions that would 
cover all situations under the RMA, rather than requiring a formal process for 
each activity. The possibility for time wasting by the RMA on significant national 
projects was attested to by the current Minister for Environment, Nick Smith 
(2009) while presenting a case for the review and realignment of the RMA after 
18 years of its existence.  
Public notification is unique to the RMA and allows community members in the 
immediate environment to work through all environmental impact issues before 
the local councils commit to a development project. However the stipulated 
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notification and consultation procedures have further implication on post disaster 
recovery. At one extreme, strict implementation of the notification process may 
slow down recovery. Time is wasted going through submissions for and against a 
proposed development. In the event that a decision is not reached at the council 
level, the consent applications are transferred for hearing at the environment 
court. At the other extreme, there is the risk of non-participation by concerned 
parties which could negate its usefulness (Clark & Newlove, 2001). Thus 
redevelopment projects that could potentially harm the surrounding environment 
may be wrongfully permitted.  
Dealing with Nationally Significant Projects 
Another dimension to the implementation of the RMA is the potential effect it 
could have on the rebuilding of critical infrastructure post disaster. Of the 0.69% 
of the total consents declined in the 2005-2006 period, some were for major 
infrastructure projects that were in the national interest (IPENZ, 2008). Though 
the RMA provides for a fast track process for projects of national significance (s6, 
s141), there is no indication that critical reconstruction projects are adequately 
covered by this provision (McShane, 2008). Criteria such as the cost of projects, 
scale of projects, sphere of influence on the public are well established in the 
RMA; however there appears to be no specific criterion that could enable the 
classification of some reconstruction projects as being in the national interest. The 
absence of specific criteria to fast-track critical reconstruction projects has the 
implication of delaying the projects beyond acceptable timeframes. 
McShane (2008) suggests a cost-benefit assessment whereby the potential benefits 
of a proposed development would become an additional criteria for classifying 
projects of national significance. Such assessments could be applied to 
reconstruction projects too so that public infrastructure projects and critical 
lifeline utility projects with demonstrated public/social benefits may be sped up 
through a bypass of normal consent processes. With increased clarity on the 
projects that are nationally significant, Ministerial call-in provisions in the RMA 
(s141(B)) could be applied to shorten the consenting process for such projects 
considerably.  
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The RMA and Litigations 
The RMA has been the subject of litigation (Ministry for Environment, 2003) as a 
result of protracted procedures and development control decisions. The Ministry 
for Environment 2007-08 report show that there were 722 appeals transferred to 
the Environment Court. These large number of appeals places considerable load 
on the court system. In a disaster situation such prolonged litigation periods may 
impact whole-of-community recovery after a disaster (this is discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter).   
The RMA and Civil Defence Legislation 
The RMA expressly recognises the activities of a CDEM group in the event of a 
civil defence emergency (s330B) whereas local authorities and network utility 
operators will exercise powers under s330 (Harper, 2006). Harper posits that the 
responsibility for actions undertaken during a civil defence emergency will rest on 
the delegating body whether, the CDEM group, local authority or Minister. In the 
event of a significant disaster event, it is expected that the Minister of civil 
defence and emergency management will take control and can exercise its powers 
within emergency provisions contained in both the CDEM Act and RMA. During 
a declared emergency, sections 9, 12, 13, 14 and 15 (relating to the obtaining of 
resource consents) of the RMA cease to apply, therefore civil defence legislation 
(CDEM Act) supersedes (Harper, 2006). While the foregoing may not be 
considered an impediment to emergency activities, the issue of concern lies with 
the re-emergence of resource consent processing after the expiration of a declared 
emergency. The pertinent question to ask is: what steps could be taken to prevent 
the problems of delays associated with consent processing occurring after a 
declared civil emergency has been lifted? 
3.3.3  The Building Act (BA) 2004 
The Building Act provides for the regulation of building works, the establishment 
of a licensing regime for building practitioners, and the setting of performance 
standards for buildings for purposes outlined in s3 of the Act. The Act prescribes 
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the requirements of the national building code which requires buildings and other 
associated features to meet certain performance standards such as durability, fire 
safety, sanitation services and facilities, moisture control, energy efficiency and 
access (s16, s17...). The Act is administered at the national level by the 
Department of Building and Housing (DBH) and at the local level by Building 
Consent Authorities (BCA) and Territorial Authorities through a building consent 
process (s12). The responsibilities of BCAs under the Act are complemented by 
Licensed Building Practitioners who are expected to have undergone an 
accreditation and certification process to enable them act in the capacity of 
consent and code compliance officers.  
The practical implications of implementing the provisions of the BA are discussed 
under the following heading. Particular emphasis is given to the problems that 
could be experienced during reconstruction after a significant hazard event in 
New Zealand. 
3.3.3.1 The BA and Post-Disaster Reconstruction 
Building consent processing involves individual property owners, their 
designers/builders and the Building Consent Authorities. An application for 
consent is required for all building work in connection with the construction, 
alteration, demolition or removal of a building (s40) with some minor exceptions. 
Consent is granted when the BCA is satisfied that the proposed works are in 
accordance with the building codes and associated regulations. Under normal 
circumstances, the building consent process is expected to take 20 days (s48), 
though the reality is far from this. The Act requires a strict inspection of work 
progress during construction at ‘hold points’ corresponding to progress 
milestones. Each defined stage must be inspected and certified before subsequent 
stages can be started. Inspection provides some certainty about code compliance 
and construction quality, and ensures that constructed works are in accordance 
with the original work specified in the approved consents. At completion of all 
works a Code of Compliance Certificate (CCC) is issued (s91-s95A).  
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The BA is laudable as a risk-mitigating document for proposed development and 
redevelopment projects. It would allow for improved construction technology and 
facilities that could reduce vulnerabilities after a hazard event for example. But 
strict implementation of some of the BA provisions could create problems during 
reconstruction projects. Some of the issues which are culled from related literature 
are discussed under the following headings.  
Issues contiguous to consent processing 
Relevant sections of the BA appear to give some clarity on the building and 
alteration works that will or not require an application for consents. However in 
the event that building or alteration work is carried out in situations of urgency (as 
may be the case after a disaster); there are no special provisions in the BA for 
territorial authorities to issue retrospective consents for work that has been 
undertaken without the necessary building consent. It behoves the property owner 
therefore to apply for consent before any remedial work is carried out on a 
damaged property; and consequently a code of compliance certificate issued at 
completion. A property owner (vendor) may have limited opportunities to sell 
without a code of compliance certificate. Property law requires that the owner of a 
property for sale must guarantee full disclosure of the availability or non-
availability of the necessary permits and where appropriate a code compliance 
certificate (The Real Estate Institute of New Zealand, cl. 6[8]). It is not clear what 
implications such disclosure will have on sale value in terms how a buyer will 
view a certificate of acceptance in relation to a code compliance certificate during 
sale transactions. 
The BA’s provision for works that do not have to comply with building codes is 
likely to generate implementation problems during reconstruction programmes. 
There is a special waiver under the BA to allow building consents to be granted 
subject to a waiver or modification of the building code (s67-s70). The 
determination of the appropriate circumstances when this section can be applied 
has been left to the discretion of BCAs. BCAs are required to prepare policies and 
guidelines on how this discretion can be exercised, but this is not being done 
across all councils (DBH, 2005). In somewhat similar requirements, BCAs are to 
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prepare guidelines for collaborating with other councils and disaster agencies for 
resource sharing and deployments in a disaster situation. This is required to 
provide donee councils relief during the likely demands for external services 
when consent applications increase.  
Processing of building consents at the early stages of reconstruction and recovery 
are a potential bottleneck (AELG, 2005). Access to normal resource levels is 
unlikely and so there will be shortages of qualified persons and material resources 
to handle impact assessments and consent processing. More flexible approaches to 
the standard consent process might be necessary to expedite the consenting 
process and help cope with high volumes of consent applications after a major 
disaster. As a fall out, the potential complexities during response and recovery 
after disasters, procedural delays and other bureaucratic processes may impact a 
property owner’s ability to proceed with reconstruction before a building consent 
lapses.  
Pertinent to reconstruction also is the implication of s52 of the BA. This section 
prescribes a 12 months period for the validity of an issued building consent, 
except a special extension is granted by the BCA. This provision may compound 
post-disaster recovery, where reconstruction is not started before an issued 
consent lapses. A repeat application will have to be made by the property owner. 
An appropriate extension of this period to reflect the realities of post-disaster 
reconstruction and with due consideration to the magnitude of devastation 
experienced after an event, may have to be made by respective councils. A 
valuable lesson for New Zealand was the reported amendment to planning 
regulations after Hurricane Ivan in the Cayman Islands. The amendment included 
the extension of the period of validity to development approvals from 12 to 18 
months from their dates of issue. It was also reported that the fees charged for 
consent applications were reduced by 50% to alleviate the effect of the disaster on 
the community (The Legislative Assembly, 2004). These kinds of amendments 
could ensure that the recovery process is not made more onerous by planning 
requirements.  
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The effects of BA Notices 
Another key aspect of the BA that may impact on reconstruction activities post 
disaster is the limitations and restrictions applicable to buildings on land subject to 
natural hazards (s71-s74). The Act requires that Territorial Authorities must 
refuse to grant building consents on land subjected to natural hazards unless the 
land can be protected from the hazard, and where waivers are granted, it requires 
that notices be placed on the land to indicate the risk of natural hazards it is 
exposed to. If this provision is strictly implemented, then some categories of 
house owners may not qualify for insurance claims where there is an identified 
risk to their land and facilities. There is a limit to what property owners can claim 
from insurance companies; and the BA notices may complicate the issue more. 
For example, risk from ground subsidence is not covered by the EQC, although 
the rule was bent in Waihi 2001 due to public outcry (Earthquake Commission, 
2005). There are ongoing adjustments to New Zealand hazard landscape, which 
means that previously risk-free buildings may be re-defined as risk-prone after 
hazard review exercises. Hence new notices could prevent owners of such 
properties from being compensated in future disasters. 
3.4  A Review of Recovery Case Studies in New Zealand 
Having discussed the practical implications of recovery-related legislation, this 
section reviews two locally significant flooding incidents in New Zealand. The 
review demonstrates the challenges that such disaster events could pose to the 
regulatory environment and other salient issues that will need to be addressed to 
improve resilience in future recovery programmes. Both incidents reviewed had 
significant impacts on the economy, physical and built assets and on response and 
recovery capabilities in New Zealand. The extent of damages and the risks to life 
and property warranted the declaration of civil emergencies in both situations. 
The events and the scale of impacts are individually described followed by a 
review of the reconstruction and recovery activities that took place after each 
event. Finally a summary of the lessons learnt from the two flooding events is 
made within the context of the current study.  
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3.4.1 Manawatu-Wanganui Flood, 2004 
The flooding incident occurred in the Manawatu-Wanganui region in year 2004. 
The affected region is located in the lower half of the North Island of New 
Zealand. The flooded area covered 10 districts and includes Palmerston North and 
Wanganui Township as prominent cities. The flooding of the Manawatu-
Wanganui region was caused by heavy rain and gale force winds which occurred 
from 15 to 23 February 2004. The event necessitated a region-wide civil defence 
emergency declaration on 17 February that lasted till midnight of 25 February. At 
the height of the event over 2300 people were reported to have been evacuated 
from their homes.  
3.4.1.1 Damage Assessment 
The flood incident triggered the largest emergency management activity in New 
Zealand for 20 years (Reid et al., 2004). Many rivers breached their banks and 
considerable areas of farmland were inundated by silt and floodwaters. Damage to 
infrastructure was significant with damage to roads, bridges, and railways 
recorded. In addition there were telecommunications, power, gas and water supply 
outages to thousands of homes. The magnitude of the event stretched the response 
and recovery capabilities of the local authority and emergency management 
agencies involved (Reid et al., 2004). 
Damage assessments carried out immediately after the flooding event gave 
recovery estimates as $160-180 million for the rural sector; and $120 million for 
roads and council infrastructure (Van der Zon, 2005). In addition $29.5 million 
and $3.5 million were estimated to stop future flooding of the lower Manawatu 
and Rangitikei rivers that run through the region respectively. Approximately 500 
houses were damaged, 4 bridges destroyed and 21 bridges seriously damaged. 
Roads and rail closure including power and phone outages were widespread. 
Stock losses were estimated at 1300 (MCDEM, No date-a). A report by Reid et al. 
(2004) provided more details on the impact of the flood. 
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3.4.1.2 Reconstruction and Recovery Work 
Reconstruction work on damaged utilities commenced immediately after the 
flooding incident. Various utility providers, consultants and contractors worked 
24-hour days to repair damaged roads and bridges, and to restore disrupted 
services (Le Masurier et al., 2006; Reid et al., 2004). The focus was on rebuilding 
quickly; hence existing contractual relationships were exploited. Reconstruction 
was carried out through collaboration between CDEM agencies, local authorities, 
utility companies and insurance companies. Recovery was coordinated through 
the regional council’s CDEM group arrangements as provided for in the CDEM 
Act. For the other territorial authorities the event was managed using the previous 
Civil Defence Act 1983 arrangements (Wilkinson, Zuo, Le Masurier, & Van Der 
Zon, 2007).  
The CDEM Act 2002 provided a structure appropriate for dealing with events 
such as the floods and did not hinder authorities from dealing with the event (Reid 
et al., 2004). Hence the evolved structure involving: Interdepartmental Officials 
Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC); Domestic and External 
Security Coordination (DESC); National Crises Management Centre (NCMC) and 
local Emergency Operations Centres (EOC) was considered suitable flexible and 
robust in the event (Reid et al., 2004). Roading authorities did not diverge from 
normal legislation and regulations and building consents were sought and granted 
as usual.  
However the implementation of environmental control requirements became a 
source of frustration. According to AELG (2005) much time was lost by utility 
companies trying to develop an understanding with the regional council about 
emergency actions that could cover all situations under the RMA, rather than 
require a formal process for each activity. The Infrastructure Recovery Task 
Group leader and the Regional Council had to outline the procedures to be 
followed in the form of a guidance note (AELG, 2005). Van der Zon (2005) 
highlighted the problem that arose with the deposition of slip materials for 
example. The regional council required all slip materials to be deposited at 
designated landfill sites. These landfill sites were located far away from the 
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disaster zone which would have taken too long to cart away. Subsequently the 
Regional Council had to allow a more pragmatic approach which meant that slip 
materials could be moved and deposited locally.  
There were reported delays caused by the sourcing of reconstruction funds 
especially for roading infrastructure. Transfund, the road funding authority that 
had direct access to government funds did not become involved as early as 
required, thus the prioritisation process for infrastructure works was hampered 
(Van der Zon, 2005). Much more was expected to have been done by Transfund 
to secure certainty over funding of emergency road contracts in the early stages of 
recovery. 
The 2004 flooding incident exposed disaster management problems that could 
arise from the management of emergencies across jurisdictional boundaries. There 
were issues connected with the management of recovery around the Whangaehu 
valley that is shared between the Wanganui and Rangitikei Districts. Reid et al. 
(2004) believes recovery management could pose jurisdictional conflicts as to 
who should take responsibility for what in such situations. Reid et al. report 
identified the need for advance negotiation and a memorandum of understanding 
amongst Districts Councils to determine which district has primacy in the event of 
a civil emergency. Without some form of clarity about responsibilities, borderline 
lands or properties could become mismanaged, overlooked or at worst, emergency 
activities could be duplicated.  
Reid et al. (2004) faulted communication and information flow between agencies 
during response at the event. It was reported that the Local Councils were slow in 
some cases to realise the importance of being proactive in seeking information on 
the range of activities that took place during the event. The local authorities did 
not have the opportunity to prepare detailed plans and standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for information gathering and dissemination before the 
incident. For example requests for information from the National Crises 
Management Centre (NCMC) did not match the Local Council’s requirements 
(Reid et al., 2004). The expectation was for Local Councils to be the receptacle of 
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information by identifying the exact nature of the flooding incident and then to 
identify who can assist and how these people could be contacted and directed. 
Similar inadequacies were observed in the performance of CDEM groups. There 
was little evidence of active direction by CDEM groups (AELG, 2005). The 
CDEM Act provided for the CDEM to direct activities, assets and services on 
behalf of key lifelines, but restoration priorities were determined by lifeline 
utilities and then communicated to the CDEM group. The CDEM role during the 
recovery phase was limited to communicating problem areas and issuing progress 
updates to the lifeline utilities. Individual utilities became aware of problems 
through the CDEM reports but took their own action to address recovery issues. 
3.4.2  Matata (Bay of Plenty) Flood, 2005 
This section reports on flooding of Matata Township in the Bay of Plenty in 2005. 
Matata is a small farm community under the jurisdiction of the Whakatane 
District located in the North Island of New Zealand. The town is 24 km to the 
north-west of Whakatane. On 18 May 2005, a band of intense rain (308 mm of 
rainfall within 20 hours) fell in the catchments behind the Matata Township. The 
rain triggered floods and several large debris avalanches and landslips. Debris 
flow reached State Highway 2 and railways around Pikowai to Awakaponga with 
boulders the size of cars strewn all around. Some details and photographs 
describing the extent of the flooding incident are available on Environment Bay of 
Plenty website (http://www.envbop.govt.nz/CD/MatataTauranga-May-2005.asp).  
The Matata/Tauranga area had experienced significant flooding in the previous 
year, but this particular incident was more localised, concentrated and 
unparalleled in its magnitude. The engineering solutions consultants contracted 
for rehabilitation works at Matata confirm that the flooding incident had a chance 
of between 0.5% and 0.2% of happening in any year (Tonkin and Taylor Ltd, 
2005). The flooding incident necessitated a civil defence emergency declaration 
on 18 May 2005 and this remained in place until the end of May.  
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3.4.2.1 Damage Assessment 
Total government valuation including land value and capital value of properties 
affected along the flood path of the hazard was initially estimated to be about $10 
million for unsafe buildings and $3 million for buildings subject to restricted use. 
The MCDEM situation report (Recovery Report Nr. 06) on the initial damage 
evaluation at Matata and environs gives a breakdown of physical damages in 
Table 3.3(a) and (b). 
 Table 3.3 (a) Affected houses in 2005 Matata flood path  
 Source: WDC Recovery Report 
No Description Nr. of Properties affected 
(Matata/Awakaponga) 
1 Unsafe houses 28 
2 Unsafe - houses washed away 3 
3 Unsafe land 14 
4 Restricted use – houses 16 
5 Restricted use - land 1 
 Table 3.3 (b) Other housing situation reports 
Nature of Work Required Matata/Awakaponga Edgecumbe/Otakir 
Houses requiring removal of wall linings 
– unable to be occupied (Total less 
unsafe/restricted houses) 
 
24 
 
9 
Houses requiring removal of wall linings 
– preline approved 
6 0 
Houses requiring removal of wall linings 
– postline approved 
0 0 
Houses requiring removal of wall linings 
– CCC approved 
0 0 
Septic Tanks and drains to be cleaned 85 1 
Septic tanks and drains cleaned 84 0 
 
Response and subsequent reconstruction activities commenced immediately after 
the flooding incident. It was reported in the ‘WDC Recovery News’ a Newsletter 
published by the Whakatane District, that a week after the incident there were 
already collaborative activities between the Department of Building and Housing 
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(DBH), the Whakatane and Tauranga District Councils. The collaboration 
involved the assessment of flood-damaged properties, processing of urgent 
building consents, and the provision of guidance on rebuilding procedures. A 
Recovery Coordinator, Steve McDowell, was appointed by the MCDEM to act as 
interface between the central government and Whakatane District Council 
(WDC). Steve was required to produce a recovery plan and to determine the 
quantum of government’s assistance package required by the community, in 
conjunction with the WDC Recovery Manager, Diane Turner.  
3.4.2.2 Reconstruction and Recovery Work 
Several task forces were set up in line with CDEM guidelines. A Hazard Task 
Force was appointed whose original scope of work included identifying what 
action plans and processes need to be put in place to address the short term and 
long term risks still facing Matata as a result of the event. The Hazard task force 
worked with the Infrastructure Task Force responsible for clearing flood debris, to 
sort out roads and to restore portable water to the affected (Wilkinson et al., 
2007). Both ONTRACK and Transit NZ owned a significant part of the 
infrastructure in the affected area and were required to work collaboratively with 
the Hazards and Infrastructure Task Groups to identify long-term solutions. Other 
task forces that were set up included the Rural Task Team; and Task Force Green 
(Le Masurier et al., 2006). 
Reconstruction works commenced with road clearance for rocks, stones and 
debris resulting from the flood. Wilkinson et al. (2007) explain that there was no 
tendering for the works undertaken during this initial response period; and a fast 
tracked tendering arrangement was implemented on subsequent reconstruction 
projects (4-6 weeks after the incident). Fortunately there were existing 
relationships with contractors executing civil work projects in the vicinity, thus 
mobilisation of the required resources did not pose a great challenge. However 
because of the priority attached to the reconstruction projects, progress on existing 
developmental projects was disrupted.  
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The rate of progress achieved at the initial response was commendable, however 
reconstruction activities slowed down considerably afterwards. Private property 
owners were seriously affected and some were unable to rebuild because they 
were plainly at risk from similar events in the future. Several flood mitigation 
project options were proposed coupled with planning controls to reduce risks and 
to protect lives and property. The WDC Recovery News (Issue 7), 2005 reported 
that the following redevelopment controls were recommended on sites where 
damage had occurred until the extent of future hazard zones was confirmed:   
• Limit redevelopment works through s72 of the Building Act. 
• Keep a record of hazard information on land information memoranda (LIM) 
and project information memoranda (PIM). 
• Undertake all redevelopment works in accordance with the Public Works Act, 
which requires a limitation of works, so far as practicable, to hazards that have 
already developed. 
• Variation of District Plans to reflect the improved level of hazard information 
in Matata Township. 
A revealing insight into reconstruction and recovery after the flooding incident is 
found in Spee’s (2008) study of the psychological and social impacts of the event 
on the Matata community. Spee (2008 p.18) generated a list of stressors that relate 
to the reconstruction problems experienced by individuals and the community 
following the event. These stressors include: 
• The inability to return to homes until months later, fifteen months in one case; 
• Two years after the event people were still waiting to receive resource consent 
to rebuild on their sections; 
• Moving four times in one year; 
• Constantly making plans which needed to be adjusted due to resource consent 
timeframes being moved; 
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• A state of limbo as people waited to learn of their property’s fate (i.e. whether 
the land was considered safe to rebuild); 
• Having to live in another community permanently while still  considering 
Matata home; 
• Physical health issues (hip operations, heart attacks) for the elderly; 
• The fact that no mitigation works had started. 
Spee concludes that the longer term recovery events had caused more stress and 
frustration than the initial periods after the disaster. It would seem that the greatest 
impact on holistic recovery was the inadequacies experienced during the 
rebuilding efforts. Individuals and property owners were in a state of limbo for too 
long after the event. 50 families were still in temporary accommodation five 
months after the incident (Rowan, 2005). A formal disaster recovery plan only 
came to effect 18 months after the event.  
Construction of flood mitigation structures that were approved by council could 
not commence because environmental resource consents for such works were still 
being processed as at June 2008 (Becker et al., 2008). Without the mitigation 
measures in place, property owners were unable to get insurance cover and 
without insurance payments no rebuilding could take place. There was widespread 
misunderstanding on compensation claims and settlement with the EQC making 
compromises to enable residents to receive compensation for their flooded 
properties (L. Dixon, 2005). In any case building consent processing in the at-risk 
areas of Matata was suspended till March 2007. Middleton’s (2008) analyses of 
the housing situation after the event re-affirms the impact that (re)development 
and legislative requirements had on the whole-of-Matata recovery.  
3.4.3 Summary of Lessons from the Local Disasters  
This section summarises the key lessons learnt during the two flooding incidents 
reviewed in 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 above. More detailed lessons across all aspects of 
recovery are provided by Reid et al. (2004) and AELG (2005), however the 
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current study discusses the lessons learnt within the context of improvements 
needed in legislative and regulatory provisions. 
3.4.3.1 Powers to coordinate reconstruction activities 
It was observed in both flooding incidents that response and reconstruction works 
were managed through the collaborative effort of CDEM groups, local authorities, 
utility companies and insurance companies during recovery in both cases. The 
CDEM did not play a lead role in directing activities in spite of the legal 
provisions under the CDEM Act that enabled it to do so. Emergency powers were 
never exercised  during the declared state of emergencies (AELG, 2005). Utilities 
(with their respective contractors) were allowed to determine their own 
reconstruction priorities without specific directives from the CDEM agencies. The 
following modes of interaction between CDEM and lifeline utilities are possible 
(AELG, 2005). The different modes are dependent on the scale and type of hazard 
events that is being managed.  
1. Utilities determine their own restoration priorities with CDEM gathering 
information and monitoring performance. 
2. CDEM and lifelines work together to identify priorities and to implement 
performance through agreements. 
3. CDEM determine priorities and then request utilities to perform in line with 
the set priorities. 
4. CDEM direct specific actions calling on the powers in the CDEM Act. 
Modes 1 and 2 were the operating situation in both flooding incidents and could 
pose barriers to effective reconstruction activities. None of the entities involved in 
the management and coordination of reconstruction in previous disaster events 
had any specific remit to work outside their own interests (Resilient 
Organisations, 2006). Therefore for larger scale disasters it might not be out of 
place for more proactive action from CDEM in the form of modes 3 and 4 
coordination.  
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3.4.3.2 Processing of building and environmental consents  
In both flooding incidents, there was a fast track approach adopted at the initial 
response stages. Rapid procurement routes were employed to engage contractors 
for emergency road network clearance and debris removal by key utilities. This 
approach was possible because there were already established relationships with 
these contracting organisations. However reconstruction activities were slowed 
down at the reconstruction stage when building and environmental compliance 
requirements took effect. There appears not to have been a waiver to normal 
processes except in the situation reported in the Manawatu-Wanganui flood where 
the Recovery Task Group leader and the Regional Councils prepared guidance 
notes outlining more expedient procedures to be followed for debris clearance and 
disposal. Delays caused by statutory compliance procedures were in addition to 
delays already caused by the property assessment and evaluations after the event. 
Such delays necessitated a review of building safety evaluation procedures to 
speed up recovery in future disasters (New Zealand Society of Earthquake 
Engineers, 2009). 
There was anecdotal evidence to suggest widespread duplication of resources on 
both flooding incidents. Damage assessments were required by different agencies 
like the EQC, private insurers and the local councils and it was not uncommon for 
assessment exercises to be repeated on the same properties by these agencies 
(Reid et al., 2004). This situation had a ‘knock-on’ effect, thus delaying the actual 
implementation of the various reconstruction projects.  
In summary, both flooding incidents emphasise the importance of pre-planning 
for large scale response and recovery programmes in New Zealand. By 
undertaking some prior planning, responding agencies are better equipped to 
implement recovery plans within reasonable time frames forestalling the sort of 
frustrations experienced in these events. A good supportive framework should 
guide effective co-ordination of resources after an event, allowing for more 
effective and efficient recovery activities. 
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3.5  What lessons can be learnt from recovery programmes 
overseas? 
As the title suggests, this section gives a brief review of recovery activities in 
other countries that could provide useful lessons on post-disaster recovery. The 
reviews are made with a focus on changes that were made to existing legislation 
and regulatory provisions to allow for recovery activities to proceed unhindered. 
The reviews provide evidences on the need for appropriate legislation and other 
regulatory provisions for reconstructing the built environment after disasters. 
It is useful to note that research on the impact of regulations on building 
rehabilitation or on how procedural barriers discourage physical development and 
rehabilitation, is sparse but developing (Burby et al., 2006; May, 2004). Much of 
what exist in housing and disaster management literature are anecdotal evidences 
that suggest that there is a relationship between building/environmental 
regulations and rehabilitation works (Martín, 2005). Some of these anecdotes do 
not provide enough empirical data for further research and Schill (2005) suggests 
that the lack of empirical data makes it difficult to influence public policy. 
However poor the empirical data on these relationships are, it has not diminished 
the fact that regulations could become burdensome in rehabilitation and 
reconstruction projects and are worthy of considerations (Gavidia & Crivellari, 
2006; Marano & Fraser, 2006). The current study presents information that will 
support the thesis that some aspects of legislation may have to be reviewed to 
meet emergency management objectives.  
Martin (2005) describes burdensome regulations as those which incorporate 
excessive rules and regulations and red tape (statutory procedures) that add 
unnecessarily to the cost of housing. Though Martin’s study refers to the effects of 
building codes on housing, the current study believes the same parallel can be 
drawn for reconstruction projects also. Therefore burdensome regulations impact 
negatively on recovery such that physical facilities are unable to be rebuilt at the 
speed desired by the community and property owners.  
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Listokin & Hattis (2004) provides useful analysis on two kinds of barriers that 
building codes could pose to rehabilitation works. They are ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
barriers to rehabilitation. The hard barriers are impediments to rehabilitation as a 
result of over-regulation, which would not add appreciably to building value or 
public safety (Burby et al., 2006) and could discourage housing development or 
rehabilitation because they are added burdens (May, 2004). For instance building 
and environmental regulations that do not reduce the vulnerability of built assets 
to a hazard event are unnecessary. Also to insist on expensive structural solutions 
in a highly hazardous zone, where a simple alternative will be to restrict 
development in that zone is another example of regulation that could fall under 
Listokin & Hattis hard category. 
Soft impediments, on the other hand, are administrative requirements that require 
extra time, money and effort to accomplish rehabilitation and reconstruction 
projects (Listokin & Hattis, 2004). These are red tapes (bureaucratic procedures) 
that could delay new construction and the rehabilitation/reconstruction of physical 
facilities (Marano & Fraser, 2006; May, 2004). Such soft impediments are the 
focus of the current research study.  
Bureaucratic procedures must be supportive of emergency management under 
different emergency scenarios whether routine or chaotic. However research 
suggest that bureaucracies have been less supportive of the expediency that is 
desired in disaster response and recovery (Olshansky, 2005; Rosenthal & 
Kouzmin, 1997). Bureaucracies derive their strength and weaknesses from a 
modus-operandi that is time consuming, the typologies are ‘procedure-bound’ and 
are unable to foster creativity, improvisation, and the adaptability needed in 
disaster situations (Harrald, 2006). May (2004) suggests three sources of 
regulatory process barriers which are in line with the current focus on legislation 
in New Zealand. These process barriers are outlined below: 
• Regulatory approvals. These are delays associated with consent processes and 
approvals that arise from cumbersome decision making processes and the 
duplication of regulations. These types of delays are inherent in the building 
and environmental legislation which were discussed in section 3.3. Some other 
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examples of post-disaster reconstruction programmes where regulatory 
approvals became impediments are presented later in this section. 
• Regulatory enforcement strategies and practices. These are overly rigid 
practices that foster an unsupportive regulatory environment for the 
development and rehabilitation of the housing stock. In post disaster situations 
rigid enforcement strategies discourage genuine recovery efforts as would be 
shown later.  
• Patchwork of administrative arrangements. This could result from duplication 
of administrative structures (as in layers or hierarchies of control) and gaps in 
regulatory decision processes. May (2004) explains that patchwork frustrates 
regulatory implementation and adds to complexities in regulatory processes.  
Process barriers could also result from administrative conflicts in and among disaster 
agencies (Listokin & Hattis, 2004). For example rivalry between responding agencies 
are not foreign to emergency services and are an obstacle to effective emergency 
management (Granot, 1997; McEntire, 2002; Quarantelli, 1988). Rivalry may result 
from existing silos or from the absence of a coordinating agency as were previously 
experienced in the local events reviewed earliier. Hence a broad range of cooperative 
effort is needed for the success of post disaster reconstruction activities. 
Organisations must coalesce to plan for resource utilisation in the restoration of 
physical assets. Coordination is therefore central to multi-organisational response and 
recovery programmes (L. Comfort et al., 1999; McEntire, 2002). The question is how 
is coordination achieved? The current study believes that a good start point will be to 
embed the requirements for the coordination and interaction of all stakeholders in 
legislation and regulatory provisions. This will then feed into respective community 
recovery plans with policies and specific criteria for post-disaster situations.  
Another useful dimension to the problems with burdensome regulations is provided 
by Listokin & Hattis (2004). It is that regulatory procedures could become too rigid 
forcing implementers to ‘go by the book’ even though variations may be warranted. 
This places implementers in a state of continuous fear of liability should things go 
wrong. Some latitude of control and discretion is often required to aid decision 
making as long as such decisions are pragmatic. Commenting on the rebuilding 
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programme after the flooding incident in New Orleans, Stackhouse (2006 p. 36) says 
‘removing democratic processes from the rebuilding process has the advantage of 
expediting decision making by allowing politically dangerous but practical 
outcomes’. This statement suggests that greater freedom in decision making by 
officials of coordinating agencies could increase the speed of rebuilding programmes 
after significant disaster events.  
From the foregoing treatise, it is evident that legislation and regulations pertaining to 
post-disaster reconstruction could hinder the achievement of reconstruction 
objectives. Speed is of essence in disaster reconstruction while pre-planning activities 
help to improve the speed and quality of reconstruction delivery (Harrald, 2006).  
In the following sections, two examples of overseas disasters are presented to show 
where changes were proposed or made to legislation to enable speedy implementation 
of reconstruction objectives. 
3.5.1  The Northridge Earthquake 1994 
The Northridge Earthquake is chosen in this study because it provides an 
historical example of a disaster situation where legislative changes helped to 
facilitate reconstruction projects. The nature of the disaster is first described then 
a presentation on the legislative changes that were made after the event is 
discussed within the context of the current study. 
The earthquake was a moderate but damaging disaster that struck Southern 
California in the early hours of 17 January, 1994 (Barton-Aschman Associates, 
1995; Bolin & Stanford, 1998). It had a magnitude of 6.8 on the Richter scale, 
small compared to other earthquakes but devastating because of the quantum of 
damage the earthquake caused. 
(Comerio, Landis, Firpo, & Monzon, 1996) give an insight into the extent of 
damage. There were damage to 27 bridges and a collapse of sections of six 
freeways. 450 public buildings suffered significant damage; 6000 commercial 
buildings, 49,000 housing units in 10,200 buildings had serious structural 
damages; while 388,000 housing units in 85,000 buildings experienced minor 
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damages. The total value of damage to houses in Los Angeles was estimated to be 
about $1.5 billion (Comerio et al., 1996). 
The Northridge earthquake caused a shift in emphasis from disaster preparation 
and relief to recovery in the United States (Comerio et al., 1996); and this shift 
largely resulted in the success of emergency management programmes for the 
restoration of the affected areas. (Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004) suggests that 
reconstruction activities contributed to the economic revitalisation of the affected 
area. Kamel et.al. explain that the efficiency and effectiveness of response became 
a primary objective which was tackled by every government agency. Several 
bureaucratic requirements were suspended to pave way for rapid rebuilding of 
damaged infrastructure (Marano & Fraser, 2006; P. Phillips, 2005).  (Marano & 
Fraser, 2006, p. 2) conclude that ‘identifying and easing regulations and statutes that 
inhibit reconstruction can mean a dramatically faster and less costly recovery’. 
Wu and Lindell (2004) provide an insightful summary into some of the actions 
that were taken to increase the speed of housing reconstruction in Los Angeles 
after the earthquake. The summary in Table 3.4 provides proof that expediting 
procedural requirements by establishing fast-tracked processes that would operate 
after a disaster would benefit recovery. It would be observed across the different 
government departments in Table 3.4 that there was a streamlining of bureaucratic 
procedures of one form or another.  
Whilst the rapid recovery experienced after the Northridge earthquake can be 
attributed to other factors, such as political will (Wu & Lindell, 2004) and large 
supplementary appropriations to tackle the incident (Barton-Aschman Associates, 
1995; Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004); public policy changes and enabling 
emergency management legislation played a substantial role in the rebuilding 
programmes after the earthquake. 
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Table 3.4 - Actions taken to increase the speed of housing 
reconstruction in Los Angeles. Source: Wu & Lindell (2004) 
Department Actions increasing the speed of housing reconstruction 
Building and safety 
 
Establish criteria for emergency demolition contracts 
Establish due process and procedures for demolition 
Prepare pre-incident agreements 
Set up a damage assessment system 
Expedite building permits 
Establish one-stop processing 
Create parcel database 
Community Redevelopment 
 
Review and revise qualifying criteria for the city’s 
neighbourhood revitalisation tools 
Streamline procedures for redevelopment area expansion or 
Additions 
Housing Prepare emergency regulations 
Identify staff in other departments who understand loan 
processing 
Have procedures to adopt emergency regulations 
Develop loan guidelines and procedures 
Obtain pre-approval on loan procedure from federal agencies 
Develop and implement city loan programme 
Identify available housing 
Planning Update procedures to expedite permits 
Insure consistency of R&R Plan with safety element 
Prepare procedures, forms, list of R&R division members 
Determine criteria for balancing post-event work priorities 
Emergency Operations Board 
 
Request formation of ad-hoc committee on R&R, assist 
utilities in restoration, initiate demolition and debris removal 
programme 
Chief Legislative Analyst 
 
Lobby for and support the National Earthquake Insurance 
Program 
 
3.5.2 Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans US (2005) 
The disaster that followed Hurricane Katrina provides lessons on legislative 
changes either proposed or already implemented to enable its recovery from the 
event. The Hurricane was a category 3 storm that struck New Orleans and the 
Gulf Coast in the morning of 29 August, 2005. The storm surge caused severe 
destruction along the Gulf coast from central Florida to Texas in the US (Knabb, 
Rhome, & Brown, 2006). Knabb et al. (2006) reported that the most severe 
damage occurred in New Orleans, Louisiana, because of the failure of the levee 
system that was designed to contain the resulting storm surges. The worst damage 
was caused by floods resulting in probably the largest evacuation of citizens 
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within the US in recent times, with an estimated 1.2 million people evacuated 
before the incident and another 100-120 thousand afterwards (Nigg et al., 2006). 
About 350,000 houses were destroyed and over 200,000 persons required 
temporary shelters scattered around 16 states in the US (Rodriguez & Marks, 
2006). 
By all accounts Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic event with economic loss 
estimates of about $200 billion (Burby, 2006). Comfort (2005) concludes that the 
catastrophe was both natural and man-made, suggesting that the event was both 
uncontrollable and controllable. Uncontrollable because the hurricane was a 
natural meteorological phenomenon, while it was controllable because the break 
in the levee system and resulting floods could have been avoided through better 
foresight and planning (Burby, 2006; Piotrowski, 2006). The incident exposed the 
inadequacies of US response capacity to disasters of that magnitude and brought 
other emergency management issues to the fore (Harrald, 2006; Rodriguez & 
Marks, 2006; S. K. Schneider, 2005; Waugh Jr, 2006). 
Within the context of the current study, Hurricane Katrina provides valuable 
lessons for disaster management. One of which is the need to prepare for the 
unexpected as every hazard brings surprises and every disaster even more 
surprises (Colten, Kates, & Laska, 2008). The disaster situation was completely 
overwhelming leaving the New Orleans community dysfunctional. Its response 
system was a failure and complete recovery is not expected any time soon. Recent 
reports conclude that reconstruction after Katrina will most likely take longer than 
a decade to accomplish (Colten et al., 2008; Kates, Colten, Laska, & Leatherman, 
2006).  
Along similar lines, the Katrina disaster shows what could happen when there is a 
breakdown in the administrative elements of an emergency management system 
(S. K. Schneider, 2005). Schneider suggests that there were three bureaucratic 
characteristics that failed, and which impeded the response process at the critical 
early phases of the disaster. These failed bureaucratic characteristics include:  
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a) Established emergency procedures – Schneider concludes that the response 
process was impeded by a failure to implement pre-established administrative 
procedures. Rodriguez & Marks (2006) attributed the failure to a breakdown 
in communication between the hierarchies of government. Thus its top-down 
(command-and-control) approach was not effective. The American Bar 
Association (2006) in its review of the emergency system that operated during 
the disaster, suggested more proactive response arrangements that will 
originate from the bottom-up with the local authority as the first responders. 
The American Bar Association (2006) believes that the emergency procedures 
that operated during Katrina caused conflicts in jurisdictional responsibilities 
between emergency agencies. In their words, ‘there remain no standards or 
consensus as to when an incident warrants direct Federal as opposed to EMAC 
assistance, or indeed, in what order, or in what quantity, resources should be 
requested via one route or the other’ (American Bar Association, 2006 p. 17).  
b) Leadership. There was also a lack of decisive leadership in the Katrina 
response activities (American Bar Association, 2006; S. K. Schneider, 2005). 
The leadership problem is cross-linked with the emergency management 
system which manifested as lack of situational awareness amongst all the 
disaster stakeholders (Rodriguez & Marks, 2006). Waugh Jr (2006) concludes 
that the slow and inadequate disaster response that characterised Hurricane 
Katrina was the result of lack of understanding (of functions and roles) that 
was exhibited by emergency management officials. 
c) Unclear emergency management objectives. The US emergency management 
agency has had a confused set of objectives largely because of its shift in 
focus from natural disasters to antiterrorism activities since 11 September, 
2001 (American Bar Association, 2006; S. K. Schneider, 2005).   
Perhaps the most valuable lessons for the current study are the steps being taken 
to rebuild damaged infrastructure in the disaster zone. A pertinent question this 
study asks is, what policies are in place (or have been put in place) to encourage a 
holistic recovery after the event? Some of the policy changes and legislative 
reviews are briefly outlined below. 
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1.   Changes in building codes and standards - There are reported changes made to 
the building codes in New Orleans with a view to improving the resilience of 
built spaces in New Orleans. For example there were revisions made to the 
base flood elevation levels for new construction to three-feet or higher (Colten 
et al., 2008). This is a risk mitigation strategy which has been tied to flood 
insurance cover so that only buildings that meet the new guidelines can 
qualify for flood insurance and subsequent compensations. Overall, funding 
sources and budget priorities have been developed for reconstructing flood 
protection in New Orleans (Colten et al., 2008; Edwards, 2007).  
2.   Changes in emergency management regulations and guidelines -  Colten et al. 
(2008) explains that the Katrina event necessitated the review and updating of 
Louisiana and New Orleans response strategies and their emergency 
operations plans. The legislative reviews included the adoption of an all-
hazards approach thus expanding the scope and magnitude of anticipated 
hazards; and allowing greater involvement of non-agency actors who proved 
crucial to response and recovery after the event. Colten et al. noted that 
partnering with non-governmental stakeholders was a paradigm shift that 
emerged out of the Katrina experience.  
  Other useful changes have been advocated to improve emergency 
management activities. For example, Chhean & Kakkar (Chhean & Kakkar, 
2006) suggest the development of comprehensive disaster management plan at 
local response levels, which will be consistent with a national level disaster 
management framework in the U.S. Chhean & Kakkar are of the opinion that 
such a development will assist local responders to effectively manage complex 
disasters. Crockett (2007) on the other hand suggests giving more powers to 
the military to intervene in a natural disaster. This is probably consistent with 
Chhean & Kakkar notion of merging natural emergency preparedness and 
response functions in the Federal Emergency Management Agency within the 
Department of Homeland Security, so that the nation’s security apparatus are 
accessible to natural disaster management in times of need.  
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3.   Changes in land development regulations – Changes to land and development 
regulations are largely seen as a veritable tool for mitigating disaster risk in 
disaster management (Burby et al., 1999; Ingram et al., 2006; Schwab et al., 
1998; Wamsler, 2006). After Hurricane Katrina several changes in land use 
planning and zoning systems have been proposed to reduce the vulnerability 
of the New Orleans region from future flooding disasters (Burby, 2006; 
Edwards, 2007; Olshansky, 2006).    
The legislative changes described above do not provide an exhaustive list of the 
changes needed to facilitate the recovery at New Orleans; but they serve as 
exemplars to the importance placed on built asset reinstatements as a major input 
to holistic recovery. Edwards, (Edwards, 2007) suggest that the building 
reconstruction efforts in New Orleans (with a focus on restoration of landmarks 
and facility improvement) act as stimulants to development and growth 
opportunities which in turn benefits recovery. The rate at which recovery is 
achieved is therefore tied to the speed of reconstruction guaranteed by legislative 
and regulatory changes.  
3.6.  General Implication of Legislation on Recovery 
Having highlighted some of the issues that are connected to the appropriateness of 
legislation and regulatory provisions in the previous sections; this section presents 
a summary of their implication on recovery. In other words the following 
summarises the effect that poor legislative provisions could have on post-disaster 
reconstruction activities. 
1. Loss of vital momentum of action – The efficiency of post disaster 
reconstruction activities is impaired as a result of delays caused by poor 
planning and implementation; restrictive legislation and regulatory provisions; 
lack of government commitment in reconstruction programmes (Aysan & 
Davis, 1993; S. K. Schneider, 1995).   
2. Loss of commitment to the reconstruction process – There is a tendency for 
poor commitment to recovery programmes by responsible authority because 
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disaster practitioners are unable to apply pragmatic solutions to real-time 
reconstruction problems for fear of being held liable for their decisions.  (J. O. 
Rotimi et al., 2008). 
3. Difficulties in achieving reconstruction deliverables and inability to accelerate 
the process of reinstatement (Ye, 2004); introduce measures for risk and 
vulnerability reduction; and aid planning for sustainable developments. 
Jigyasu, (2004);  Shaw, Shiwaka, Kobayashi & Kobayashi, (2004). 
4. Impairment of overall community recovery and quality of life. Of essence, 
reconstruction should become a tool for empowerment till a level of 
functioning is reached where communities are self sustaining and require no 
external interventions (Ofori, 2004); (Sullivan, 2003); and also a therapeutic 
process for overall community recovery (Aysan & Davis, 1993). 
3.7 Overall Summary of Knowledge Gaps in Literature 
This section concludes the problem identification phase of the study (see figure 
1.1, chapter one). The section summarises the key issues that have been raised in 
chapter one through chapter three from background readings, review of literature, 
document analyses and case study evaluation. The summary of the three chapters 
is in meeting with objectives one and two outlined in section 1.3, chapter one. The 
objectives began with a review of the existing situation and conclude with the 
identification of the research problem and knowledge gaps. 
As outlined in chapter one, the research question being addressed by the current 
study is:  
What improvements can be made to existing disaster-related legislation 
and regulatory provisions so that they facilitate the implementation of 
significant reconstruction programmes in New Zealand?  
This research question presupposes that there are problems in existing disaster-
related legislation and regulatory provisions which need improvement. The 
research study thus far has identified some of these problems and provides some 
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articulation of the problems specific to the three legislative documents that are the 
focus of the current study. Some of the key issues pertaining to the 
implementation of the three legislative documents being studied are presented in 
the left-hand column on Table 3.5. The knowledge gaps which the current study 
desires to address are presented in the right-hand column. 
The next stage of the research study which is covered in chapter five validates the 
existence of theses identified research problems and seeks means by which the 
problems can be solved through suggested improvement schemes. 
 Table 3.5 – Summary of Knowledge and Knowledge Gaps 
Knowledge Contribution Knowledge Gap 
Legislation could become a source of 
vulnerability in post disaster 
reconstruction 
Limited articulation of the nature of 
legislative problems  
Limited suggestion of solutions 
especially from practitioner 
perspectives. 
KEY ISSUES WITH LEGISLATION 
Civil Defence & Emergency Management 
Act (2002) 
Adequacy of statutory powers for 
recovery. 
Extension of Recovery Coordinators 
powers beyond declared emergency 
period. 
Recovery modalities, adequate? 
Implementation of CDEM Act vis-à-vis 
BA and RMA, Any conflict? 
 
Clarity in responsibilities and 
arrangements to deal with the transition 
from disaster response to recovery. 
Operation and coordination of disaster 
recovery after emergency declarations. 
Cross linkages of disaster management 
(in CDEM Act) with building (BA) and 
environment (RMA) legislation. 
Resource Management Act (1991) 
Resource consent process and statutory 
requirements. 
Consultation in the RMA. 
RMA and pragmatism of post disaster 
decisions. 
 
 
Limited knowledge of reconstruction 
requirements vis-à-vis resource consents 
processing. 
Implications of processing delays on 
reconstruction projects. 
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Conflicts during RMA/BA implementation Identifying of reconstruction projects of 
national significance for ministerial call-
ins (bypassing normal consent procedure 
for significant reconstruction projects) 
Mitigating the effect of public 
notification in post-disaster 
reconstruction works. 
Minimising litigation in reconstruction 
projects with potential environmental 
impacts. 
Building Act (2004) 
Building Consent process and compliance 
requirements.  
Procedural arrangements for 
building/damage evaluations (on-the spot 
assessment). 
Approval and certification of BCAs. 
Training requirements for new and 
external evaluators/assessors. 
Insurance cover for buildings with 
section 71-74 notices etc. 
Decision making liabilities etc.  
 
Limited knowledge on means by which 
stipulated processes can be simplified 
for significant events.  
Lack of guidelines for special waiver / 
modification of BA provisions for 
reconstruction projects. 
How to address parity issues for CCC and 
COA for property owners. 
Empowerment of BCAs for discretionary 
application of BA provisions in 
circumstances where expediency is 
necessary. 
Harmonisation of regulatory provisions 
between BA and environmental (RMA) / 
emergency management (CDEM Act) 
legislation. 
Other Issues 
NZ recovery capacity. 
Effect of resource availability. 
Collaboration amongst TAs and Councils. 
Public acceptance of legislative reviews. 
 
Limited knowledge on public acceptability 
of legislative changes. 
Practicability of suggested improvements 
to recovery capacity.  
Limited knowledge on consequences of 
reconstruction resource shortages. 
Poor collaborative arrangements between 
responding agencies / councils. 
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Chapter Four 
Methodology and Research Development  
4.0  Introduction  
This chapter begins by explaining the development process of the research from 
inception to completion. It then presents the research design and the philosophical 
assumptions that underlie the use of the methods that have been employed in the 
study. The methods are described and the rationale for using these methods in the 
study is explained. This is followed by the ethical issues considered in the study 
and a description of the theoretical framework that led to the development of the 
research questions. Finally the approach to data analyses is explained. 
The research essentially involved a systematic process of problem identification; 
data collection and analyses; synthesis of the knowledge gained; and finally the 
drawing up of objective conclusions in relation to the research objectives. The 
thesis outline in figure 1.1 chapter one, lists the activities and sub-activities 
undertaken throughout the four phases of the research process. Further details on 
the research process are presented in the following section to show how the study 
developed from the initial research directions to its current form.  
4.1 The Research Process 
Figure 4.1 provides a diagrammatic overview of the research process and the 
progression from the initial to the final phase of the research. In the first phase of 
the research there was a need to identify the research problem(s). The phase 
involved preliminary readings around the subject area and review of 
contemporary thoughts on disaster management in New Zealand. The researcher 
also met and interviewed five disaster management practitioners in Wellington 
and Christchurch in July 2006 (a summary of these interviews is included at 
Appendix B2). The outcome of the interviews coupled with the reviews of 
relevant recovery reports gave the initial directions to the research study and 
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provided a focus on delivering results that will be of relevance to disaster 
management in New Zealand.  
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Key research questions that the research was initially based upon include: 
How effective will the existing New Zealand reconstruction framework be in the 
event of a major disaster?  
Will the provisions in the existing regulations help or hinder reconstruction 
programmes? 
What framework and practice changes could be made to improve the 
reconstruction framework with due cognisance of stakeholder objectives?  
Four research objectives and plans were developed in line with these initial 
objectives and they included: 
• To review existing CDEM operational framework vis-à-vis statutory guidelines 
and regulations.  
• To identify the factors that determine the effectiveness of CDEM 
reconstruction programmes and their relationships and levels of influence.  
• To ascertain the effects of regulations on post disaster reconstruction 
framework, and  
• To develop process models of the existing and proposed reconstruction 
framework.  
Subsequently the researcher commenced detailed review of relevant literature, 
which culminated in the presentation of five conference papers in 2006 and 2007, 
of which three were peer-reviewed. Endnote record of these papers is given in 
Appendix C, while copies of some of the publications are included at Appendices 
D1 to D7. Feedback on these presentations led to a honing of the research 
question and objectives to those presented in sections 1.1 and 1.3 of chapter one.  
The second phase was the data collection and analyses phase. Primary data was 
obtained through the analyses of local and overseas recovery reports, government 
and other local documents. Secondary data was collected using two methods: (a) 
workshop involving a focus group of industry practitioners and (b) online survey 
of a wider community of building and development control officers and other 
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disaster practitioners. Information obtained from the secondary data was analysed 
descriptively in line with the evolving research question and objectives. Two peer-
reviewed papers, one journal and the other a conference paper, published parts of 
the preliminary findings in 2008 and 2009 (see Endnote record in Appendix C). 
The findings from the research aspect of the study were then presented to subject 
matter experts for their verification. The verification and validation exercise was 
designed to gauge the practicability of some of the suggested improvements to the 
legislative documents that were the focus of this study. 
The third phase of the study involved a synthesis of all the information generated 
to arrive at objective conclusions that meet the stated objectives of the research 
study. The suggested improvements to legislation are therefore the result of a re-
classification of practice options beyond those generated from the secondary data 
collection and analyses. 
The study consistently explored opportunities to disseminate the research output 
so that the final research outcomes could be relevant to practice needs and 
realities. Examples of where the research outputs were presented include:   
a) Presentation and discussion of the draft recommendation via telephone 
conference to industry focussed representatives based in Wellington on 2 
April 2009. A copy of the paper submitted for discussion is included at 
Appendix A4  
b) Written submission to the the Select Committee on Local Government and 
Environment, New Zealand Parliament. This was a submission on simplifying 
and streamlining the Resource Management Act, was submitted to New 
Zealand parliament on 4 April 2009. A copy of the submission is included at 
Appendix D1 
The next section describes the research design and gives reasons for selecting the 
methods that are applied in this research study.   
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4.2  The Research Design 
A multi method approach (triangulation) has been employed in the research study 
with a view to providing more credibility and validity to the research process. This 
triangulated approach is commonly used in social science research (Bryman, 2001). 
Bryman (2001) and Flick (2006) both explain that triangulation in a research study 
is a combination of several qualitative methods or may involve the combination of 
both quantitative and qualitative research methods. This combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods can occur at three matrix levels 
(Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007). It could be a ‘pure mix’ of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods, in which case, each method has equal status 
with none of the methods dominating; or at two extremes of ‘quantitative dominant’ 
or ‘qualitative dominant’ mixed research methods in line with Johnson et al. (2007). 
Figure 4.2 gives a linear representation of these three major research paradigms and 
other subtypes.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 – Three major mixed methods research paradigms including   
subtypes  Source: Adapted from Johnson et al. (2007, p. 124) 
Both quantitative and qualitative research approaches have been individually 
applied in disaster research according to Stallings (2006), while triangulation is 
increasingly being applied to more recent disaster research (Brunsma, Overfelt, & 
Picou, 2007). For example in the current study, five qualitative research methods 
were employed. Four of the methods assisted in the collection of research 
information from both primary and secondary sources; while the fifth research 
method helped to validate the qualitative information collected. All five research 
methods are described within this chapter. 
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The combined use of the five research methods have made for more incisive and 
robust findings on the impediments which legislative provisions could pose to post-
disaster reconstruction activities, and what improvements can be made to the 
current recovery management framework. This research approach provides further 
evidence that multi-method research strategies result in convergent validity because 
of the range of perspectives that the research has been viewed from (Lewis-Beck, 
Bryman, & Liao, 2003).  
4.2.1  Multiple Methods and Disaster Research 
Multiple method research study refers to the application of or combination of 
several approaches to the study of the same phenomenon. Multiple or multi 
method research is alternatively referred to as mixed research (Johnson et al., 
2007); complementary research (Flick, 2006); and triangulation. The term 
‘triangulation’ has been credited to Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest 
(1966) (Bryman, 2001; Johnson et al., 2007) when they suggested that:  
“Once a proposition has been confirmed by two or more independent 
measurement processes, the uncertainty of its interpretation is greatly 
reduced. The most persuasive evidence comes through a triangulation of 
measurement processes. If a proposition can survive the onslaught of a 
series of imperfect measures, with all their irrelevant error, confidence 
should be placed in it”. (p. 3) 
Multi methods research approach is ‘becoming increasingly articulated, attached to 
research practice, and recognized as the third major research approach or research 
paradigm, along with qualitative research and quantitative research’ (Johnson et al., 
2007, p.112). The primary philosophy behind multi methods research is that of 
introducing pragmatism to the research process. Thus knowledge is approached 
from a variety of perspectives. This benefits the research by improving confidence 
in the research materials that have been gathered from the variety of sources (Mays 
& Pope, 1995). Hewson (2006) explains that confidence is achieved through 
convergence and cross-validation of the findings; and wherever there are 
differences in the findings, these can be easily identified for further research.  
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Greene, Caracelli, & Graham (1989) provide useful reasons for employing a 
mixed methodological approach in research studies, which are applicable to multi 
methods. These reasons are outlined below with indication in each case, as to how 
these have been applied in the current study.  
1. Triangulation i.e. seeking convergence and substantiation of results from 
different methods when studying the same phenomenon. Triangulation in the 
current research study involved a synergy of information gathered from both 
primary and secondary sources; and the inputs of subject matter experts.  
2. Complementarity, which means seeking to elaborate, enhance, illustrate, or 
clarify the results from one research method(s) with results from another 
research method(s). For example two complementary methods were used in 
the current study to collect secondary data: the focus group study and the 
online survey.  
3. Development – involves using the results from one method to help inform the 
other method. Research development was achieved in this study through a 
three-step process starting from the focus group, through the administration 
of a questionnaire and finally the verification of the research results.  
4. Initiation - discovering paradoxes and contradictions that may lead to the 
review of a research question. Initiation was applicable in the first and second 
phase of the research using a combination of methods such as interviews, 
focus groups to narrow the original research question into those that will 
deliver useful knowledge to disaster management in New Zealand; and  
5. Expansion – involves seeking to expand the breadth and range of an inquiry 
through the use of different methods for different inquiry components. 
Concepts referred to in disaster management literature, especially those with 
relevance to legislative provisions, have been expanded upon through the 
focus group study and the online survey method.  
These five identified reasons have informed and provided the rationale for the 
methods used in the current research study. The study envisages that the final 
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output gives more credence to the multiple methods that have been applied. The 
validity of the current research findings is thus enhanced (Jupp, 2006).  
A form of triangulation that has been used in disaster research is multiple data 
triangulation where data is gathered using several sampling strategies. Tierney, 
Harrald and Nebb (2000) used the multiple data triangulation approach to obtain 
data from multiple sources such as document analysis, interviews and physical 
observations. Another form of triangulation used in disaster research involved the 
use of multi methods to explore local risks and threats in Australia by Buckle, 
Marsh, & Smale, (2003). The Buckle et al. study commenced with an exhaustive 
review of literature; then an analysis of expert opinions using grounded theory 
methodology; structured and semi-structured interviews were then conducted with 
individuals and focus groups; and finally a number of municipalities that had 
experienced disasters were studied using a case study approach. Buckle et al. 
explain that their choice of method was partly because of the absence of a robust 
and rigorous body of knowledge and theory about key disaster concepts; and in part 
by the exploratory and speculative nature of the study. Multiple methods therefore 
offered the best approach to their research. A similar approach to Buckle et al study 
was used by Barnshaw and Trainor (2007) and Barnshaw (2006) with the use of 
multi methods to provide better understanding of the complex social processes that 
resulted from Hurricane Katrina. Both studies employed interviews, which were 
based on grounded theory strategies and structured surveys of randomly selected 
disaster victims.  
In general, four distinguishable forms of triangulation are in use (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000). They are Data, Investigator, Theoretical and Methodological 
triangulation. Of the four forms of triangulation, methodical triangulation is 
predominantly used where the intention is to maximise the validity of a research 
(Denscombe, 2008; Johnson et al., 2007; Jupp, 2006). 
Methodological triangulation is used in the current study considering the 
exploratory and speculative nature of the current research. It was apparent from 
the literature reviewed that no other study has considered how the current 
legislative framework pertaining to reconstruction activities can be made robust to 
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cater for large scale disasters. The current study conscientiously exploited 
methods such as document analysis, focus group studies, a survey instrument to 
seek improvements to the current post-disaster regulatory environment and finally 
using subject matter experts to verify the research outputs. In summary, 
qualitative methods were used to gain basic knowledge in the subject area, which 
are then validated using both qualitative and quasi-quantitative methods. 
From the primary information sources reviewed, there appears to be a strong 
relationship between prior regulatory policies and the success of post disaster 
management programmes. Qualitative information obtained through document 
analyses and focus group discussions identified that reconstruction could be 
hindered by the current legislative framework in New Zealand. However this 
information is largely unarticulated in the current research environment. Potential 
solution(s) to the perceived problem(s) have also remained unexplored. Hence this 
current study’s research objective is to provide knowledge on how the existing 
legislative and regulatory framework for reconstruction could be improved, so 
that the legislative framework facilitates effective and efficient implementation of 
reconstruction programmes after large-scale natural disasters in New Zealand.  
The use of a multiple methods approach benefits the current study. Multiple 
methods provide more substantive results than in situations where many small 
qualitative investigations are undertaken or where there are few poorly executed 
quantitative investigations (J. Barnshaw & Trainor, 2007). Generally the prospects 
for the use of triangulation in disaster research are increasing and have helped to 
introduce robustness in disaster research processes.  
4.3  Outline of Research Methods Used 
This section describes the individual research methods that have been used in 
accomplishing the objectives of this study. The section gives the rationale for their 
selection as appropriate tools for the study. Essentially the five methods discussed 
fall under the qualitative research category.  
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Qualitative research methods are usually employed in the investigation of aspects of 
social circumstances that are not amenable to quantitative measurement as Sumner 
(2006) has stated. Denzin and Lincoln (2000) and others suggest the common use of 
the method to study things in their natural settings. Attempt is made in qualitative 
research to interpret natural phenomena from the meanings people bring to them. 
Qualitative research methods provide ways of knowing based on a constructivism 
of understanding, meanings and theory.  
The qualitative research approach has the researcher as the primary instrument of 
data collection and analysis (Merriam, 1998), thus the findings and results are 
fundamentally interpretive. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2001) the methods 
require a great deal of analyses and syntheses so that all information generated from 
the study are fitted together to form a meaningful matrix. The qualitative research 
methods that are used to accomplish the objectives of this study are described in the 
following sections. 
4.3.1 Personal Interviews 
At the early stages of the research programme it was necessary to complement the 
researcher’s knowledge base with information from other people. Personal 
interviews were therefore arranged with industry and government experts working 
in the general area of civil defence and emergency management in New Zealand. 
The interviews were an aspect of the problem identification phase of the research 
and had the following key objectives: 
• To clarify the focus of the research, specifically to determine from these experts 
if the right research questions were being asked. A list of the initial research 
question is included in section 4.1.  
• To develop further research direction beyond those decided after the initial 
literature review. 
• To determine potential information sources and the strategies for sourcing the 
information required.  
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• To determine the best way to continue with subsequent parts of the research.  
As such, the conversations and interviews were not without purpose (Merriam, 
1998); and the study concludes that the interview objectives were largely met. The 
people initially interviewed were: 
1. Mr. Rian Van Schalkwyk (Coordinator, Recovery Management Forum, 
Wellington)  
2. Dr. Hugh Cowan (Research Manager, Earthquake Commission, Wellington) 
3. Mr. Roger Crimp (Telecom, Wellington)  
4. Mr. Peter Kingsbury (MCDEM, Canterbury Regional Office), and  
5. Mr. David Brunsdon (Project Manager – Wellington Lifelines Group)  
These industry experts were contacted prior to the interview to solicit their 
participation. A research outline (including brief literature and research objectives) 
was sent to the research participants in advance by email, for their consideration. 
The interviews took place in the interviewee’s respective offices in Wellington and 
Christchurch. The interviews were conducted on 18 and 19 of April 2006 and 
generally lasted between 30 and 45 minutes. These preliminary interviews were 
semi-structured and took place within the first seven months of the research 
programme. Questions were generally open-ended so that the interviewees could 
comment freely on the proposed research and other relevant issues.  
The interviewees made useful comments on the research questions and objectives 
that helped shape the research focus. A summary of the interviews is included at 
Appendix B2, however the key themes that emanated from the interviews include: 
• This research should place emphasis on the identification of issues around the 
implementation of building and environment legislation such as the Building and 
Resource Management Acts. These legislative documents were considered 
pertinent to the achievement of reconstruction programmes in a major disaster.    
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• The study is to evaluate research information from both local and overseas 
disasters on how reconstruction works were progressed under the existing 
legislative frameworks. The criteria for selecting overseas disasters should be 
their similarities (in social, cultural and economic terms) with the New Zealand 
environment. 
• The research study should plan effectively for the data collection phase with a 
good communication plan that would ensure a good uptake of the perspective 
views of a wide range of disaster management stakeholders. 
• The study is to develop best practice guidelines that could ensure smooth 
implementation of building and environmental legislation.  
The interviewees were also forthcoming on the study resources at their disposal and 
they suggested other sources of information that were useful for the research. The 
interviews generated the initial research directions and gave useful insights into the 
nature of the research problem.  
Generally the personal interviews and other discussion forums clarified some of the 
initial research ideas, while the interviews necessitated reviews to some of the 
research objectives outlined in section 1.3 of chapter one. 
4.3.2 Workshop (Focus Group Study) 
Following on from the preliminary interviews, the Resilient Organisations 
research group held a workshop on 11 April 2006 at Te Papa, Wellington. The 
theme of the workshop was ‘Barriers to Post-Disaster Reconstruction’.  
The workshop was designed to facilitate group discussion on ideas, experiences 
and memories of participants around reconstruction after natural disasters in New 
Zealand. The group discussion produced information and insights only accessible 
through the interaction found in a group setting. This interaction is referred to as 
the group effect, such that issues emerge in a kind of chaining or cascading 
manner from topics and expressions preceding the discussion (Lindlof & Taylor, 
2002 ). 
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The workshop had industry practitioners in attendance with a wide a range of 
experience in civil defence and emergency management including other specialist 
knowledge areas in legislation, contract and recovery management. A profile of 
the workshop participants is given in Table 5.1 of chapter five. The specific 
objectives of the workshop included the following:  
1. To explore the challenges and opportunities for reconstruction in a post-
disaster situation.  
2. To prioritise research efforts on those reconstruction issues that are most 
critical, and for which the research team might be able to realistically 
influence.  
3. To identify potential barriers and opportunities for engaging the 
reconstruction stakeholders in addressing these issues.  
4. To define research outputs. 
There were three keynote papers presented in a general session, before 
participants were divided into four groups to brainstorm and discuss the main 
issues of reconstruction under four headings: legislation and regulations; contracts 
and procurement; resources; and coordination of reconstruction. At the end of the 
breakout sessions, participants reconvened to report back on the issues discussed. 
The results of the workshop (focus group) that relate to the current study are 
presented in chapter five, while the complete report on the workshop deliberations 
is included at Appendix A3. Some of the research priorities identified by the focus 
group have been progressed to a logical conclusion in the current study. The focus 
group study facilitated the triangulation process of the current research study.  
4.3.3  Document Analysis 
One of the objectives of the current study is to evaluate research information from 
past disasters and to seek means of translating the lessons learnt to improve New 
Zealand situations. It was therefore considered appropriate to undertake in-depth 
contextual analyses of past reconstruction programmes. Information on both local 
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and international reconstruction phenomena was collected through the analysis of 
relevant documents, research reports and commentaries. A large amount of 
information on the disaster events was obtained through electronic searches of 
reports and official documents. This qualitative research method was significant as 
it provided insight into current reconstruction arrangements such as the structure of 
recovery management in New Zealand; reviews of historical information on 
reconstruction activities, such as Matata and Manawatu flooding incidents; and 
commentaries on the legislative framework, such as the Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Act.   
Documents relating to reconstruction and recovery activities in two local natural 
disasters (the Matata and Manawatu flooding incidents) which had significant 
impact on New Zealand communities; and two other international events 
(Hurricane Katrina and Northridge Earthquakes) were reviewed. The external 
events were chosen for their magnitude and impact on the built environment 
(catastrophes); and the local events were selected because they are recent natural 
disasters of considerable national significance in New Zealand. The reviews and 
analysis show the constraints placed on recovery by restrictive legislative 
provisions. There was an exploration of the relevant legislative reviews (coupled 
with the modalities of such reviews) that were made in each of the incidents to 
allow for the implementation of post-disaster reconstruction programmes. 
Key legislative documents that provided guidelines on post-disaster reconstruction 
and recovery in New Zealand were analysed. The legislative documents which were 
the focus of the current research study include: the Civil Defence Emergency 
Management CDEM Act (2002); the Resource Management Act RMA (1991); and 
the Building Act BA (2004). Other related documents, agency reports and 
commissioned reports referred to included research reports of studies conducted by 
Resilient Organisations research group members; and reports prepared by The 
Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand (IPENZ) and the Auckland 
Engineering Lifelines Group (AELG). Key lessons from the document analyses and 
disaster cases are presented in chapter three. 
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4.3.4  Survey/Questionnaire 
The survey used in this research study was designed as an instrument for validating 
previously generated information from the personal interviews and focus group 
discussions. The questions covered themes and sub-themes which are in line with 
the main objectives pursued throughout the interviews, focus study, and analyses of 
relevant documents. The questionnaire was an opinion survey with the majority of 
the questions in the form of Ordinal and Likert scales. The different sections of the 
questionnaire contained statements which participants were required to rate 
according to their opinions on the subject matter. The statements are both positively 
and negatively worded to minimise the tendency of participants responding towards 
one end of the scale (Sekaran, 2003).  
There were open ended questions which permitted the participants to give reasons 
for their opinions and to provide additional comments. The open ended questions 
were probing questions (Oppenheim, 1992) which illuminated their responses and 
helped to put the results in proper perspective. Analyses of responses to these parts 
of the questionnaire are presented in chapter 5.   
The questionnaire was designed as a generic instrument so that the same 
questionnaire was administered to all irrespective of who was participating.  It was 
therefore necessary to collect demographic and other useful information to assist 
with categorising the responses. These demographic questions helped to ascertain 
the respondent’s profile. Where needed, the pattern of the responses could be cross 
validated with their capability profile during data analysis.  
The main body of the questionnaire required the respondents to rate some 
statements about the CDEM Act, BA and RMA in accordance with their opinions 
on how these Acts will affect the implementation of reconstruction works after 
disasters.  
The questionnaire was structured to be administered as an on-line survey (through 
an independent web portal called ‘Survey Monkey’) to respondents. This decision 
was reached after having explored several data collection methods. For example 
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some government agencies that were initially consulted, gave indications that they 
could not permit the use of their websites to promote the survey or to use their 
mailing lists to distribute hard copies of the questionnaire. The preferred option 
was therefore the on-line survey with participants sent web links to the survey 
within the letter requesting their participation. The request for participation 
included attachments containing the ‘participant information sheet’ and 
‘participant consent forms’.  
The survey was initially open for a period of six weeks commencing late February 
to the end of March, 2008. The survey portal enabled tracking of the survey to 
determine the number of completed and uncompleted responses. A reminder was 
sent out mid-March to request participants to respond to the survey before the end 
date. A further two weeks was allowed for the completion of the online survey. 
The questionnaire asked questions which aligned with the main research 
objectives outlined in section 1.3 of chapter one. In order to identify the 
constraints that may be posed by existing legislative and regulatory provisions 
(objective 2), the questionnaire asked questions to determine the effect that 
existing provisions within the CDEM Act, BA and RMA could have on the 
reconstruction of the built environment after major natural disaster events in New 
Zealand. 
To meet objective 3 of the research, the questionnaire asked specific questions to 
confirm or refute recovery problems that are envisaged in the deficient aspects of 
recovery-related legislation. For example there were questions to determine the 
following: 
a) how the span of control and liabilities of appointed Recovery Coordinators 
could be enhanced through legislation, so that they retain control of 
reconstruction after the initial response to a disaster. 
b) how existing arrangements for emergency readiness and response can be 
extended to cater for the longer-term recovery period especially after the 
expiration of declared state of emergencies. 
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c) how the building consent process can be simplified and made more responsive 
to potential higher demands during the reconstruction period, reducing the 
frustrations experienced under the current process. 
These questions emanate from previously gathered research information during 
the first phase of problem identification. Generally the questionnaire was designed 
as a validation tool and to propose means by which the identified deficiencies in 
legislation could be minimised. The quantitative data generated from the survey 
was analysed with the aid of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 
and Microsoft Excel software. 
4.3.4.1 The Pilot Survey  
An initial pilot of 10 surveys was conducted using members of the research 
supervision committee, members of the Resilient Organisations research group 
and two officials of the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The pilot (or pre-test) was desired to provide feedback on the structure, 
comprehensibility, relevance, and any issue of bias noticed in the questionnaire. 
The initial questionnaire was subsequently modified in line with the feedback 
received from this pilot group of respondents. A large proportion of the changes 
made to the original questionnaire dealt with rewording/rephrasing of the 
questions. 
*  On the front page you say they should withdraw by 31st Jan 08 - will need to 
change this date. 
*  1. In the course of your work performance (decision making etc), how often 
do you make reference to the following Acts - suggest taking out the word 
"performance" 
*  Pg 3: There can be no conflicts while applying the BA and other Acts 
relating to the reconstruction of the built environment. - is "can" the right 
word here? 
*  Pg 3: The BA consent application process is not the major source of concern 
in post-disaster reconstruction. - should "the" be replaced by "a" - what 
impact would this change have on the answers you get? 
*  Pg 3, question 2. Suggest spelling out "Building Act" 
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An example of some of the suggestions to reword the questions is given in the text 
box on the previous page. Items in the text box were extracted from the email 
correspondences between the researcher and one of the pilot participants. 
Some other suggestions by pilot participants relate to the structure of the 
questionnaire. For example the parts of the questionnaire with Likert scales had to 
be written to include both positively and negatively-worded questions to prevent 
participants from answering questions at one end of the scale. An extract from the 
email correspondence with one of the participants relating to the wording of the 
Likert-scaled questions is given in the text box below.  
 
 
 
There were useful suggestions by the pilot participants to facilitate smoother 
administration and answering of the online questionnaire. There were some 
technical tools in the Survey Monkey portal, which needed adjusting to enable 
survey participants to start and complete the questionnaire without broken or 
missing links within the period for which the survey was open. The text box 
below gives an observation that was made by one of the pilot participants on the 
technicalities of the online questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
Other changes that were made to the initial questionnaire included providing 
enough space for participants to address some of the open-ended questions; and 
making some of the questions in the demography section optional, so that the 
The questions on BA/RMA are all negative, you should change some of them to be 
positive, as otherwise people will not read all and answer ‘Strongly Disagree’ for 
them all, or ‘Strongly Agree’. Likewise with the civil defence ones being all 
positive. 
 
 
About your trial survey, there are several technical problems as some of the 
question lists have vertical dead locks, which shouldn’t be the case (couldn’t select 
same answer for different questions). You may want to fix them. The other thing 
you might want to consider is that some questions are required to be answered 
before the interviewee could proceed further. Respondents may drop the survey 
halfway very easily. But generally it's a very organised and good one. 
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respondents can complete the questionnaire. These and other changes previously 
described are proof of the usefulness of conducting pilot surveys.   
4.3.4.2 The Communication Plan 
At the conclusion of the pilot survey, a communication plan was put in place for 
the distribution of the questionnaire. The communication plan was necessary in 
order to reduce the following perceived risks: 
• risk of non-participation or poor response to the survey. 
• poor communication plan resulting in inability to reach the target respondents. 
• difficulties in achieving follow-up and feedback on responses after the survey, 
and 
• discarding of responses from either uncompleted or outlier-type answers.  
The following paragraphs describe the steps taken to minimise the risks identified 
above.  
To address the risk of non-participation or poor responses, the researcher decided 
to seek means by which wider participation could be gained. One step taken to 
achieve good response was to solicit participation through local councils in New 
Zealand. All 86 councils in New Zealand were telephoned to request their 
permission to pass the questionnaires through their offices. After speaking with 
either the Chief Executive Officers or their Personal Assistants, 85 councils gave 
their approval to become the channels of distribution of the questionnaire. The 
councils were required to identify officials who were in a position to address the 
issues raised in the survey. These included officers concerned with the 
implementation of the Building Act, Resource Management Act and Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Act. Some of the councils had officers 
responsible for each Act while others had officers with dual/multiple roles that 
could respond to the survey. Another step taken to encourage participation was to 
administer the questionnaires to the 12 Regional Emergency Management 
Officers (EMOs) in New Zealand, through their Coordinator based in Wellington. 
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He was contacted by phone, and he agreed to assist in the distribution of the 
questionnaire to his colleagues. There was also specific invitation to selected 
people and a general invitation to participate placed on the Resilient Organisation 
website to improve the responses rate to the questionnaire. A breakdown of the 
final survey participation through the different medium used to encourage 
participation is given in Table 5.2 of chapter five.  
The risk of inability to reach target responses was mitigated by using a variety of 
means to advertise the online survey. There were phone calls and emails made to 
key people; advertisements were placed on the Resilient Organisations website; 
and personal contacts with industry participants. These means of communication 
were exploited to their fullest use to increase the probability of reaching the target 
participants.     
To minimise the risk of not achieving follow-up and feedback to the survey, a part 
of the questionnaire requires participants to indicate their interest in participating 
in any feedback or future surveys. Those who indicate interest are further required 
to fill-out their email contacts to demonstrate consent to future contacts. The 
survey result database includes contact information of participants who can be 
contacted for their feedback.   
Finally to avoid discarding the responses, the study needed to ensure that only 
people who had genuine interest in the survey and the overall research outcome 
participate in the survey. It was also necessary to ensure that the respondents had 
good knowledge of the subject matter in the questionnaire. Therefore the 
questionnaire was structured to pick up the knowledge base of participants and 
other background information which could demonstrate the reliability of their 
responses. The information sheet accompanying the questionnaire contained 
information on who the questionnaires were addressed to, and other information 
that could encourage the right participation. A copy of the participant information 
sheet is included at Appendix B3. 
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4.3.5  Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) 
Subject matter experts (SMEs) are individuals who are experts in their field of 
activities (Sugar & Schwen, 1995). They have been engaged in the current study to 
complete triangulation in the research process. The research is conscious of the 
need to provide feasible solutions to deficient parts of the three legislative 
documents, hence the engagement of SMEs to verify the research outputs and to 
confirm whether suggested solutions could be applied in practice. Three SMEs were 
selected; one for each legislative document (CDEM Act, RMA and BA) to extend 
and verify the results obtained from the focus group and online surveys. The SMEs 
were expected to provide their opinions on issues relating to their field of expertise 
and other general issues around the implementation of post-disaster reconstruction 
programmes in New Zealand. 
A structured questionnaire was administered to each of the SMEs for their 
comments. The respective questionnaires to the SMEs are included at Appendix B6 
to B8. The questionnaires contain the outlines of key issues that emanated from the 
focus group study and online survey; and other general issues on disaster 
management in New Zealand. The specific objective for approaching the SMEs 
with these issues is to enable verification of the research outputs, in terms of the 
deficiencies in these legislative documents and the feasibility in practice of this 
study’s suggested improvements. 
The three SMEs selected for the study are: 
1. Mr. Paul Houliston - Manager, Civil Defence Emergency Management Policy 
in the Department of Internal Affairs, Te Tari Taiwhenua, Wellington. Mr. 
Houliston holds a postgraduate qualification with over 20 years of New Zealand 
experience. Paul considers that he has very good knowledge of the three 
legislative documents being studied. However he is selected as the SME to give 
his valued opinion on policy-type issues around the CDEM Act. 
2. Mr. Owen McShane - Director, Centre for Resource Management Studies, 
Kaiwaka, Northland. Owen is a commentator on a wide a range of issues that 
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border the RMA. Owen has written widely on resource management and draws 
references from overseas experiences to proffer suggestions to implementation 
problems around the RMA. Owen has over 20 years of New Zealand and overseas 
experience. Owen has been selected as the SME to address issues pertaining the 
RMA and reconstruction in New Zealand. 
3. Mr. Mike Stannard - Chief Engineer, Department of Building and Housing, 
Wellington. Mike was requested to give his valued opinion on the implementation 
issues around the BA in New Zealand. Mr. Mike Stannard has a postgraduate 
qualification with over 20 years of work experience in both New Zealand and 
overseas. Mike has a very good understanding of BA issues and engages with the 
document on a regular basis.  
The information obtained from this verification exercise enable a re-classification of 
practicable solutions beyond those generated from the secondary data collection and 
analyses. The actual results of the verification are presented in discussion format in 
chapter five in line with the key themes emanating from the research. The 
verification exercise enhanced the research triangulation that pulls together all the 
information into a meaningful conclusion in chapter six and seven. 
4.4  Developing the Theoretical Framework  
This section gives an outline of the conceptual foundation that has been developed 
from the qualitative approaches used in this study. This is the theoretical framework 
upon which other aspects of the research are based. Sekaran (2003) describes the 
theoretical framework for a research as that which presents the interrelationships 
among variables that are integral to the dynamics of the research study. The 
relationships between the variables helps develop theories and hypotheses which 
can be examined for their validity by the research process.  
The preliminary readings around the subject area and the outcome of the 
workshop held in April 2006 provided useful insight into the issues of concern in 
the management of post-disaster reconstruction activities in New Zealand. There 
were a range of problems and issues that were identified, which could cause 
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impediments to the realisation of reconstruction objectives in New Zealand. A 
pertinent issue, which is being pursued by the current study, is the legislative and 
regulatory framework for post-disaster reconstruction. Thus the main research 
question pursued by the study is: 
What improvement can be made to existing disaster-related legislation and 
regulatory provisions so that they facilitate the implementation of significant 
reconstruction programmes in New Zealand?  
Other related questions developed out of this main research question include: 
What specific provisions/clauses within the Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Act, Resource Management Act and Building Act, could impact post-
disaster reconstruction?         
How could a balance be achieved between the needs for expeditious 
reconstruction programmes and legislative compliance requirements contained in 
the three Acts? 
How adequate is New Zealand’s recovery framework to cater for a large-scale 
recovery effort beyond what it is used to? 
The CDEM Act, RMA and BA are the three legislative documents of primary 
interest in post-disaster reconstruction in New Zealand. These documents give 
legal backing to recovery related issues including emergency and recovery 
powers, coordination responsibilities, standard operating procedures, and 
interrelationships between stakeholders. The research investigations conducted by 
the current study show clearly that regulatory provisions in these three Acts need 
to be made more robust to enable post-disaster recovery and reconstruction 
programmes. The research hypothesis therefore is that some of the content of the 
three Acts would need to be reviewed so that they facilitate the implementation of 
significant reconstruction programmes.  
The survey instrument is designed to prove or disprove that the three legislative 
documents were deficient and could impede post-disaster reconstruction. Thus if 
it could be deduced from the survey results that the three Acts pose significant 
barriers to post disaster reconstruction then the hypothesis is accepted otherwise 
rejected. 
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Research triangulation is achieved in the current study through a synergy of 
information gathered using the focus group, the online survey and the research 
verification questionnaire. These approaches generate information on 
improvements that can be made to the legislative documents to facilitate post-
disaster reconstruction. Some other general opinions about the nature of disaster 
management in New Zealand would also provide conceptual basis to the survey 
responses. 
4.5 Research Data Analyses 
The study adopts a qualitative approach to the analyses of the research data. 
Several analyses and presentation formats are used. For example frequencies and 
percentages were used to classify the opinions obtained from the online survey 
(see Appendix B5); tables and figures summarise some of the data (see section 5.2 
to 5.8); and descriptive narratives of essay type questions are provided (section 
5.10). The objective for selecting the approach to research data analyses in the 
current study follows Chenail (1995) suggestions for openness, juxtaposition and 
simple presentation strategies.  
Openness is achieved in the data analyses by presenting as much of the 
information collected during the research study as possible, in a clear manner. 
Juxtaposition in the study involved relating the information and data collected 
from both primary and secondary sources to the analyses, description and 
commentaries. Juxtaposition allowed emerging themes and gaps to be accurately 
discussed within the context of the current study. Finally the presentation format 
has been kept as simple as possible because complexity is in the data collected in 
any qualitative research (Chenail, 1995).    
Some of the information collected required further analysis beyond those 
described above, such as the ranking of responses using weighted average 
measure, and thematic analysis of essay type responses. These analytical methods 
are briefly described under the following headings.  
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4.5.1  Weighted Average Method 
The weighted average was used to rank some of the responses obtained from the 
Likert scaled questions. Values (0, 1, 2 and 3) were assigned to the opinions given 
by participants. For instance, 3 was assigned to ‘High priority’; 2 to ‘Low 
priority’ etc. The formula used simply sums up the respective multiples of the 
number of response by the assigned values. The total weight is used as the criteria 
for ranking the statements. A statement with the highest total weight is ranked 1, 
meaning that it is considered by the respondents to be of higher priority than the 
next succeeding total weight. 
4.5.2 Thematic Analyses 
Thematic analysis has been used in the context of this research to summarise and 
encapsulate information that was provided in the open ended questions in the 
online survey and the questionnaire to the SMEs. Thematic analysis allowed ideas 
to emerge from identifiable themes and patterns from the transcripts of the 
responses. The steps involved reading backwards and forwards between the 
transcripts to collate the themes. In some sections where thematic analysis was 
conducted, the result includes extracts of relevant transcripts to provide back-up 
evidence. Complete transcripts of the original data from the online survey are 
presented in the Questionnaire Analyses sheet in Appendix B5. 
4.6  Ethical Considerations in the Research 
The study considered ethical issues at all stages of the research design and 
execution process. An application was made to the University’s Human Ethics 
Committee on the 5 October 2007. Ethics approval was granted by the Human 
Ethics Committee on 30 November 2007 (Ref. HEC 2007/148 in Appendix B1). 
Ethics application was made on the University’s approved format and other 
supporting documents such as the list of questions with an appropriate rubric; 
participant information sheet (included at Appendix B3); and participant consent 
form (included at Appendix B4) were attached.  
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All University ethics guidelines and principles were adhered to in the formulation 
and administration of the questionnaire. All solicitations for participation and 
subsequent correspondences contained information guided by the following 
principles:  
1. Informed Consent – All participants were made aware of the nature of the 
research through the initial request for participation (emails and web 
information) and the participant information sheets. They were told their 
rights to accept or decline their participation at any time during the study 
(including withdrawal of information they have provided). All participants 
were requested to fill out a consent form to confirm their decision to 
participate in the research. 
2. Privacy and Confidentiality – All participants were assured of their rights to 
privacy, confidentiality and anonymity through the use of pseudonyms. No 
participant is directly identified within this thesis, without their prior consent 
to do so.    
3. Limitation of Deception – Every step has been taken to provide participants 
with the true nature of the research and of the use of any information they 
have provided.   
4. Minimisation of Risk – There is no foreseeable risk on the part of the 
participants and the researcher in this study considering that other ethics 
principles are upheld. 
5. Obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi – There were no matters of cultural 
concern raised; nonetheless cognisance was given to this principle throughout 
the study. 
4.7 Conclusion 
The focus of this chapter was to provide an overview of the research process, 
research methodology and the parameters within which the study was conducted. 
The development process of the research questions and objectives from the early 
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part of the study up to its current form were presented together with contextual 
information that explains the reasons for choices that were made during the 
research development phases. The research programme involved qualitative 
research approaches to generate data on the needed improvements to three 
legislative Acts in New Zealand. The qualitative research methods used were 
presented and the process by which research triangulation was achieved in the 
study is explained. 
The following chapter presents detailed results from the focus group study, the 
online survey and the verification questionnaire. This is undertaken in pursuant of 
objective three of the research study which is outlined in section 1.3 of chapter 
one. 
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Chapter Five 
Analyses and Presentation of Results 
5.0  Introduction  
This chapter reports on the results of the research methods employed in the study 
i.e. the focus group, online survey and verification exercise. The three approaches 
are described and the research outcomes presented under main themes and sub-
themes pursued by the research. These themes are in consonance with the general 
focus of the research study which has been highlighted throughout the literature 
review and other parts of this report. 
The chapter concludes by comparing the results of the two research approaches as 
a way of validating the research outcomes. The main objective of the chapter is to 
present the problems (and possible solutions) associated with the implementation 
of current recovery-related legislation in practical terms. Other general aspects of 
disaster management in New Zealand are covered by the research also.  
Preliminary investigations that were carried out through interviews, literature 
review and document analyses brought to light recovery problems in New 
Zealand. Particularly some issues surround the implementation of the CDEM Act, 
RMA and BA. Some of the issues were highlighted in section 3.3 and 3.4 of 
chapter three, while the result of preliminary interviews conducted at the early 
stage of the research are presented in section 4.3.1.1 of chapter four. 
Essentially this chapter is in pursuant of objective three of the research study, 
which is: 
to investigate whether building and development control officers, and other 
disaster management practitioners, envisage problems in the post-disaster 
recovery process that are specifically caused by deficiencies in legislation.  
The chapter presents the result of three research instruments to prove or disprove 
recovery problems that are envisaged during the implementation of the current 
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legislative framework for post disaster; and to seek means by which future 
reconstruction programmes can be executed with minimum hindrance. 
5.1 The Research Workshop (Focus Group Study)  
This section reports on the outcome of the workshop described in section 4.3.1.2 
of chapter four. The outcomes are reported using the personal notes and 
observations of the author during the course of the discussion sessions. 
The workshop was structured in a focus group format, with participants 
encouraged to express their ideas in a free-flowing and relatively unrestrictive 
atmosphere. ResOrgs’ lead researchers were the facilitators and moderators to the 
group discussions while student researchers (including the author) were the 
rapporteurs at the discussion sessions that took place simultaneously. 
The focus group was comprised of representatives experienced and 
knowledgeable in CDEM and other specialist knowledge areas such as insurance, 
disaster legislation, construction and contract management. A breakdown of the 
type of organisations represented at the workshop is given in Table 5.1. In all, 
there were 24 focus group participants and 9 ResOrgs members in attendance. The 
invited participants had been sent a proposed agenda, and a list of questions that 
the group would discuss prior to the workshop. 
Table 5.1 – Profile of workshop participants 
No Type of Organisation Number in attendance 
1 Insurance including EQC 6 
2 Territorial/local councils 5 
3 Lifelines (Telecom, Transit NZ etc) 3 
4 Research and Education 4 
5 Private consultancy (legal & engineering) 4 
6 MCDEM 2 
7 Resilient Organisations 9 
 TOTAL 33 
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There were three keynote papers presented in a general session before participants 
were divided into four sub-groups to discuss key post-disaster reconstruction 
issues under four headings: legislation and regulations; contracts and 
procurement; resources; and coordination of reconstruction. At the end of the 
breakout session, participants reconvened to report back on the issues discussed 
and to summarise the key outcomes. The key outcomes that relate to the current 
research study are presented under the section 5.1.2. The following sub-heading 
presents a summary of the keynote presentations. 
5.1.1 Summary of Keynote Presentations  
This section summarises the three keynote presentations delivered at the general 
session before participants were broken into smaller groups. More emphasis is 
given to the second keynote presentation because it aligns more closely to the 
current research focus. Generally, all three presentations helped to set the stage for 
the focus group discussions that followed the keynote presentations. 
First Keynote Presentation
David’s presentation was on the effects of disasters and the challenges it poses to 
recovery. David summarised the effects of disasters into what he acronym the 
‘4Ds’ of Damage, Death, Destruction and the Determination to recover. In terms 
of the challenges to recovery, he drew an interesting analogy of the disaster 
recovery process and recovery from the casualty of a broken limb. In summary he 
considers that the main challenge to recovery is to ‘get back to normal’ by taking 
every possible step to achieve this.    
:  David Hopkins (David Hopkins Consulting)  
Second Keynote Presentation
David Middleton’s presentation focused on the issues and problems that surround 
post disaster reconstruction in New Zealand. His presentation reinforced the 
issues identified by the workshop conveners i.e. resources, legislation, 
coordination and contractual issues. David believes that recovery in New Zealand 
would present a set of challenges that could not be easily solved under 
normal/routine operating conditions. He pointed out that day-to-day legislation 
: David Middleton (EQC) 
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such as the Resource Management and Building Acts will constitute the biggest 
impediments to reconstruction as emergency management officials may be 
constrained and fearful of overstepping certain legislative parameters. David 
suggests that the following specific issues need to be addressed as a way of 
enhancing post-disaster recovery in New Zealand:  
a) The challenges that will be faced by appointed Recovery Controllers who may 
not have the power to coordinate recovery activities under the current 
legislative framework. 
b) The transfer of recovery coordination between different persons during a long-
term recovery period i.e. transfers of control from Group Controllers to Group 
and local Recovery Managers etc.  
c) The nature of contractual arrangements in New Zealand may pose impediments 
to the efficiency of reconstruction projects. Contract and procurements 
arrangements may have to be reviewed to suit the demands for speed and 
efficiency during recovery periods.    
David concludes that it is imperative that systems be put in place that will 
streamline processes before any significant disaster event in New Zealand. He 
believes that emergency management officials can achieve success in disaster 
management, if the officials are given reasonable leeway to act under conditions 
of trust and positive relationships.   
Third Keynote Presentation
Regan presented three novel questioning systems being trialled on actual disaster 
events around the world by some of the non-governmental agencies he is involved 
with. These questionnaires were developed to ensure that the intervention of the 
non-governmental agencies in disaster reconstruction activities achieves the 
desired objectives for community recovery. Such questionnaires may be useful as 
a check on the effectiveness of recovery policies after disasters. 
:  Regan Potangoroa (UNITEC, New Zealand) 
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5.1.2  The Focus Group (Key Outcomes)  
This section presents the outcome of the discussions by focus group participants. 
The discussions were held after keynote presentations in four different groups 
corresponding to the four identified issues that could pose barriers to post disaster 
reconstruction activities in New Zealand. These are (a) contractual issues; (b) 
resource availability and accessibility; (c) legislation; and (d) recovery 
coordination. However, this chapter presents only the outcome of the discussions 
under (c) and (d) because they closely align with the research focus.  
The pre-cursory information given to the ‘legislation’ focus group and subsequent 
discussion honed the hypothesis that the provisions of some legislative documents 
would impede reconstruction after a large-scale disaster in New Zealand. These 
impediments could be lengthy bureaucratic procedures; conflicts of 
responsibilities or misplacement of recovery policy priorities. The questions 
addressed by the participants were: 
 (a) How to provide the best balance between legislative requirements and rapid 
recovery (reconstructing the built environment) after disasters.  
(b) What could be done to achieve effective reconstruction?  
(c) Would a review or realignment of existing legislation be adequate?  
(d) Is a national recovery framework required to facilitate reconstruction 
objectives?  
At the end of the focus groups deliberations, the information was collated and 
discussed further in a general session. The sets of information generated by the 
focus group were plotted on a decision matrix table (see Figure 5.2) to determine 
their relative importance and subsequently the priority areas were ranked. 
After plotting the general issues on the decision matrix, the statements in the 
following text box summarise the research priorities pertaining to the current 
research study on disaster legislation and regulations.  
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 Figure 5.1 - Decision matrix for ranking research priorities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The items identified in the main research focus, were used to formulate the key 
objectives pursued by the current research study. Particularly items 2, 3 and 5 
listed in the text box above are in consonance with the issues discovered at the 
early stages of the research programme; they were also raised at a number of 
Items in the main research focus:  
1. To determine the extent of liabilities for reconstruction works and where 
this lies 
2. To determine how the consenting process for reconstruction programmes 
can be simplified 
3. To study the gaps in existing legislation and other wider government 
initiatives and consequently the constraints this will impose on post-
disaster recovery  
4. To determine public acceptance issues for changes in legislation needed, 
and 
5. To define what legislation should address. 
Items to be achieved by other ways (High Importance):  
1.  How to facilitate engagement by the Disaster Planning and Management 
Committee (DPMC).  
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forums where the current research was discussed. Other items in the main 
research focus identified by the group have been identified as potential future 
research topics for the Resilient Organisations research programme. 
The deliberations of the focus group that considered the legislative and regulatory 
barriers to post disaster reconstruction in New Zealand are summarised below. 
Current legislative and regulatory provisions may pose barriers to the 
implementation of major reconstruction programmes.  
Focus group members were in general agreement that the provisions in some 
legislative documents around disaster management are ambiguous. Particular 
concern was in the implementation of those provisions during extensive 
reconstruction programmes when the demands for speed are of essence to 
community recovery. The focus group noted that more should be able to be 
achieved following the expiration of the period of a declared emergency. The 
following are examples of the areas of concern noted in some legislative 
documents: 
• Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act – There were concerns 
around planning and strategising for reconstruction activities as provided for 
by the Act. For example, group members were of the opinion that appointed 
Recovery Controllers may not have the powers to actually coordinate 
reconstruction. Coordination and control responsibilities are more likely to be 
taken over from the Controller at the expiration of a declared state of 
emergency. This may mean changes in policy approaches and discontinuity 
during the transition period from emergency response to actual recovery. This 
change may impact on the implementation of reconstruction programmes. 
• Resource Management Act (RMA) – The focus group were concerned that the 
statutory requirements for processing of resource of consents may not augur 
well for an early recovery from a disaster event. There are delays envisaged in 
compliance and processing arrangements considering that there would be a 
spike of consent applications to be processed within a limited timeframe. 
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• Local Government Act – The processes and powers stipulated in the Act are 
of concern and the focus group asked how much discretionary control is able 
to be exercised under current extensive consultation requirements? Another 
related question asked was: what liability cover exists for Recovery 
Managers?  
• Building Act (BA) – Compliance and processing delays are envisaged as in 
the RMA. Focus group members asked what effect the new building 
inspection regime would have on minor reconstruction works. The new Act 
requires several hold points during construction work where inspections have 
to be carried out before work could be progressed. For minor reconstruction 
works, how much of inspection is needed and in which circumstances will 
inspection be required. There are also wider implications of the new 
guidelines for certification of Building Consent Authorities on reconstruction 
work. The question asked by members is: how prepared are the councils for 
certification?  
• EQC Act – The areas of concern on the EQC Act include its prescription and 
limitation to the administration of compensation claims. The focus group 
noted that there is no certainty on what perils are covered by EQC considering 
that the EQC had been flexible in previous hazard events.  
Of the five legislative documents identified by the focus group, only three of these 
have been investigated by the current study that focuses on the CDEM Act, RMA 
and BA.      
Current legislation may prevent pragmatic solutions from being implemented 
during response and recovery.  
The focus group discussed the implications of the current framework on decision 
making responsibilities. There were fears that disaster management leadership 
could become more risk-averse as the scale of devastation in a disaster event 
increases. There is the tendency on the part of decision-makers not to want to 
apply a pragmatic solution that is outside of statutory guidelines. They note that 
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the current legislation is disempowering. For instance, who can make decisions on 
debris disposal, dead animals, or waste? How much liability cover is available to 
decision makers in the event of failed policies or actions? 
Organised arrangements for readiness and response may not be adequate in a 
large-scale recovery programme.  
The focus group discussed the recovery situation in previous disaster events. They 
concluded that there are organised arrangements for readiness and response in 
New Zealand; however these arrangements would not suffice, particularly during 
the recovery phase of a major natural disaster. The following questions were 
posed: Who is in charge of recovery? Is it the MCDEM, Recovery Controller, 
Recovery Manager, or affected lifelines? Some local government officials in the 
group suggested the establishment of cluster groups as a special arrangement to 
oversee reconstruction activities within geographical areas. No conclusion was 
reached on the feasibility of this cluster approach. However, it was agreed that the 
statutory basis for coordination of recovery activities in New Zealand is not 
adequate.  
Several different pieces of legislation guide recovery agencies thus operational 
performance may not permit flexibility in decision making.  
The group noted that there were different pieces of legislation that contain 
operational guidelines for performance during an emergency. Some of the 
guidelines are specific to some agencies while others are generic. Some agencies 
may find it difficult to operate outside the remit of their guiding documents 
(emergency plans, standard operating procedures etc) which may not be in tandem 
with those of other agencies. Inter-agency coordination of efforts seems unlikely 
in such a circumstance. Some group members have questioned the extent to which 
agencies would consider the impact of their actions (or inaction) on other 
agencies.  
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Legislation may be difficult to change because law revision takes a long time to 
process before implementation.  
The group noted that legislation changes take long to effect. Potential reviews and 
law changes may have to be made before a disaster event. The group noted that 
contentious areas observed during recent recovery programmes have to be 
addressed before another hazard event. The group submit that this is one way that 
current bureaucratic tendencies could be avoided in times of chaos. In the event 
that needed legislative changes have not taken effect before another disaster, the 
group suggested that a controlled relaxation of the contentious areas may be 
expedient to allow for efficiency and effectiveness of emergency activities.  
5.1.3  Conclusion 
The information received from this focus group reinforces previously held 
opinions about the problems of implementing legislative provisions after a 
disaster in New Zealand. There is some consistency in the opinions expressed by 
this focus group and those of the industry experts interviewed at the early stages 
of the research. Throughout the research development stages it became apparent 
that the CDEM Act, RMA and BA are the main pieces of legislation of concern in 
post-disaster reconstruction in New Zealand. Therefore, imperatives for this 
research programme include more incisive studies to address the potential 
problems that these three Acts may cause to post-disaster reconstruction; and how 
these problems can be mitigated.  
The research question is honed on the improvements that can be made to the three 
identified legislation and other regulatory provisions so that they facilitate the 
implementation of significant reconstruction programmes in New Zealand. Thus, 
in pursuant of the third research objectives which is to investigate whether 
problems are envisaged in the recovery process that are specifically caused by 
deficiencies in legislation (outlined in section 1.3), the study expanded the scope 
of its investigation by administering an online questionnaire to a larger group of 
disaster management practitioners, building and environmental development 
officials.  
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The online survey is described in the next section and is followed by a discussion 
of the results of a verification exercise. The chapter concludes with a general 
summary of findings from the three research approaches (focus group, online 
survey and verification exercise) employed in this study. 
5.2 The Online Survey 
This section reports on the outcome of the online survey administered using an 
internet web service called Survey Monkey (http://www.surveymonkey.com/). 
The section begins with a description of the questionnaire, the profile of the 
respondents and then the salient issues covered by the different parts of the 
questionnaire. The results are presented under main themes and sub-themes, 
corresponding to prior qualitative information that is being validated by the 
questionnaire. 
5.2.1 Brief Description  
The website used for the administration of the questionnaire has basic research 
features which allow for the design of the survey instrument; its testing, the 
collection and simple analyses of the responses. Some information on the survey 
instrument was provided in chapter four (section 4.3.2.1). A detailed analysis of 
the questionnaire is included at Appendix B5. This contains data on frequency and 
percentages of the responses.  
The objective of the questionnaire was to investigate whether officials with 
experience in building and environmental development and emergency 
management envisage problems in the post-disaster recovery process in New 
Zealand. Thus the questionnaire covered the following themes: 
• Investigation of the impediments imposed by the CDEM Act on post disaster 
reconstruction 
• Investigation of the impediments imposed by the RMA on post disaster 
reconstruction  
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• Investigation of the impediments imposed by the BA on post disaster 
reconstruction, and 
• Other general investigations on the effectiveness of post-disaster management 
activities in New Zealand.  
Two other parts of the questionnaire covered the following themes:  
• The demography of participants (Profiling); and  
• Questions to determine participants’ knowledge of disaster-related legislation  
Altogether the questionnaire covered the six main themes that were outlined 
above. The results of the analyses of the responses are presented under six 
sections (5.3 to 5.8) that correspond with the themes covered.  
5.2.2  Response Rate  
There were four methods by which the on-line survey was administered to the 
participants in New Zealand (stated in chapter four, section 4.3.2.1). These were 
by direct administration of the survey to the 86 territorial local authorities; 
through the Coordinator of Regional Emergency Management Officers; selective 
distribution to interested persons; and a general request for participation posted on 
the Resilient Organisations’ website.  
It was estimated that a total of 200 responses could be received through these 
sources. The research assumes that at least one-third of the 86 councils will 
produce three participants each (N=86) while the remaining two-thirds will 
produce two participants each respectively (N=114). The first set of surveys were 
despatched to participants on 22 February 2008. A follow-up in the form of a 
reminder was sent out on 18 March 2008 to those who had either not responded or 
completed the questionnaire. The survey portal had a tracking system that 
displayed the number of persons who had started, but not completed their 
questionnaire. The last of the questionnaire was received by surface mail on 15 
May 2008.  
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The total number of usable questionnaires after a data cleanup exercise was 80. 
This corresponds to an overall response rate of 40% when compared with the total 
anticipated response of 200. The table 5.2 below gives a breakdown of the number 
of questionnaires received through each medium of distribution.  
Table 5.2 – The distribution of survey responses 
No. Medium of Distribution No. of usable 
Questionnaires  
Response rate cf 
expected 200 (%) 
1. Local Councils 57 28.5 
2. Coordinator, Regional 
Emergency Management 
Officers 
19 9.5 
3. Selected participants 4 2 
4. General notification 
(ResOrgs website) 
0 0 
 TOTAL 80  40 
 
The highest number of questionnaires was received through the territorial local 
authorities, while no questionnaires were received through the Resilient 
Organisations’ website. The same set of questionnaires was administered to all the 
participants irrespective of their background or inclinations. Participants 
completed parts of the questionnaire according to their understanding of the issues 
raised within each part. Therefore there were variable levels of completeness of 
the different parts within the questionnaire. This variability is accounted for and 
appropriately indicated in the general analyses of the questionnaire in Appendix 
B5 and in discussions in the later part of this chapter.  
5.3  Profile of the Survey Participants 
This section presents salient characteristics of the participants to the survey, which 
had a section on the demography of participants. Data on demography have been 
used in these analyses to establish the competencies of the participants, and to 
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provide assurance that the results could be relied upon as a representative sample 
of opinions across New Zealand.  
Participants’ response to this section was optional and data obtained was limited 
by this. A preliminary analysis of the completed responses shows that there is no 
significant relationship between the pattern of the responses and the participants. 
Identifiable groups held opinions at both ends of the scale. Table 5.3 summarises 
the demographic information collected from respondents to the online survey. 
Table 5.3 – The demography of survey participants 
Profile of Respondents Frequency Percentages 
Country of Practice New Zealand 80 100 
Overseas - - 
Region/Island North Island 40 50.0 
South Island 17 21.3 
Not Stated 23 28.7 
Gender Male 48 60.0 
Female 9 11.2 
Not Stated 23 28.8 
Place of Work Experience New Zealand only  47 58.8 
Overseas only 2 2.50 
Both  3 3.75 
Not Stated 31 38.7 
Work Experience Above 20yrs 30 37.5 
16-20 years 8 10.0 
11- 15 yrs 6 7.50 
6 – 10 yrs 6 7.50 
0 – 5 yrs 7 8.80 
Not Stated 23 28.8 
Highest qualification obtained Postgraduate 15 18.8 
Degree or Equivalent 19 23.8 
Diploma 10 12.5 
Others - - 
Not Stated 36 45.0 
 
5.3.1  Regional Groupings 
57 participants indicated their regional groupings. Of this number the majority 
came from the North Island (73%) while the remaining 27% were based in the 
South Island. The percentage of uncompleted responses (30%) makes statistics on 
regional grouping inconclusive. However, there is no indication within parts of 
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the survey data that participants’ regional grouping had any impact on the pattern 
of their responses.  
5.3.2 Work Experience, Qualifications and Professional Affiliations 
Table 5.3 also gives a summary of the professional work experience of the 
participants. Of note is that more than 37.5% of these participants have above 20 
years experience, with at least 62.5% having more than 5 years of disaster-related 
work experience. A detailed analysis of the data is expressed as a horizontal bar 
chart in Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2 – Survey participants' work experience 
Of the total number of completed responses 58.8% (n=47) indicated that their 
disaster-related work experience was gained while working in New Zealand; 2.5% 
(n=2) while overseas; and 3.75% (n=5) have both New Zealand and overseas 
experience.  
In terms of their educational qualifications, 18.8% have post graduate degrees; 
23.8% undergraduate degrees or equivalent; and 12.5% (n=10) diploma 
qualifications. Participants have also indicated a wide range of professional 
affiliations to disaster management and other professional associations.  
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Generally the data displays a good level of relevant academic and professional 
experience of the survey participants. This is indicative of a good capability 
profile which positively influences the integrity of the responses. One may 
conclude that the information collected can be relied upon; and that it reflects the 
perspective and opinions of the respondents.  
5.4 Survey Participants’ Knowledge Base 
As stated earlier, the questionnaire was a generic instrument; this means that an 
identical set of questions was administered to the participants, irrespective of their 
job responsibilities in their respective organisations. Therefore, to create a 
distinction between the responses, participants were asked to rate their levels of 
understanding of the three Acts under consideration, i.e. the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management (CDEM) Act; Resource Management Act (RMA); and 
the Building Act (BA). They were also to indicate how often they make reference 
to these regulatory documents; their understanding of each document; and to 
provide information on other regulatory documents which relate to the roles that 
they are employed in. 
This section of the questionnaire helped to segregate the responses in line with the 
participants’ different levels of understanding of the Acts, so that it would be 
possible to explain incomplete and unusable responses within the questionnaire. 
The dataset analysed in 5.5 to 5.7 have been adjusted, using two criteria: (1) the 
total usable responses; and (2) analyses of responses from those who claim to 
have a good knowledge of the contents of each regulatory document only. The 
analyses of this section of the questionnaire are presented in Section 1 of 
Appendix B5. 
5.4.1 Participants’ Levels of Reference to the Acts 
Figure 5.3 presents a summary of the responses (in percentages) to the question 
requiring them to indicate how often they make reference to the three Acts under 
consideration.  
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The chart shows that a good number of the participants, 33.8% for the CDEM 
Act, 56.2% for the RMA and 51.2% for the BA, have expressed that they very 
often refer to these Acts in the course of performing their roles. Fewer than 15% 
of the total participants (N=80) indicated that they have never had cause to refer to 
the respective Acts, especially with regards to the RMA and BA.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 - Level of reference to the three Acts 
5.4.2 Participants’ Understanding of the Provisions of the Acts 
As a follow-on to the question requiring references to the three Acts in 5.4.1, 
participants were asked to rate their understanding of the provisions of the three 
Acts. The objective was to determine how knowledgeable the participants were 
with the Acts even though they may not reference the Acts in the course of their 
work. Their response to this question is presented in a bar chart form in Figure 
5.4. There is evidence of a good level of understanding of the provisions of the 
three Acts. 63.7% (n=51) of the participants have an above average understanding 
of the CDEM Act, while the remaining 36.3% (n=29) have either little 
understanding of the Act or failed to respond to the question. 
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Figure 5.4 – Levels of understanding of the Acts 
The reasons given by some of the participants who assessed themselves as having 
little understanding of the CDEM Act are provided in the text box below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Any potential Civil Defence issues [I] discuss directly with Council's Civil 
Defence Officer. (P002)                                                                                                                                                                     
Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act not well publicised or used in 
my everyday role. (P005)                                                                                                                                                                  
Not required to use in my role, I will reference the appropriate staff when 
required. (P012)                                                                                                                                                                          
I am a team leader for building controls; although I participate in Civil 
Defence I am not involved in the management. (P023)                                                                                                                                     
I have some knowledge of the CDEM Act in my capacity as a headquarters 
Manager for civil defence matters. I however rarely refer to this legislation 
in my capacity as Principal Planner. (P022) 
There has been little need for me to have knowledge of the CDEM Act… 
(P034)                                                  
Not a core responsibility in my role. (P035)                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Role is policy and reactive to emergencies, but in context of the Building Act 
only. (P041)                                                                                                                                                                                
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A thematic analysis of their responses show that the reasons they have outlined 
for their little knowledge of the CDEM Act centre around their respective roles 
and responsibilities that do not involve a direct involvement in CDEM.  
For example those participants who held building and development control or 
environmental/health control roles have indicated that they are not involved in 
disaster management decisions thus have little use of the CDEM Act. One 
participant believes that the CDEM Act is not well publicised suggesting that only 
persons with direct emergency/disaster-related responsibilities could understand 
its content.     
A comparatively higher level of understanding of the RMA was indicated by the 
participants. 82.5% (n=66) have an above average understanding of the RMA. 
This high percentage may be explained by the large percentage of the survey 
response that came from local government officials who have to deal with 
environmental and resource issues of one form or another on a fairly regular basis. 
It could be deduced from the transcripts (see text box below), that persons with 
little understanding of the RMA are those with job roles distinct from 
environmental compliance such as emergency management and health. One 
participant expressed that the RMA is only relevant to reduction and readiness 
work. This suggests that the RMA provides for disaster mitigation activities only.  
 
 
 
 
Similar high levels of understanding (75%; n=60) were obtained for the BA. It is 
interesting to note that some of the participants have indicated that they have dual 
responsibilities within their Council that require an understanding of both the 
provisions of the BA and CDEM Acts. Reasons given for lack of understanding of 
the Building Act are similar to those of the CDEM Act and RMA.  
I am an Emergency Manager involved in CDEM and Rural Fire. I rely on others 
for information regarding the RMA and Building Act. (P008)                                                                                                                             
Involved in Emergency Management (P026) 
…RMA [only] relevant to reduction and readiness work.  (P042) 
Not really relevant to the day to day activity in Health. (P063)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
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These reasons are largely to do with their respective roles. Excerpts from 
transcripts of the reasons given by participants are presented in the box above.   
5.4.3 Other Useful Acts/Regulations 
Participants were asked to indicate which other Acts/Regulations related to 
disaster management were useful in the discharge of their job responsibilities. 
They were provided with a shortlist which they could add to. The list includes the 
Local Government Act 2002 which 76.2% (n=61) of the participants believe was 
relevant in disaster management. The District Plan was selected by 27.5% (n=22); 
the Earthquake Commissions Act 1993 selected by 18.8% (n=15); the Housing 
Improvement Regulations 1947 selected by 10% (n=8); Historic Places Act 1993 
(30%); and Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 (15%). Other Acts and 
regulations that participants considered useful in disaster management 
considerations are outlined in the text box below.  
One participant explained that while some of these documents may not be as 
relevant in routine construction works, they may be relevant during reconstruction 
works after a disaster. Some of the provisions of these documents may influence 
Have no responsibilities with Building Act. (P004)                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Involvement is with the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act, not the 
Building Act. (P010)                                                                                                                                                                     
I don’t use them much and I don’t need much knowledge of them to do my job. 
(P040)                                                                                                                                                                                     
BA not so relevant to CDEM work which has its own Act... (P042)                                                                                                                                                       
I leave this to the relevant experts; not my field. (P064) 
Have a working knowledge only. Reliant on the planning section and building 
compliance section to provide resources and response post disaster. (P069) 
The Building Act has no relevance to my work. (P070) 
Don’t work with them often. (P079)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
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the implementation of the three key Acts and vice versa. For instance the District 
and Regional plans provide overarching policy guidelines on the administration of 
local and territorial areas in New Zealand, and could determine how other 
guidelines contained in the three Acts could be interpreted and applied within a 
jurisdictional area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5  The CDEM Act and Post-Disaster Reconstruction   
This section of the questionnaire contains statements relating to the CDEM Act. 
Participants were required to rate some statements according to how well each 
represents their opinions on a five-point Likert scale. There are four interrelated 
issues covered by the section and the questions that relate to these issues are 
highlighted. Sixty-One (76.25%) completed the questionnaire and usable 
responses have been considered in these analyses. It could be inferred that 
complete responses came from participants who have indicated a good knowledge 
base on the CDEM Act and its provisions, coupled with others who may make 
reference to the Act in the course of their work activities. The full analysis of the 
questions in this section of the questionnaire is presented in Section 2 of 
Appendix B5. Further discussions are presented under the following headings.  
 
 
• The Civil Defence Plan and associated Guidelines. Expressly mentioned are 
the Southland CDEM Group plan, Welfare plan and Recovery plan. 
• Health related Acts such as: The Public Health Act, Health and Disability 
Act 2002; Health Act 1956; Health and Safety in Employment Act 2002; 
Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act; Air Quality NES. 
• Public Works Act. 
• Local Government Official Information & Meetings Act. 
• Fire Service Act 1975; Forest and Rural Fires Act 1977. 
• BRANZ Bulletin on Flooding Assessment.  
• Property Law Act 2007.  
• Biosecurity Act 1993.   
• District and Regional Plans (Regional Policy Statements). 
• Reserves Act (1977).   
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5.5.1 The Impact of the CDEM Act on Reconstruction Programmes 
Participants’ opinions were sought on three related statements intended to capture 
what impact the CDEM Act will have on reconstruction programmes in New 
Zealand. The statements (St.1 – 3) are listed while a summary of the responses is 
presented below in Table 5.4. 
It would seem from the data presented in the table that the majority of the 
participants are unsure of the effect that the CDEM Act will have on 
reconstruction programmes. The opinions expressed by few of the participants (at 
both ends of the Likert scale) show a prevalence of disagreement with the three 
statements posed. 
Table 5.4 – Impact of the CDEM Act on reconstruction 
 Statements SA A N D SD 
1 The CDEMA provides for a speedy 
implementation of reconstruction projects. 
(N=61) 
0 16.4% 59.0% 23.0%  1.6% 
2 Large scale implementation of reconstruction 
projects have been catered for under the 
current regulatory regime. (N=61) 
0  9.8% 62.3%  4.6%  3.3% 
3 There is NO foreseeable hindrance to 
reconstruction posed by the CDEMA. (N=61) 
0 21.3% 65.6%  8.2%  4.9% 
SA – Strongly Agree; A – Agree; N – Neutral/Unsure; D – Disagree; and SD – Strongly Disagree 
5.5.2 The Powers for Coordinating Recovery Programmes  
Two statements which were presented to participants in this section generated 
inconclusive responses. The statements and the percentage responses are 
presented in table 5.5. Few participants responded at both ends of the scale 
(disagreed or agreed with the statements) compared with a larger percentage that 
were neutral about both statements.  
A slightly higher percentage of participants (in response to the first statement) are 
of the opinion that the powers of Recovery Coordinators are not adequate when it 
comes to dealing with large scale disaster events. Conversely the majority of the 
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participants have expressed that appointed Recovery Coordinators have enough 
power to decide on reconstruction activities under the CDEM Act.  
  Table 5.5 – Powers for coordinating reconstruction 
 Statements SA A N D SD 
1 The statutory powers of appointed 
Recovery Coordinators as contained in the 
CDEMA are NOT adequate for large-scale 
disasters. (N=61) 
4.9% 
 
18.0% 55.7% 19.7% 1.6% 
2 Recovery Coordinators have enough powers 
to decide on reconstruction priorities under 
the present regulatory framework. (N=61) 
4.9% 24.6% 52.5% 18.0% 0 
SA – Strongly Agree; A – Agree; N – Neutral/Unsure; D – Disagree; and SD – Strongly Disagree 
Opinions on these two statements appear to be conflicting considering that 22.9% 
agreed that the powers of appointed Recovery Coordinator are not adequate for 
large disasters while 29.5% indicate that the Coordinators have enough powers to 
decide on reconstruction priorities. 
5.5.3 The Period of Declared Emergencies  
Participants were required to express their opinions on two statements relating to 
the powers of Recovery Coordinators during and after declared emergency 
periods. The first statement wanted to know if the maximum specified days for an 
appointed Recovery Coordinator were adequate, while the second statement aims 
to determine whether an extended period could facilitate reconstruction works.  
The response in percentages to the two statements is presented in Table 5.6. It 
seems that the prevalent opinion (n=30) among participants is for the extension of 
emergency powers of Recovery Coordinators beyond the declared emergency 
period. This response compares with the opinions on statement no.1 in 5.5.1 
where they expressed that the provisions of the CDEM do not provide for a 
speedy implementation of reconstruction projects. However, some participants 
(n=20) are of the opinion that extending emergency powers beyond the declared 
emergency period may not facilitate reconstruction works.  
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Table 5.6 – Period of declared emergencies 
 Statements SA A N D SD 
1 The maximum specified days (28) for 
which Recovery Coordinators are 
appointed need to be extended beyond the 
declared emergency period. (N=61) 
 6.6%  42.6%  49.2% 1.6% 0 
2 Extending emergency powers beyond the 
emergency period may NOT facilitate 
reconstruction works. (N=61) 
3.3% 29.5% 47.5%  18.0%  1.6% 
 
SA – Strongly Agree; A – Agree; N – Neutral/Unsure; D – Disagree; and SD – Strongly Disagree 
5.5.4 Implementing the CDEM Act  
The opinions of participants about the statement in this section would help 
determine if, in their view, the provisions of the current CDEM need to be re-
aligned with other legislation. This assertion will hold true only if participants 
confirm that there is conflict in the implementation of parts of the CDEM Act. 
Participants were required to respond to the statement as set out in Table 5.7 
below:  
Table 5.7 – Potentials for conflict under the Act 
 Statements SA A N D SD 
1 There are potential areas of conflict in 
the implementation of the CDEMA with 
other legislation during the recovery 
phase. (N=60) 
6.7% 33.3% 55.0%  5.0% 0 
SA – Strongly Agree; A – Agree; N – Neutral/Unsure; D – Disagree; and SD – Strongly Disagree 
The result gives a majority opinion that there are potential areas of conflict in the 
implementation of the CDEM Act. Participants (40%) who agreed with this 
statement make a prevailing case for a review of the CDEM Act and for its re-
alignment with other regulatory documents. Further evidence to support this claim 
is discussed in the following section. 
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5.5.5 General Comments on the CDEM Act and Post-Disaster Reconstruction 
The next section summarises the issues connected with the CDEM Act and the 
implementation of post-disaster reconstruction in New Zealand. It is condensed 
from the survey results presented in sections 5.5.1 to 5.5.4; and the participants’ 
responses to some open-ended questions.   
It was made apparent by participants that some aspects of the CDEM Act require 
reviewing in order to facilitate the speedy implementation of reconstruction 
projects. They have indicated that large scale reconstruction projects are 
particularly vulnerable to slow execution because they are not specifically catered 
for in the CDEM Act.  
Greater responsibilities for the coordination of disaster activities are expected 
from MCDEM and its officials than in the present circumstance. Under current 
legislation, the responsibility for reconstruction project implementation largely 
rests with the lifeline utilities and individual project owners. This was put 
succinctly by one of the participants. In his words: 
 
 
 
 
The survey result is also indicative of the need to empower appointed Recovery 
Coordinators by extending their tenure beyond the statutory 28 days provided for 
in the CDEM Act. In somewhat similar note, participants have also expressed that 
the statutory powers conferred on Recovery Coordinators be extended beyond the 
period of a declared state of emergency in large scale disasters. It would seem that 
such an extension could enable more pragmatic response and recovery decisions 
by any appointed Recovery Coordinator.  
Finally, the survey results are indicative of the need for clearer linkages between 
the CDEM Act and other legislation to forestall conflicting implementation of 
...the CDEM Group, I believe should make more submissions to the reconstruction 
process, particularly where development is proposed in places that are in close 
proximity to hazard-prone areas. That is not the case at present. I believe the 
CDEM Group should be more proactive, and stand as the mediator and/or 
integrator between emergency procedures/provisions across different sectors 
in NZ... (P055) 
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some provisions contained in these legislative documents. In the words of one of 
the participants (see text box below), the CDEM Act and the two other legislative 
documents have parallel processes which have to be streamlined to achieve both 
effective and efficient disaster management.  
 
 
 
 
 
The participant gave the example of harmonising processes around risk/hazard 
mitigation for proposed developments. Other examples may include harmonising 
operational guidelines contained in the CDEM Act with those of District and 
Regional plans to help address potential recovery implementation problems. 
Integrating and aligning the provisions for post-disaster reconstruction within all 
disaster-related legislation would be more enabling of large scale recovery 
programmes.  
5.6 The RMA and Post-Disaster Reconstruction   
This section of the survey had an average of 61 (75%) complete responses out of 
the total 80 collected. The individual number of responses used for the analyses 
are indicated on the Questionnaire Analysis sheet in Section 4 of Appendix C1. 
An indication of the respondents’ profiles is given in 5.3. It shows a 
comparatively higher level of understanding of the provisions of the RMA than 
the other two legislative documents.  
The questions in this section were structured similarly to previous sections. There 
are Likert scales as well as open-ended questions to seek clarification on 
participants’ opinions. Four main themes related to the implementation of the 
Integration between the CDEMA, RMA and the BA is crucial. These three 
legislative instruments have parallel processes in my view which seldom interact. 
For example, the CDEMA is somehow silent on 'Reduction', says a lot about 
Readiness, Response and Recovery. I believe the reduction phase is crucial to 
ensure less occurrences of disasters in New Zealand. Also, the CDEM Group, I 
believe should make more submissions to the RC process, particularly where 
development is proposed in places that are in close proximity to hazard-prone 
areas. That is not the case at present. (P055) 
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RMA during reconstruction activities are covered in the section. The results are 
presented under the following sub-headings.  
5.6.1  The Impact of the RMA on Reconstruction  
Participants were presented with four statements with a view to determining the 
impact that the RMA will have on reconstruction projects. Responses were made 
on a five point Likert scale and are summarised in Table 5.8 below.  
The opinion of participants on the first statement is split as to whether the RMA 
will impede reconstruction works or not. About equal numbers agreed and 
disagreed with the statement. However, a slightly more prevalent opinion (above 
45%) was that the RMA would impact reconstruction activities negatively. A 
larger percentage (over 47%) also disagreed with statement 3 (that the RMA will 
NOT become a regulatory burden on disaster-affected property owners). 
Conclusively, therefore, most participants felt the RMA could pose a burden on 
property owners during reconstruction work. 
The response to the fourth statement was inconclusive with 69.4% unsure about 
whether the RMA was a source of frustration in previous disasters in New 
Zealand. 
Table 5.8 – The RMA and reconstruction 
 Statements SA A N D SD 
1 The RMA will not impede the effective 
achievement of reconstruction of built 
infrastructure. (N=62) 
3.2% 32.3% 24.2% 35.5% 4.8% 
2 The RMA will have a negative effect on 
efficiency during reconstruction works. 
(N=62) 
4.8% 41.9% 22.6% 24.2% 6.5% 
3 The RMA will NOT become a regulatory 
burden on disaster-affected property 
owners. (N=62) 
1.6% 33.9% 16.1% 46.8% 1.6% 
4 The RMA was a source of frustration in 
previous disaster situations. (N=62) 
1.6% 9.7% 69.4% 11.3% 8.1% 
SA – Strongly Agree; A – Agree; N – Neutral/Unsure; D – Disagree; and SD – Strongly Disagree 
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5.6.2 The RMA Consent Process 
The objective of this section is to determine if participants were supportive of the 
consent procedure outlined in the RMA and whether they consider public 
notification under the RMA is appropriate.  
Table 5.9 – The RMA and consent processing 
 Statements SA A N D SD 
1 The application process for resource 
consent will NOT slow down reconstruction 
programmes. (N=62) 
6.5% 16.1% 19.4% 53.2% 4.8% 
2 The RMA places too much emphasis on 
consultation. (N=62) 
4.8% 19.4% 35.5% 33.9% 6.5% 
3 The consultation process needs NOT to be 
limited in scope because of reconstruction 
demands. (N=62) 
3.2% 35.5% 38.7% 21.0% 1.6% 
SA – Strongly Agree; A – Agree; N – Neutral/Unsure; D – Disagree; and SD – Strongly Disagree 
Participants were confronted with three statements (St. 1 - 3). Their responses are 
expressed in percentages in Table 5.9 above. There is a prevailing pattern of 
response to the first statement on the effect of the application process on 
reconstruction work. It is, therefore, conclusive from the views of participants that 
the resource application process may slow down reconstruction activities. This 
confirms earlier responses to statements made in 5.6.1. In a similar manner, more 
participants (38.7%) are of the opinion that the requirements for consultation and 
public notification may have to be limited in scope to allow reconstruction works 
to be carried out unencumbered.  
However, this opinion was at variance with the participants’ response to the 
second statement (that the RMA places too much emphasis on consultation). It 
could be concluded from their responses to the second statement that they felt the 
RMA does not place too much emphasis on consultation. 
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5.6.3 The RMA and its Implementation 
In this section there are two statements requiring participants’ opinion. The 
objective is to determine the problems experienced by territorial local authorities 
with implementing the RMA. The direction of participants’ opinions is presented 
in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 – Implementation of the RMA  
 Statements SA A N D SD 
1 There is the possibility of conflict 
between the different tiers of 
government concerning the 
implementation of the RMA. (N=61) 
8.2% 54.1% 23.0% 11.5% 3.3% 
2 There could be jurisdictional conflicts 
between councils and regions etc during 
reconstruction works under the RMA. 
(N=62) 
4.8% 50.0% 19.4% 21.0% 4.8% 
SA – Strongly Agree; A – Agree; N – Neutral/Unsure; D – Disagree; and SD – Strongly Disagree 
The table presents a prevailing agreement with the two statements, with over 62% 
and 54% agreeing with statements 1 and 2 respectively. Participants expressed the 
view that there could be conflicts between different tiers of government on the 
implementation of some provisions of the RMA. It is also possible that the 
implementation of the RMA across territorial local authorities may result in 
jurisdictional conflicts. 
5.6.4 The powers of Recovery Managers under the RMA 
In this section, the study’s objective was to determine if Recovery Managers are 
able to exercise their powers and responsibilities towards the coordination and 
implementation of reconstruction projects. The study sought participants’ 
opinions on whether they felt Recovery Managers should be allowed to veto any 
aspect of the RMA that could restrict the execution of reconstruction projects.  
The prevailing opinion (42%) was for Recovery Managers to be allowed to veto 
the RMA, where there was a clear need to do so. Lower percentages of 
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participants were either neutral or disagreed (38.1%) with this view. Details of the 
responses are presented in Section 4 of Appendix B5. 
Table 5.11 – Powers of Recovery Managers  
 Statements SA A N D SD 
1 Recovery Managers should be allowed to 
veto some aspects of the RMA, where there 
is a clear need to do so. (N=62) 
4.8% 37.1% 27.4%  4.2% 6.5% 
SA – Strongly Agree; A – Agree; N – Neutral/Unsure; D – Disagree; and SD – Strongly Disagree 
5.6.5  General Comments on the RMA and Post Disaster Reconstruction 
The following paragraphs summarise the responses from the questionnaire section 
that cover the RMA and post disaster reconstruction. Other responses from open-
ended questions have been included in this discussion to put the issues raised by 
the questionnaire into clearer perspective. 
Participants have indicated that the RMA will impact reconstruction activities and 
programmes. For instance, the emphasis on public notification and wider 
consultation on the environmental impacts of proposed developments is likely to 
slow down the reconstruction of damaged physical assets. This signifies that more 
flexibility in the current resource consent process is desirable.  
Participants indicated that, while the RMA could be considered burdensome, it 
was also necessary to regulate reconstruction to avoid a recurrence of existing 
vulnerabilities. The RMA was commended by one participant (P055) as being 
crucial to risk and hazard reduction. However, there seems to be a need to 
improve processes around emergency work provisions to reduce the potential for 
the RMA to become an impediment to reconstruction activities. One participant 
suggests that there is a lot of inconsistency between different territorial local 
authorities on how emergency work provisions are implemented. These 
conclusions originate from comments made by some participants on how large 
scale reconstruction programmes could be facilitated. These comments are 
presented in the next page. 
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The survey results give an indication that the powers to progress recovery 
activities by Recovery Managers would need to be enhanced. The prevailing 
opinion is that Recovery Managers or appointed Recovery Coordinators should 
have the capacity to veto certain requirements/provisions under the RMA to allow 
for reconstruction work to progress with little hindrance.  Some caution is noted 
here since sub-standard works may create difficulties when the situation 
normalises. 
Finally, it was observed that jurisdictional conflicts may arise in RMA 
implementation between territorial local authorities in New Zealand. For instance, 
subtle differences exist between individual District Plans that could influence how 
the RMA is interpreted and implemented across different territorial local 
authorities.  This inconsistency was alluded to by one participant in the text box 
above. Such potential problem areas may have to be overcome so that they do not 
hinder the progress of reconstruction activities. Differential progress (and 
interpretation of standards) during recovery between territorial local authorities 
may not augur well for overall recovery efforts, particularly individual house 
owners who may be frustrated by consenting processes in the post-disaster phase. 
5.7 The Building Act and Post-Disaster Reconstruction   
This section of the questionnaire contained questions relating to the Building Act 
and the effects that some of its provisions will have on post-disaster 
RMAs not an impediment if have right relationships in place and know how to 
use the tools it provides like emergency works provisions in a disaster. (P017)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
There is a clear need to identify what can, and cannot, be done under 
'emergency works'. This will negate the potential backlog of regulatory 'red 
tape' whilst still providing surety of maintaining acceptable standards. 
Bypassing the regulatory [provision] is a 'licence' to build substandard 
buildings. (P051)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Improvements to RMA and BA to better provide for emergency works, AND 
better training and information to support Councils using these provisions 
(there is currently a lot of inconsistency in how emergency works provisions 
under the RMA are implemented, for example). (P052)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
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reconstruction activities. Participants were presented with statements as in 5.6 
above, which they were required to rate according to how best they represent their 
opinions on a five-point Likert scale. An average of 65 (81.25% of the total 80 
responses completed) was usable for this section of the questionnaire. Participants 
who provided their opinions in this section included those with a good knowledge 
base on the Building Act and those who refer to this document in the course of 
their work activities. The profile of participants in this category shows that more 
than 65% of them have had over 15 years of working experience. The detail of the 
profiling was provided in 5.4.2. Further details on the data set and its analyses are 
provided in Section 3 in Appendix B5. 
5.7.1 The Building Act and its Implementation 
There are three statements in this section that required the opinions of the 
participants. The objective was to determine whether there are problems in the 
implementation of the Building Act during reconstruction works. The statements 
are outlined below, while a summary of the responses (in percentages) is 
presented in figure 5.12. There seems to be a general perception that the BA will 
impact on post-disaster reconstruction activities to a greater or lesser extent.  
Figure 5.12 – Implementing the Building Act 
 Statements SA A N D SD 
1 Strict application of the BA provisions will 
affect efficiency of construction 
operations (N=66) 
21.2% 34.8% 28.8% 13.6% 1.5% 
2 The consents/approval procedure outlined 
in the BA may become cumbersome during 
large scale disaster reconstruction. 
(N=66) 
28.8% 48.5% 10.6% 7.6% 4.5% 
3 Councils will NOT struggle to meet the 
requirements for consent processing 
after a major disaster event (N=66) 
4.5% 10.6% 10.6% 47.0% 7.3% 
SA – Strongly Agree; A – Agree; N – Neutral/Unsure; D – Disagree; and SD – Strongly Disagree 
There is prevailing agreement among participants (over 55%) that the strict 
application of some of the provisions of the BA may affect the efficiency of 
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reconstruction operations. Also in response to the second statement, participants 
(over 76%) are of the opinion that the building consent process may become 
cumbersome during large scale reconstruction programmes in New Zealand. Their 
opinion on the third statement confirms their previous responses to both 
statements 1 and 2. Most of the participants disagreed with the notion that 
Councils will not struggle to meet the requirements of building consent processing 
after a major disaster event.  
5.7.2 Simplifying the Consent Process 
The statements under this sub-heading sought participants’ opinions on the 
processing of building consents under the BA. The objective was to confirm 
whether consent processing was a problem and whether this would need to be 
simplified. 
Table 5.13 – Simplifying the consent process 
 Statements SA A N D SD 
1 The BA consent application process is NOT 
a major source of concern in post-disaster 
reconstruction. (N=64) 
 4.7% 20.3% 31.2% 31.2% 12.5% 
2 There are enough provisions for bypassing 
consent processing in the BA for post-
disaster reconstruction (N=65) 
 6.2% 18.5% 50.8% 18.5% 6.2% 
3 The building consent and compliance 
process must be followed through 
irrespective of the scale of the disaster. 
(N=65) 
9.2% 50.8% 15.4% 21.5% 3.1% 
SA – Strongly Agree; A – Agree; N – Neutral/Unsure; D – Disagree; and SD – Strongly Disagree 
It can be observed from figure 5.13 above that over 43% (n= 28) of participants 
disagreed with the first statement; thus the consent application process was 
considered a major source of concern during post-disaster reconstruction. 
However in response to the third statement, participants are of the opinion that the 
building consent and compliance process must be followed through irrespective of 
the scale of the disaster. This was agreed to by 60% (n=39) of the participants.  
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The second statement generated inconclusive opinions on the provisions for 
bypassing the current consent procedure. The opinions were split between the 
sufficiency and insufficiency of the BA provision for bypassing routine 
processing of building consents.  
5.7.3  The Clarity of Building Act Provisions 
The set of statements in this section sought to determine from the participants 
their opinions about certain provisions of the BA that may directly impact on 
reconstruction activities. The statements and the responses are detailed in Table 
5.14 below: 
 Table 5.14 – The clarity of BA provisions 
 Statements SA A N D SD 
1 The BA is clear as to the damage inspection 
procedure on built facilities (N=66) 
1.5% 16.7% 62.1% 18.2% 1.5% 
2 The current insurance cover (liabilities) for 
Building Consent Authorities (BCA) and 
their Independent Qualified Persons (IQP) 
is adequate for decision making (N=63) 
3.2% 14.3% 68.3% 12.7% 1.6% 
3 Section 71-74 Notices in the BA will prevent 
some disaster-affected property owners 
from receiving compensation (N=63) 
6.3% 20.6% 69.8% 1.6% 1.6% 
4 The arrangements made by councils for the 
on-the-spot assessment of damaged 
properties are adequate. (N=65) 
0 21.5% 38.5% 30.8% 9.2% 
SA – Strongly Agree; A – Agree; N – Neutral/Unsure; D – Disagree; and SD – Strongly Disagree 
It can be observed that a greater percentage of participants took a neutral position 
on the issues raised. For example participants neither agreed nor disagreed with 
the notion that the BA provided a clear procedure for post-disaster damage 
inspection. However, they were more forthcoming on the arrangements made by 
territorial local authorities for on-the-spot assessment of damaged properties in 
statement no. 4. A large percentage of respondents 40% (n=26) believe that the 
arrangements made by territorial local authorities in this regard were inadequate. 
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The second statement generated an inconclusive response. The majority of 
participants were not sure of the relationship between liability cover and 
reconstruction decisions. Of those who understood the problem, there was a split 
in opinion of the adequacy (17.5%) and inadequacy (14.3%) of liability cover in 
decision making. 
There appears to be little agreement on whether section 71-74 notices in the 
Building Act will prevent disaster-affected built facilities from receiving 
compensation for damages. Only 27 % (n=18) are of the opinion that these 
provisions will prevent compensation of property owners; while about 70% 
(n=56) have taken a neutral position on the issue.  
5.7.4  The Building Act and other Regulatory Documents 
The two statements in this section look at the relationship between the BA and 
other regulatory documents in terms of how they facilitate the implementation of 
reconstruction programmes. The statements and the responses are presented in 
Table 5.15. 
Table 5.15 – The BA and other regulatory documents 
 Statements SA A N D SD 
1 There is NO potential for conflicts while 
applying the BA and other Acts relating to 
the reconstruction of the built environment. 
(N=66) 
0  6.1% 34.8% 47.0% 12.1% 
2 There could be jurisdictional conflicts (i.e. 
between local and regional councils) in the 
implementation of BA provisions after a 
major disaster. (N=65) 
7.7% 36.9% 24.6% 26.2% 4.6% 
SA – Strongly Agree; A – Agree; N – Neutral/Unsure; D – Disagree; and SD – Strongly Disagree 
59% of participants disagreed with the first statement. Therefore, they hold the 
view that there is potential for conflict to arise between the BA and other 
regulatory documents. This view contrasts with that of the 6% who agreed with 
the statement. This suggests that BA may require re-alignment with some other 
regulatory documents to ease the implementation of reconstruction projects.  
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Majority of the participants (47.6%) also agreed that there could be jurisdictional 
conflicts in the implementation of BA provisions after a major disaster. Such 
conflicts can be envisaged in reconstruction projects that spread across 
jurisdictional boundaries. 
5.7.5  General Comments on the BA and Post Disaster Reconstruction 
The following general comments emanate from the responses in 5.7.1 to 5.7.4 and 
other general opinions expressed by the participants to some open-ended 
questions. 
Participants are of a general view that the strict implementation of the BA may 
become cumbersome during a major disaster recovery programme. Their 
responses have indicated that reconstruction works may be slowed down by 
procedural requirements that cannot be supported by the quantum of existing 
resources in the country. They assert, in particular, that the capability of the 
building consent authorities (BCAs) coupled with Designers and Engineers 
(independent qualified persons IQPs) to respond to demands for on-the-spot 
assessments of damaged built facilities would probably be an issue. This group of 
professionals identify that they struggle with the consent process during ‘normal 
times’, and would most probably be challenged further by a larger volume of 
requests if the current resource levels are maintained during ‘abnormal times’.  
Participants were not satisfied with the arrangements made by territorial local 
authorities for on-the-spot assessment of damaged buildings. These inadequacies 
in rapid building evaluations may exacerbate the reconstruction problem already 
posed by resource availability problems. 
The survey responses give little clarity on the possibilities for simplifying the 
consent process. The view held by some of the participants is that the benefits of 
strict implementation of the BA outweigh the disadvantages. Thus, in their view 
New Zealand communities are more likely to be adversely affected by a relaxation 
of the provisions for thoroughness in the processing of (re)building consents. 
Some participants have expressed the view that territorial local authorities are 
 165 
under an obligation to apply the BA regardless of the circumstance. A cross 
section of these views is presented in the transcripts below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It may be inferred from these statements that current consenting procedures are 
satisfactory and the situations under which the process can be bypassed are 
tenable. However, the question is raised of how the ‘build back better’ philosophy 
may find expression through application of the BA in its current or amended form. 
One of the participants indicated that urgent works can be carried out if such is 
certified with a Producer’s Statement certificate (PS4) or for reasons of safety. 
However, another participant explains that a Certificate of Acceptance (COA) is 
less robust than a Code of Compliance Certificate (CCC) as shown in the text box 
below. 
 
 
 
On the issue of compensation for properties that have been notified under section 
71-74 of the BA, not many participants considered that the BA will prevent 
compensation by Insurers. In the words of one participant: 
 
…the BA and its purpose and principles have a large and important effect on 
society, to throw those principles out in the reconstruction phases may make 
society the loser. (P028) 
Council's are obliged to adhere to the Accreditation requirements. (P029) 
…Application of the Building Code will ensure that "practical/pragmatic" building 
solutions post-disaster do not become additional problems in the recovery period 
e.g. during aftershocks. (P035) 
 Bypassing the regulatory is a 'licence' to build substandard buildings. (P051) 
 
Certificate of Acceptance (COA) work is currently viewed with extreme caution.  
Many COA applications are not accepted and of those that are accepted very 
few will receive a COA, the liability risk is too high as there has been no council 
inspections of the work. In a major damage event most homeowners will want to 
proceed on the basis of a COA and can legally do so, I would be very surprised if 
any council granted the COA on completion.  (P066) 
 
It is up to the earthquake commission to decide if they will pay out on section 71 
– 74, political influences may affect this area… (P028) 
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This statement suggests that compensation issues are largely political and 
presupposes that the scale of destruction may warrant a change in insurance 
legislation to accommodate a larger number of affected properties. This position 
assumes that the Earthquake Commission (EQC) could be influenced by a change 
in compensation policy. This may not hold true for private insurers whose 
decisions are largely made on a commercial basis. The problem envisaged with 
compensation claims for notified buildings is clearly expressed in the comment 
below:  
 
 
 
Participants are of the opinion that there has to be a review and realignment of the 
BA with other legislative documents. This view was previously explained in 
section 5.5.5.  Such a review and realignments should prevent conflicts during the 
execution of reconstruction projects.  
Apart from reviews and realignment to the BA, it appears that further steps need 
to be taken to ensure consistency in its implementation across the country. This 
was put succinctly by one participant as a suggested solution to operational and 
logistic problems associated with large-scale reconstruction programmes:  
 
 
5.8  Facilitating Post-Disaster Reconstruction in New Zealand 
This section of the questionnaire was designed to collate the perspective and 
views of participants on issues that are pertinent to post disaster management in 
New Zealand. There are four aspects covered by the questionnaire that are 
analysed under the following subheadings.  
 
If a building affected by disaster is rebuilt again, the Consent Authority under 
the BA is mandated to require the property owner to register a Section 72 
notice on the affected title, which may affect the right to the property being 
insured, etc. (P055)  
 
(there is a need for) …co-ordinated, uniform and consistent application of 
provisions of the BA by Councils within a region. Regional co-operation and 
production of common protocols and procedures.  (P032)   
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5.8.1 Solving Operational/Logistic Problems in Reconstruction 
Participants were presented with some suggested solutions to operational and 
logistic problems that are associated with large-scale reconstruction programmes. 
The solutions include: (1) Continuous training of emergency personnel, (2) 
Disaster exercises and personnel role plays, (3) Public disaster awareness 
campaigns, and (4) Pre-planned programmes and courses of action.  
Using the five point Likert scale, participants were to indicate how strongly they 
agreed or disagreed with these suggested solutions. A summary of the responses is 
presented in Section 5(A) of Appendix B5.  
Figure 5.5 displays the pattern of the responses in bar chart format. The 
percentage responses leave no doubt as to the opinion of participants about the 
suggested solutions (Sol.1 - 4). The prevailing opinion is that all four solutions 
will help to reduce the operational and logistic problems associated with large 
scale reconstruction programmes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
Figure 5.5 – Response to suggested solutions to logistic problems 
Participants have also indicated other possible solutions in response to the open 
ended question requiring them to suggest other solutions. A selection of their 
suggestions is presented in the text box on the next page. 
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A thematic analysis of the transcript above (in the text box) reveals four possible 
solutions to operational and logistic problems that may be experienced at the post-
disaster reconstruction phase in New Zealand. These are outlined below: 
• improved coordination of disaster management services;  
• generalised disaster training and exercises;  
• memoranda of understanding with neighbouring jurisdictions, and  
• political buy-in into disaster management activities by all levels of governance. 
5.8.2 Facilitating Large-Scale Reconstruction Programmes 
In a similar vein to 5.8.1 above, participants were asked to indicate the priorities 
they attach to some suggested ways by which large-scale reconstruction 
programmes could be facilitated in New Zealand. Their responses are summarised 
in Section 5(C) of Appendix B5. To rationalise the data, further analysis has been 
performed to generate a ranking of the responses on the means by which large-
scale reconstruction programmes could be facilitated.  
Better co-ordination between Emergency Services, particularly on training 
matters. (P001) 
Political buy-in from Local Authorities and Central Govt agencies… More Central 
Govt funding/support in areas where national planning makes more sense than 
piecemeal efforts in regions. (P011)       
Training, or at least awareness programmes, should be included for council staff 
throughout the organisation e.g. Resource Consent Officers, Asset Management 
Officers, RMA Monitoring Officers etc. (P032)  
The role of Reduction is imperative. It is through understanding of likely effects 
under any given scenario, that programming can be forecast. You can then be 
proactive rather than reactive and have an accurate plan of action ready to go. 
This is what would be 'honed' in the exercises. (P051)    
Memoranda of Understanding with neighbouring countries. (P078)                
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Table 5.16 below displays the weighted score of the responses on a scale of zero 
to three (3 – High priority; 2 – Low priority; 1 – Not necessary; and 0 – Not sure). 
The total weight for each problem was obtained as the sum of the products of each 
weighted score and the number of respondents in each case. The resulting total 
weight was used as the basis for ranking the means by which large scale 
reconstruction programmes could be facilitated. The factor with the highest total 
weight is ranked 1, meaning that it was considered by the participants to be of the 
highest priority.  
 Table 5.16 - Means of facilitating large reconstruction programmes 
 
Table 5.16 shows that the highest priority was given to memoranda of 
understanding between first responders as the means by which large scale 
reconstruction projects could be facilitated. This is followed by selective 
implementation of parts of legislation; the development of a national policy 
statement on reconstruction; and accelerated registration of building consent 
authorities in that order.   
In addition to the responses above, participants have also indicated other actions 
that could be taken to facilitate large reconstruction programmes. They also 
provided some useful comments on the three legislative documents being 
evaluated. Transcripts of some of the responses are presented in the following text 
box. 
  
 
No. of Responses (Weight) Total 
Weight 
Rank 
3 2 1 0 
1 Prior MoUs between Responders 
(councils, lifelines etc.) 
42 
(126) 
11 
(22) 
3 
(3) 
5 
(0) 
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1 
2 Accelerated registration of BCAs and 
IQPs. 
23 
(69) 
16 
(32) 
14 
(14) 
8 
(0) 
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4 
3 Selective Implementation of parts of 
legislation for expediency 
27 
(81) 
23 
(46) 
4 
(4) 
7 
(0) 
 
131 
 
2 
4 The development of a national 
reconstruction policy statement 
31 
(93) 
14 
(28) 
8 
(8) 
8 
(0) 
 
129 
 
3 
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The common theme emanating from the statements in the text box above is the 
need for pre-planning the execution of large-scale reconstruction programmes. 
The participants have indicated that this requires the joint effort of all disaster 
stakeholders to prepare contingency plans, protocols and procedures that could be 
implemented in the event of reconstruction and redevelopment of the physical 
environment. Reference is made to the linkages between the various regulatory 
documents. This gives credence to their previous suggestions for the 
harmonisation of specific provisions within regulatory documents that relate to 
emergency works and the reconstruction of physical and built facilities.     
5.8.3  Memoranda of Understanding between Regions and Councils 
Considering that it is important to attain synergy between response and recovery 
activities in New Zealand, the first question in this section required participants to 
indicate if there were memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between their 
respective territorial local authorities and other agencies. This was to determine if 
The example of debris disposal can be avoided by identifying the potential need 
and pre-planning, rather than "selective" implementation (observance?) of the 
RMA.  (P010) 
Co-ordinated, uniform and consistent application of the provisions of the BA by 
Councils within a region. Regional co-operation and production of common 
protocols and procedures. (P032) 
We already have too much policy - what we need is sound contingency planning 
with an element of compulsion to it.  (P033) 
There is a clear need to identify what can, and cannot, be done under 'emergency 
works'. This will negate the potential backlog of regulatory 'red tape' whilst still 
providing surety of maintaining acceptable standards… P051) 
Improvements to RMA and BA to better provide for emergency works, AND 
better training and information to support Councils using these provisions (there 
is currently a lot of inconsistency in how emergency works provisions under the 
RMA are implemented, for example)  (P052)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
…some form of national response to building and land damage is required so that 
homeowners and councils have a guideline to follow. Liability issues abound in 
building now, after an event even greater. (P066) 
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their regions and CDEM Groups have made arrangements and/or given 
consideration to the modalities for sharing resources in the event of a significant 
disaster event. Details of the responses are presented in Section 5(C) and 5(D) of 
Appendix B5.   
Majority of participants (41%) confirm the existence of MoUs between regions 
and CDEM Groups in New Zealand. Such memoranda, where they existed, were 
considered generic documents and in loosely-written forms that could not commit 
neighbouring regions to their implementation (i.e. the agreements are not legally 
binding). A number of participants 15% (n=10) are not aware whether such 
arrangements have been made within their territorial local authorities, while 44% 
(n=28) are unsure.  
The second question in the section wanted to know whether the MoUs extended to 
territorial local authorities within regions. This was to determine the level of 
importance that territorial local authorities attach to cooperative arrangements 
amongst councils within a regional area. Only 27% (n=18) believe that such 
memoranda exist, with a larger percentage (52%) indicating that they are unsure 
of these arrangements within regions.  
To further validate the responses to the first and second questions, participants 
were asked to indicate how well some sets of issues are covered in MoUs. The 
raw data is presented in Section 5(E) of Appendix B5. Fewer participants 
responded to this part of the questionnaire (an average of 55%; n=44), perhaps 
indicating that Memoranda of Understanding are not common documents and, 
therefore, participants have little knowledge of their contents. Across all the issues 
suggested that may be covered by typical MoUs, less than 40% have indicated 
that these issues are mentioned in typical documents.  
Selected comments provided by the participants give insight into the MoU issue in 
New Zealand. Some participants feel that existing civil defence emergency 
management arrangements have provided for cooperative response and recovery 
amongst territorial local authorities: 
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These views have not indicated how formal such quasi-arrangements are, and in 
particular how enforceable they could be in the event of a large-scale disaster. In 
the opinion of some participants, existing arrangements for resource sharing and 
assistance are for the purpose of consent processing while those for disaster 
situations are at developmental stages. Their comments are presented below: 
 
 
 
 
 
5.8.4 General State of New Zealand Preparedness 
This section of the questionnaire required participants to express their opinions on 
the general state of preparedness of agencies in New Zealand for a large scale 
reconstruction programme. The first question required participants to rate New 
Zealand’s preparedness for a large-scale reconstruction programme. This was 
followed by a question requiring them to explain the reasons for their response to 
the first question. The second question was open-ended to allow participants to 
comment freely on the state of New Zealand’s preparedness.  
Analysis of the data obtained from the first question is presented in Section 5(F) 
of Appendix B5. The results are presented in pie chart form in figure 5.6.  
Through civil defence activation (declared emergency) resources can be shared 
across Regions/Districts. (P016)                                                     
We form part of the Nelson-Tasman Civil Defence Group. Not sure if we have a 
MoU but we are equal participants in a regional Civil Defence Plan (P035) 
These MoU are expressed through Group Civil Defence plans - high level, but do 
incorporate a commitment to resource sharing. (P052) 
There is a loose cluster group in this area, building staff do discuss issues but 
as far as I am aware there are no inter council support agreed. (P066) 
 
The MoU is set up for sharing resources (ability to process consents and 
Inspections) but not specifically for disaster situations. (P027) 
MoUs are very generic and the intent is to implement a resource (including 
personnel) sharing arrangement… (P062) 
The Group Civil Defence Plan and the associated Local Authorities are starting to 
embrace and see the value of joint approach to resource sharing. (P069)     
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 Figure 5.6 - New Zealand’s level of disaster preparedness  
The results are indicative of the pessimism of the majority of participants as to the 
capacity of New Zealand to tackle the problems associated with a large-scale 
disaster response and recovery. Only 10% of the respondents are of the opinion 
that New Zealand can cope in the event of a large-scale reconstruction 
programme, while the majority (54%) were of the opinion that New Zealand is 
moderately prepared for that scale of event. Further insight into their opinions is 
determined through a thematic analysis of their response to the open-ended 
question. The two main themes emanating from their responses are grouped into 
two categories. One category gives the reasons for their opinion that New Zealand 
is prepared for a major disaster while the other category give contrary reasons for 
New Zealand not being prepared for a major disaster. The emerging themes and 
sub-themes from the responses are outlined in Table 5.17.   
5.9 A Summary of the Research Findings 
The following paragraphs summarise the research findings presented in 5.1 to 5.8 
by comparing the outcomes of the focus group study and the online survey. The 
purpose of the summary is to present the areas where there is consensus and any 
variation in the outputs of the two research approaches.  
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The information obtained in the research investigations confirm the multi-
dimensional problems that the implementations of legislative provisions portend 
to reconstruction work post-disaster. It is apparent that the perceived problems 
will be compounded in a nationally significant disaster event when the number of 
stakeholders increase and jurisdictional rights and priorities become diverse. The 
research therefore confirms the thesis that current legislative and regulatory 
provisions may pose barriers to the implementation of major reconstruction 
programmes in New Zealand.  
Table 5.17 – Emerging themes on NZ state of preparedness  
Main Themes: 
New Zealand is NOT prepared for a 
major disaster 
New Zealand is prepared for a major 
disaster 
Sub themes (reasons): 
NZ is a small country with few 
resources to tackle a major disaster 
event. 
NZ communities are resilient and are 
aware of their vulnerabilities.  
NZ is geographically disadvantaged thus 
access to external aid and resources not 
easy. 
Campaigns and awareness programmes 
have been effective to prepare NZ 
communities for a major disaster. 
NZ’s capacity to respond and recover is 
dependent on the capacity of responding 
agencies and their coordinating skills.  
Local response and recovery experiences 
have helped to prepare responders and 
communities for more significant events.   
NZ has a slow uptake of lessons learnt 
from both local and international 
disasters. 
Emergency management services are up 
to the task.  
Disaster role plays and exercises have 
not been developed into capacity 
building schemes.  
 
 
The suite of issues concerning the implementation of certain provisions of the 
CDEM Act, RMA and BA (observed in previous recovery programmes as 
impediments to the realisation of reconstruction objectives) has been validated by 
the research. Some of the issues such as procedural constraints, loss of 
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pragmatism on the part of disaster practitioners, improper coordination 
arrangements, coupled with unclear inter-agency responsibilities, are recurring 
issues highlighted by the focus group and confirmed by the analysis of responses 
from participants to the online survey. It is apparent that these broad issues 
deserve attention, through an improvement on the current legislative framework.  
The research study also makes it apparent that certain provisions in one legislative 
document may be at variance to those contained in other documents. Thus it is 
probable that strict implementation of the provisions of one document may impact 
on another. Such situations do not permit flexibility in decision making and 
agencies are likely to find it difficult to operate outside the remit of whichever 
legislative document guides their performance. Reconstruction would therefore 
benefit from a harmonisation of these different provisions. The three Acts under 
focus need to be further aligned and should make specific provision for post-
disaster reconstruction to guide the operational performance of recovery agencies.  
The research shows that coordination of recovery efforts between and within 
agencies is achievable through more pro-active leadership from the Ministry of 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management. Legislation that provides for this 
leadership and control functions have to be upheld. With particular reference to 
the CDEM Act, the concerns expressed by the focus group were validated by the 
survey results. Thus, planning and strategy issues around the implementation of 
emergency powers and the coordination of response and recovery activities need 
to be strengthened. For example, appointed Recovery Controllers have not been 
empowered to actually coordinate reconstruction because control is taken over by 
different persons during the recovery phase, especially at the expiration of a 
declared emergency period. The transfer of control (leadership) from one 
coordinator to another, midway into recovery, may result in changes in policy 
approaches that could impact negatively on reconstruction programmes. There 
was suggestion of using cluster groups to facilitate reconstruction work but the 
modality for using such an approach was not investigated in the current study.  
However to ensure coordinated reconstruction efforts amongst disaster 
stakeholders, there is a consensus of opinion that memoranda of understanding 
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between agencies would benefit reconstruction. This way, every agency becomes 
aware of its roles, responsibilities and their expected performance. Memoranda of 
understanding will allow for the exchange of information and resources across all 
reconstruction needs and priorities. There is every likelihood that a major disaster 
would overwhelm local response and recovery capacities, thus having in place an 
agreement on how resources could be deployed from neighbouring (or external) 
organisations cannot be overstated. The task of preparing for the implementation 
of memoranda of understanding between organisations allows for the meeting of 
minds, breaking down of organisational silos and generally more purposeful 
decisions on emergency and recovery plans. 
In summary, conclusions reached by the focus group and the analyses of the 
online survey responses have presented consistent information on the issues of 
concern in the implementation of the three legislative documents in New Zealand. 
Research participants have suggested improvement schemes that could make the 
legislative documents appropriate for use in significant disaster event in New 
Zealand. Some of these improvements are explored in the next chapter and form 
part of the recommendations in chapter seven.  
Improving these legislative documents becomes imperative if one considers that a 
significant proportion of the online survey participants see New Zealand as only 
moderately prepared for a large-scale disaster event.   
5.10  The Research Verification Exercise  
A further step in the research process is the verification of the research results 
with subject matter experts (SMEs). At the conclusion of the analyses presented in 
sections 5.2 to 5.8, the researcher compiled a summary of the key issues 
emanating from the research investigations. These summaries were then presented 
to the identified subject matter experts in the form of a research verification 
questionnaire. A description of the subject matter experts was given in section 
4.3.5. The SMEs commented on the research results and made further 
contributions that could improve the quality of the research findings. All three 
SMEs are practitioners that have made valuable inputs into policy formulation 
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around disaster management in New Zealand. The verification questionnaires 
prepared for each of the three Acts are included at Appendix B6 to B8.  
The following sub-sections give an account of the opinions of the SMEs on the 
issues that arose from the research investigations that were presented previously. 
The key points in each of the legislative documents are presented, followed by the 
opinions of the SMEs on the respective issues.   
5.10.1 Research Verification of the CDEM Act (2002) 
The following key issues within the CDEM Act have been consistently 
highlighted throughout the research study towards improving recovery and 
reconstruction of physical facilities in the event of a significant disaster. A more 
detailed discussion of these issues is presented in chapter six. 
a) The concerns around clarity in responsibilities and arrangements within the 
provisions of the CDEM Act to deal with the transition from disaster response 
to recovery in New Zealand. The research and investigations presented 
previously shows in particular that the statutory powers for directing all 
emergency services beyond a declared emergency period could be limiting and 
may need to be reviewed. 
b) The issue around leadership of the recovery process by officials of the Ministry 
of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) at the different 
levels of response to a disaster. Statutorily the MCDEM mainly engages with 
emergency services which may be inadequate in the event of significant 
disasters where recovery may be more complex than the usual.   
c) Similar to (b) above is the need to improve the existing disaster recovery 
framework, so that it allows individual recovery objectives of responding 
agencies to be achieved whilst also contributing to overall community 
recovery.  
d) Finally are the concerns around the linkages between the CDEM Act and other 
legislative documents in all aspects of disaster management. The research 
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study shows that streamlining of parallel provisions and operating procedures 
within all disaster-related legislation would be beneficial to disaster 
management.  
What is the SME’s opinion on these CDEM issues? 
The key issues highlighted above were re-phrased (see Appendix B6) into a 
questionnaire format and presented to Mr. Paul Houliston, who is identified has a 
subject matter expert in the current study. Thematic analyses of Mr Paul 
Houliston’s comments on these key issues are presented in the following 
paragraphs.  
On whether the statutory powers for directing all emergency services should be 
extended beyond a declared emergency period, so that consistency in policy is 
ensured across the transition phases of emergency response and recovery; Paul 
explains that: 
“the CDEM Act provides sufficient powers for the Director of CDEM to carry 
out his responsibilities during response and recovery. It is more important to 
recognise the overall central-decision making body of executive government 
that addresses emergency management is the Cabinet Committee for 
Domestic and External Security Coordination (DES) and to support that 
process the Officials’ Committee for Domestic and External Security 
Coordination (ODESC) provides advice to Ministers on possible response or 
recovery options. This allows RMA and Building Act issues to be considered”.  
Paul’s response verifies the research position that the Act and other legislation 
need to be empowering of disaster management. Though, Paul believes that more 
of the responsibility lie at top management level i.e. DES and ODESC levels 
explained in chapter two. Statutorily the DES and ODESC become more active in 
response and recovery coordination in a national scale emergency and are 
expected to provide leadership in a way that allows for pragmatism at the lower 
levels of decision making by MCDEM agencies. 
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On the need to streamline emergency response and recovery activities by different 
stakeholder agencies for the achievement of common goals and objectives; Paul 
believes it is “important to see the role of lifelines (which are mainly private 
companies and not agencies) as complementary to the government’s recovery 
objectives”.  Paul believes that lifelines will “recover in a way that best suits their 
business and the needs of their customers”. He goes further to explain that 
coordination of recovery effort could be achieved through the establishment of a 
“National Recovery Coordinator” role which the CDEM Act allows for. This 
research study concurs with this suggestion. A permanent Recovery Coordinator 
role should permit the implementation of a consistent national recovery policy. 
Existing planning documents prepared by MCDEM pertaining to recovery (i.e. 
‘Recovery Management’ and ‘Focus on Recovery’) would therefore need to be 
enhanced, so that they provide a more robust framework and operational 
guidelines for collaboration with the National Recovery Coordinator during 
recovery programmes.  
On the statement concerning clearer linkage between the CDEM Act and other 
legislative documents, Paul has a diverse opinion on the issue, according to him: 
“The CDEM Act is an ‘enabling legislative act’ that provides a degree of scope 
for those responsible to best set the way to achieve its purposes. We 
recognise that the CDEM framework is supported by the RMA and BA but I 
don’t think closer alignment would achieve a better outcome. The outcomes we 
seek are better outlined in the National CDEM Strategy (as this document 
reflects the goals we seek to achieve in our sector)” 
Paul seems to suggest that any irregularity concerning linkages between 
legislative documents is with the implementers of legislation rather than the 
provisions within the legislative documents.  
On the weight of the evidence presented in the research study, clearer linkage 
between the CDEM Act and other legislative documents would benefit recovery 
management in some way. This is different from Paul’s suggestion which reduces 
the importance of integrating individual efforts into a coherent whole. The current 
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research emphasises that operational guidelines for recovery management be 
provided for in legislation and believes that cross-linking provisions within the 
CDEM Act and the RMA and BA will positively impact reconstruction 
performance.  
5.10.2 Research Verification of the RMA (1991) 
An outline of the key issues linked with the implementation of the RMA during 
reconstruction is listed below. After which the SME’s comments and 
contributions on the issues are presented. 
a) A major concern is the impact that the consent process and other statutory 
requirements under the RMA could have on recovery. The study has shown 
that reconstruction activities could be adversely affected by consent 
processing requirements; therefore the logistics of consent processing during 
chaotic response and recovery deserve consideration particularly in a large-
scale disaster event. 
b) Similarly there is concern around the RMA requirements for consultation and 
notification, as they may frustrate genuine reconstruction programmes. This is 
particularly true for projects of national significance or critical infrastructure 
projects that could act as catalyst to community recovery after major disasters. 
c) There is the issue of pragmatism in decision making under the RMA. For 
example: would granting Recovery Managers veto powers permit 
reconstruction works to progress with the least hindrance? 
d) Finally, the research shows that there are subtle differences that exist in the 
interpretation and implementation of the Act between different territorial and 
regional authorities. This issue may result in jurisdictional conflicts between 
coordinating authorities when dealing with those recovery issues that arise 
from hazard events that cut across geographical boundaries.  
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What is the SME’s opinion on these RMA issues? 
Mr Owen McShane was contacted to provide his opinions and comments about 
the issues presented above. The issues had been re-phrased into a verification 
questionnaire to solicit his opinion on them. Excerpts of his responses are 
provided in quotes within the following paragraphs. His opinions are discussed 
within the context of the respective issues that are raised by the study. The 
verification questionnaire on RMA issues is included at Appendix B7.  
Owen agrees that the requirements for consent processing and other statutory 
requirements under the RMA are burdensome but necessary. He agrees that the 
logistics of consent processing during chaotic response and recovery deserves 
consideration particularly in a large-scale disaster event. According to Owen the 
“…RMA presently provides for flexibility in emergencies but only if the environment 
is at risk. There is no provision for [RMA] effects on people”. Owen believes that 
consideration should be given to disaster peculiarities so that the burden of strict 
consent processing can be lifted. Owen notes that ”if we [New Zealand] had an 
outbreak of Foot and Mouth or Mad Cow Disease would we [New Zealanders] be able 
to burn animal carcases without having to apply for resource consent re discharges 
to air?” This opinion is consistent with the research finding that some flexibility is 
desired in procedural requirements especially for individual property owners who 
may be frustrated by the consent process, particularly when effecting minor 
damage to their properties. Previous natural events in New Zealand have brought 
the issue of debris management to the fore (see Matata flooding incident presented 
in chapter three).   
On whether the RMA should classify critical infrastructure that could enhance 
community recovery, as projects of national significance; Owen agrees with this 
statement. He states that “under the proposed [RMA] reforms the criteria used to 
classify projects of national significance and reference to the EPA should include 
appropriate clauses referring to community recovery”. The implication of such 
additional clause(s) is that projects that fall into this category (i.e. reconstruction 
work on projects that are significant enough to enable whole-of community 
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recovery) could be fast-tracked with minimal notification procedures. Owen’s 
conclusion verifies the research findings on some of the improvements that need 
to be addressed in ongoing reform of the RMA. For example the submission by 
the author to the Select Committee on the reform of the RMA in April 2009 (see 
Appendix D1) suggested reviews to the RMA for dealing with projects of national 
significance.  
In somewhat similar lines to the above, Owen is in agreement with the statement 
made within the verification questionnaire that the RMA should be flexible 
enough to allow for pragmatism in decision making after a disaster. The current 
research position is that pragmatism should be within some boundaries of reason 
whilst ensuring that reconstruction works can progress with the least hindrance 
possible. Owen gave an example of pragmatism that allowed the city of Houston 
in the U.S.A to be “able to absorb 130,000 households without rises in house 
prices”. Owen opines that this was possible through a major decision to relax 
zoning requirements in Houston. 130,000 displaced households migrated to 
Houston after Hurricane Katrina because according to Owen “urban planners 
actually prevented people rebuilding their homes because they saw the devastation 
as an opportunity to write new ‘Sustainable’ plans”. 
On the differences between interpretation and implementation of the provisions of 
the RMA between different councils; Owen suggests that the differences are more 
than subtle, which verifies the arguments posed by the current study. He believes 
there are conflicting priorities between regional and district councils. In his words, 
“smart growth advocates in some regional councils would push for post Katrina 
response while District Councils will tend to want to address the immediate and more 
local distresses.” Owen explains further that “…the ARC [Auckland Regional Council] 
for example would try to use such a catastrophe as an opportunity to have all the 
people re-housed behind the Metropolitan Urban Limits.” This position suggests that 
different councils could have different planning priorities that could conflict with 
neighbouring council’s priorities. Owens position seems consistent with the 
current study that shows that conflicting priorities and regulatory provisions 
within councils could become more pronounced in disasters and that harmonising 
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recovery decisions across regional boundaries would benefit reconstruction in 
New Zealand. 
It is pertinent to conclude with Owens’s opinion on the specific issues that were 
raised in the author’s submission to the Select Committee on Local Government 
and Environment in April 2009. The submission had outlined recommendations 
for the simplification and amendment of the RMA. The recommendations are 
given below with the respective opinions (transcript) given by Owen, immediately 
following: 
• Streamlining processes for determining projects of national significance. The 
submission suggests a criterion that would allow reconstruction programmes 
to fall under those classified as nationally significant. 
• To include in membership a Recovery Manager or National Recovery 
Coordinator (if appointed) into the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) 
or any Board of Inquiry.  
• To enhance the quality of regional and district plan production in the area of 
Disaster Recovery. The memo suggests more recognition of post-disaster 
issues in these plans. 
• Improvement to the resource consent processes to tackle the expected spike in 
consent application for minor works in the aftermath of a disaster, and 
• The development of a National Policy Statement on Recovery that will 
provide an overarching framework/guideline for post-disaster reconstruction 
work. 
Owen’s general comments on these issues are as follows: 
“...your emphasis on resilience and flexibility is singularly important as is the 
observation that there is too much emphasis on preparation and risk avoidance 
and not enough on dealing with the harsh reality when disasters happen. 
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The RMA has a high focus on the natural and physical environment and not 
enough overt emphasis on the wellbeing of people. This flows into this topic of 
emergency resilience as you correctly point out. 
Part 2 sections 5 and 6 need to be changed. Unfortunately the Minister has 
promised the Environmental Defence Society that he will make no changes to 
Part 2 of the Act so you need to seek a “whole of Government” solution. 
Policy statements can have no weight unless they reflect Part 2.” 
Owen’s comments support the research results and he is largely in agreement with 
the intent and purpose of the author’s submission on RMA reforms. Part 2 of the 
RMA referred to by Owen, gives the purpose and objectives for establishing the 
RMA. As noted by him, the Act has not considered the well being of people as 
much as it does of the protection of the environment. This aspect becomes more 
important when environmental considerations take precedence over individual and 
community recovery after a disaster. Whilst not recommending one above the 
other, the study believes that due consideration should be given to the 
implications that the implementation of the Act would have on personal recovery.  
5.10.3 Research Verification of the Building Act (2004) 
The following lists the key issues that were presented to the SME in the form of a 
verification questionnaire. Mike Stannard’s comments and opinions are presented 
in the section immediately following this list. 
a) Building consent process and compliance requirements within the BA could 
slow down reconstruction work. Could there be a short-cut to stipulated 
processes? Could consent processing problems be associated to resource 
logistics rather than procedural constraints? 
b) The requirements for notification contained in section 70-74 of the Act could 
affect rebuilding efforts of individual house owners. Similarly there are issues 
around the effect of issued CCC and COA during sale agreements. 
 185 
c) There are issues around procedural arrangements for building damage 
evaluations (on-the spot assessment of physical facilities). Could damage 
evaluations be a pre cursor to the achievement of recovery objectives? 
d) There are subtle differences in the interpretation and implementation of the 
BA across councils. Could this impact reconstruction programmes in any 
way?  
e) There are issues of re-alignment of the BA with other legislative documents 
e.g. the CDEM Act and RMA. 
What is the SME’s opinion on these BA issues? 
Mike Stannard provided his comments and opinions about these and other issues. 
Similar to the other verification questionnaires, the issues were re-phrased in the 
form of a questionnaire, which is included at Appendix B8. Mike’s opinions are 
presented in the following paragraphs. 
On whether consent processing and compliance arrangements under the BA could 
slow down reconstruction activities. Mike believes this to be the case; however he 
explains that the recently released guidelines on building safety evaluations are a 
first step to enhancing (speeding up) reconstruction projects. According to him 
“the guidelines were produced based on international best practice and tested in 
Gisborne and more recently in Padang, Indonesia”. Mike explains further that central 
and local government agencies in collaboration with the New Zealand Society for 
Earthquake Engineering (NZSEE) and the Institution of Professional Engineers 
New Zealand (IPENZ) are considering resourcing issues in the same light. In his 
words, “it is envisaged that there will be sharing of personnel among the 73 
territorial authorities to assist in emergency reconstruction”. This view seems 
consistent with those held by the current study, which seeks enhanced 
arrangements for the development of memorandum of understanding amongst 
response and recovery agencies after a disaster. It would seem also from his 
comments that he supports rapid property evaluation for damages during the early 
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phases of response, which this study considers a pre-cursor to/and determinant of 
the success of subsequent recovery and reconstruction activities.  
On the effect of section 70-74 (notices for building on land that are subject to 
natural hazards), Mike believes this might be an issue for widespread flooding 
incidents. He cites clause 3 of Schedule 3 of the Earthquake Commission Act as a 
provision that may be invoked, which may prevent property owners from any 
compensation and ultimately affect their overall recovery. Though the research 
investigations did not yield conclusive results on the effect of section 70-74 
notices (see 5.6.4); the SME’s view point is consistent with the preliminary 
reviews made in chapter three of the study. 
Mike agrees that there are differences between councils on the way the BA is 
interpreted and implemented. However he believes that the current accreditation 
process for Building Consent Authorities would reduce these differences. He is 
“not sure whether these differences impacting on the reconstruction processes have 
been tested” and “if this is a real problem”? The current study’s position has been 
that the differences in interpretation and implementation may become an issue 
around geographical borders. This was a concern expressed in chapter three from 
the document analysis and reviews of past natural incidents in New Zealand. 
Finally, Mike does not consider that parity between code compliance certificate 
(CCC) and certificate of acceptance (COA); could impact on reconstruction 
activities. According to him “certificates of acceptance were introduced as a 
mechanism to address building work that was in place and a building consent had not 
been applied for”. It would seem that the marketable value of properties is 
determined by factors greater than the type of certificate issued and are therefore 
insignificant in this research context.       
5.10.4 Verification of other General Issues  
The three SMEs were required to comment further on the following general issues 
around the implementation of legislation in New Zealand.  
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a)  How legislation could encourage government agencies to collaborate for 
information exchange to ensure their shared commitment to recovery 
planning and its implementation. 
b)  Breaking down existing silos to ensure the achievement of common recovery 
priorities 
c)  Resourcing issues during major recovery programmes in New Zealand. 
What are the SMEs’ opinions on these general issues? 
The study has revealed a general concern on the capacity of New Zealand to 
recover from a major disaster event. It therefore behoves responding agencies to 
collaborate in all manners to assist one another in times of need. This study’s 
position is that the respective legislative documents could be made to support a 
framework that will enable collaborative planning and implementation of 
recovery in large scale reconstruction programmes. Paul Houliston agrees with 
this opinion, but believes “the councils should be undertaking this function as part 
of developing their [respective] Recovery Plans”. Paul goes further to explain that 
“government has outlined how it will provide support in the National CDEM Plan (and 
the Guide)”. Owen McShane takes a more cautious approach to the issue, he 
believes “such cooperation can be highly productive and useful but equally can be a 
dreadful waste of time and money if not properly supervised and focused”. In 
Owen’s word “...we need to be careful to ensure it (collaboration) does not become 
a wish list for creating new visions of the perfect city or village”. Mike Stannard on 
the other hand is “not sure there needs to be legislation for collaboration to occur”. 
In Mike’s view collaboration “is being addressed at the central/local level” 
anyway. 
On the need to break down silos among responding agencies to ensure the 
achievement of common recovery priorities; all three SMEs verify the research 
position. Paul Houliston agrees “all parties must work better in this area”. Owen 
McShane sees the problem “as not just silo mentality”. According to Owen “silos 
contain highly conflicting ideologies. They are more like Berlin Walls designed to 
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prevent the mix of ideas”. Similar position was alluded to by Mike Stannard, 
though he is not convinced that the breaking down of silos is achievable through 
legislative provisions.  
Finally, on resourcing issues that may arise during the implementation of major 
recovery or reconstruction programmes; the following opinions were given by the 
three SMEs. Owen McShane agrees that resourcing is an issue that needs to be 
addressed. He has made several submissions on the issue (his submissions are 
outside the scope of the current study). Paul Houliston holds a similar view; he 
states that “...the main impediment will be the capacity and capability of the 
organisations and individuals involved in recovery... In somewhat similar terms, Mike 
Stannard explains that resourcing issues have been given serious consideration. 
According to him: 
“The Department of Building and Housing is working with Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), MCDEM, NZSEE, Local Government and 
IPENZ to better define responsibilities in the event of a major disaster for 
building safety evaluation”.  
In conclusion, this section on research verification has presented the comments 
made by the three SMEs to the respective questionnaires given to them. The 
comments and opinions have significantly verified the preliminary research 
investigations. In a couple of situations, their comments have extended knowledge 
beyond those held by the current study. The key results from the verification 
exercise are discussed further in chapter six.   
5.11 Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the research investigations which had involved three 
research methods; focus group study; opinion survey and research verification 
using subject matter experts. These methods provided rigorous analyses of the 
research question through an iterative process of adjusting and re-adjusting the 
research themes to align with the key issues in legislation and post disaster 
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reconstruction. The results and outcomes of the investigations are presented and 
discussed within the context of the research objectives.  
Attempt was made to highlight the significant areas of concern in the legislative 
documents under focus; and to provide insight into aspects that would need to be 
improved in the documents. The next chapter will put the result in better 
perspective through a general discussion that compares the results in this chapter 
with preliminary findings from chapter two and three.  
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Chapter Six 
General Discussions 
6.0  Introduction 
This chapter presents salient points of synthesis of the entire research findings. It 
is the concluding aspect of the third conceptual part of the study (The Research 
Synthesis) that was described in the first and fourth chapter (and depicted in 
Figure 1.1 and 4.1). The chapter contains information that has been condensed 
from points that have been made in the preliminary parts of the thesis e.g. 
literature review, document analysis and case study information; and issues that 
emerged from the research aspects of the study (in chapter five). A synergy of all 
the information collated from the literature review through to the research 
investigations is therefore presented under the following sub-headings. Essentially 
this chapter completes the triangulation of the research study. 
6.1  Synthesis of Findings 
The research has so far confirmed the multidimensional problems associated with 
the management of recovery after a major disaster, especially with regards to 
some of the regulatory guidelines in the three legislative documents studied. It is 
apparent from the investigations that, legislation may contribute to vulnerability in 
disaster recovery, as it could influence the timely achievement of recovery 
objectives. In the local and overseas natural disaster case studies presented in 
chapter three, there was evidence of changes that had to be made to building and 
development control legislation to allow for reconstruction to take place in a more 
co-ordinated and unhindered manner.  
In the current study, the research reaches a conclusion that certain provisions of 
the three legislative documents that are the focus of the study have the potential of 
becoming impediments (areas of concern) to the realisation of reconstruction 
objectives in New Zealand. These impediments are both specific and general to 
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the three Acts. Some of these impediments are explained further within this 
chapter. 
Generally the information obtained from the research aspects of the study show 
that the three legislative documents are useful as ‘building back better’ 
instruments, controlling re-development projects in a manner that is consistent 
with New Zealand’s resilience objectives. However there are subtleties 
surrounding their implementation that were (and still are) inhibitive. It could be 
surmised that a review and realignment of these documents are necessary to 
present a robust framework under which New Zealand communities can recover 
after a major hazard event.  
An outline of the key research investigations are made in the following sub-
headings. The research results are also discussed within the context of the 
research investigations and the opinions expressed by the subject matter experts to 
the study. The objective of the chapter is to bring together all the information into 
a coherent form that will put any suggested improvement to the legislative 
documents in perspective. 
6.1.1 The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 
The CDEM Act reviewed in chapter two and three, is the overarching document 
that creates awareness of New Zealand hazards; it gives directions on the 
management of those hazards; and coordinates emergency activities across the 
4Rs (Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery). The interpretation and 
implementation of the Act have been produced as guideline (planning) 
documents, a number of which have been referred to in the preliminary parts of 
this study. The preliminary investigations and reviews were indicative of 
deficiencies that needed to be addressed in the Act for a smoother achievement of 
reconstruction programmes after a disaster. A listing of these deficiencies was 
given in Table 3.5 and they include: 
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• The inadequacy of statutory powers to coordinate recovery; 
• The need to extend the powers of appointed Recovery Coordinators beyond a 
declared emergency period; 
• The adequacy of recovery arrangements in large-scale disaster events; and  
• The implementation of the CDEM Act alongside other building (BA) and 
environmental (RMA) development control legislation. 
The above set of issues was resolved into knowledge gaps which were 
investigated further in the research phase of the study. The knowledge gaps were 
outlined in the right-hand column of Table 3.5, and they include: 
• Clarity in responsibilities and arrangements to deal with the transition from 
disaster response to recovery and the actual implementation of recovery 
programmes. 
• The operation and coordination of disaster recovery after the expiration of 
declared state of emergencies, and  
• Cross linking of the provisions of the CDEM Act with the BA and RMA.  
These knowledge gaps were used in the drafting of the questions on the CDEM 
Act which were administered to building and environmental development 
practitioners in the form of an opinion survey (Appendix B5). The results of the 
online survey were verified further using a subject matter expert to comment on 
them. The main themes underpinning the research investigations on the CDEM 
Act are the themes presented in the following paragraphs. These research themes 
are presented to give an insight into the research findings and other conclusions 
arising from this study. 
The powers for coordinating recovery programmes 
From the preliminary reviews of the CDEM Act, the study had expressed 
concerns on the clarity of responsibilities and arrangements to deal with the 
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transition from disaster response to recovery in New Zealand. This issue was 
identified during the review of literature and document analysis in chapter three. 
Subsequent research investigations involving a focus group study and an online 
survey show, in particular, that the statutory powers for directing all emergency 
services beyond a declared emergency period could be limiting and may need to 
be reviewed. For example the appointment of a National Recovery Coordinator, 
allowed for in the CDEM Act, is currently at the discretion of the Minister during 
a declared emergency period. The appointment is temporary and it is expected 
that recovery coordination reverts back to local Recovery Managers after the 
emergency period. Participants to the research survey have expressed that there 
could be benefits in the review of Section 29 of the Act to allow a longer term for 
an appointed Recovery Coordinator, beyond the expiration of a declared 
emergency. The study further asserts that such an extension will allow for 
consistency in policy decisions across the transition phase of emergency response 
to actual recovery. The subject matter expert (consulted on this Act) was in 
agreement with these statements but goes further to suggest that the establishment 
of the position of a National Recovery Coordinator, be a permanent office that 
will address all recovery issues from small to large scale emergencies in New 
Zealand. 
Improving the CDEM framework 
The research result shows that there is the need to improve the existing disaster 
recovery framework so that individual recovery objectives of response agencies 
can be achieved within an overall community recovery objective. Emergency 
response and recovery activities by different stakeholder agencies have not been 
streamlined towards common goals and objectives in previous disasters in New 
Zealand (WRLAWG, 2004). Coordination remains a significant barrier to 
achieving effective emergency/disaster management objectives (McEntire, 2002). 
The current study views recovery management as a function to be taken on by 
MCDEM by being proactively involved in recovery programmes. A report by the 
AELG (2005) had suggested that MCDEM preferred a working model that sets 
priorities for lifelines during recovery, rather than to direct reconstruction 
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activities. Tonkin and Taylor (2005) confirmed that local authorities had 
coordinated their own recovery. The results of these two documents are consistent 
with the current research findings. Therefore this research concludes that the 
CDEM Act could permit greater devolvement, delegation and coordination 
responsibilities to a permanent National Recovery Coordinator. Recovery 
management could therefore take place within an enhanced synergy of activities 
by agencies, during a large-scale disaster in New Zealand.  
Implementing the CDEM Act  
The research concludes that more leadership of the recovery process is required 
by MCDEM officials at the different levels of response to a disaster. The research 
submits that leadership should derive from legislative provisions within the 
CDEM Act and other guideline documents. This will enable pragmatism in 
decision making by MCDEM officials. Statutorily MCDEM mainly engages with 
emergency services hence it focuses on the initial emergency response phase of 
any disaster. This may be inadequate in the event of significant disasters when 
recovery complexities extend beyond the response phase.  
The research result makes it apparent that large-scale reconstruction programmes 
are vulnerable to slow execution because they are not exactly catered for in the 
CDEM Act. One suggested solution is the empowerment for the coordination of 
recovery (National Recovery Coordinator) that was discussed above; another is to 
recognise the sort of issues that could be encountered in large scale reconstruction 
programmes, by the Act. In the latter case, the start point could be the 
incorporation of recovery as an important focus in Section 3 of the CDEM Act. 
Section 3 of the CDEM Act currently emphasises emergency response, and needs 
to be expanded to include recovery management. 
The Act and other disaster-related legislation 
In the light of suggested improvements to the legislative documents reviewed by 
the current study, it is pertinent that the CDEM Act reflects these new 
improvements in a manner that integrates it with the other legislative documents. 
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Cross referencing and linking of the new provisions/operating procedures will 
therefore benefit disaster management. For example it will be useful to include in 
CDEM planning documents which aspects of the RMA or BA will apply during 
different phases of disaster response and recovery. Reference could also be made 
of the new guidelines on building safety evaluations, prepared by the NZSEE as 
an instrument to speed up recovery after disaster. 
The foregoing conclusions suggest that improvements are needed to the CDEM 
Act so that it can support recovery management in New Zealand. The Act’s 
emphasis on emergency response needs to be expanded to cater for recovery. The 
establishment of a permanent National Recovery Coordinator which is suggested 
by this study should put recovery management for large-scale disasters in proper 
perspective. The revised emphasis on recovery should be reflected in related 
planning and implementation documents that are produced by MCDEM too.     
6.1.2 The Resource Management Act 1991 
The RMA is the legislative document that covers all environment planning and 
development issues in New Zealand. It is administered by respective regional 
councils but coordinated by the Ministry for Environment. The document has 
undergone several amendments since its promulgation and within the course of 
the current study; submissions were requested for a streamline and amendment to 
some of its provisions. The author made a submission to the Select Committee on 
Local Government and Environment, New Zealand Parliament in April 2009. This 
is included at Appendix D1 (Submission on the Resource Management: 
Simplifying and Streamlining Amendment Bill). The suggested improvements in 
the document came from the preliminary reviews (in chapter three) and some of 
the outcome of the research investigations (in chapter five). The preliminary 
reviews had identified the following key issues which were outlined in Table 3.5 
in chapter three: 
• Resource consent processing and statutory requirements that could impact on 
reconstruction schedules and costing. 
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• The consultation process stipulated in the RMA and its implications for 
reconstruction. 
• The issues that may arise from strictly implementing RMA provisions; and 
• Conflicting provisions within the RMA and BA which may hinder the 
execution of reconstruction programmes. 
These key issues were resolved into knowledge gaps as follows: 
• Limited knowledge of reconstruction requirements vis-à-vis resource consents 
processing. 
• Implications of processing delays on reconstruction projects. 
• Identifying reconstruction projects of national significance that will allow for 
‘ministerial call-in’ (bypassing normal consent procedure for significant 
reconstruction projects by an action of the Minister for Environment). 
• Mitigating the effect of public notification in post-disaster reconstruction 
works. 
• Minimising litigation in reconstruction projects with potential environmental 
impacts. 
The knowledge gaps outlined above were then re-structured so that the issues 
could be investigated further, at the next phase of the study (i.e. the research 
depicted in Figure 1.1). There were four main themes (see 5.6.1 to 5.6.4 in chapter 
five) covered by the research investigations. These four themes that relate to the 
RMA are described in the following paragraphs coupled with the outcome of the 
research verification by a subject matter expert. 
Consent processing under the RMA 
A key issue investigated in the current study of the RMA is the impact that the 
consent process and other statutory requirements could have on recovery. The 
preliminary reviews show that the RMA was burdensome and became a source of 
 197 
frustration in past reconstruction programmes in New Zealand (McShane, 2003; 
Tonkin and Taylor, 2005). For example 31% of resource consent applications 
could not be processed in the 2005-2006 period (IPENZ, 2008); while consent 
processing prevented re-habitation of individual house owners during the Bay of 
Plenty floods in 2005 (Middleton, 2008). Interestingly research participants have 
expressed that the statutory requirements in the RMA are a necessity although 
most agree that it could be burdensome in some situations. This suggests that 
though there is merit in the stipulated procedures, a simplification of the process 
would augur well in disaster management situations. The research concludes that 
the logistics of consent processing during chaotic response and recovery deserve 
consideration so that the spike of consent applications could be tackled 
effectively. Some of the suggested solutions are discussed within the following 
paragraphs; while chapter seven presents more specific recommendations for 
improving consent processing under the RMA. 
The effect of public notification  
This research study finds that the requirements for consultation and notification 
within the RMA could frustrate genuine reconstruction programmes. Frustration 
will be due to the consultation procedure rather than the purpose or intent of the 
Act; hence some flexibility in RMA procedural requirements is desirable. This is 
true for projects of national significance or critical infrastructure projects that 
could be catalyst to community recovery after major disasters. Surveys on 
resource consent processing conducted by the Ministry for Environment have 
consistently given lower than expected results (Ministry for Environment, 2009). 
These were largely resource applications made during ‘peace time’ situations. 
One can imagine what the situation will be when there is a spike in consent 
applications after a major disaster. It is most certain that critical infrastructure 
reconstruction projects may be held up, in the 2005-2006 period some of the total 
resource consents declined were for major infrastructure projects of national 
significance (Middleton, 2008). Critical infrastructure projects are not adequately 
catered for in the RMA (McShane, 2008). 
 198 
The current study has reached a conclusion that reconstruction projects that could 
be classified as nationally significant are vulnerable and need to be catered for 
within the RMA so that their execution are able to be fast-tracked accordingly. 
Provisions for projects of national importance are given in Section 6 of the Act; 
while Section 140-141(C) outlines ministerial call-in provisions. Both of these 
provisions outline bypass in normal consent procedures in certain situations. The 
current criteria do not make provisions for critical reconstruction projects and 
would need to be addressed as an improvement to current provisions  
Implementing the RMA at post disaster reconstruction 
The preliminary reviews show that lack of pragmatism in decision making on the 
part of disaster management may become an issue by the implementers of the 
RMA. Stipulated processes seem inflexible which may lead implementers to ‘go 
by the book’ in most cases. The research has taken the position that within 
boundaries of reason, Recovery Managers should be able to veto certain RMA 
requirements to allow for reconstruction work to progress with little hindrance. In 
Manawatu-Wanganui flood for example, guidelines for debris management 
became necessary, to set aside rigid RMA requirements for the management of 
the environment. The position of the current study is that such veto powers could 
derive from prior agreements and in association with officials in respective 
agencies that are tasked with approving and issuing resource consents as was the 
case in the Manawatu-Wanganui flooding incident. The development of ‘what if’ 
scenarios and associated guidelines on how implementers will interpret parts of 
the RMA legislation may be a solution that is pre-agreed before disasters occur. 
Implementing the RMA across regional boundaries 
The research shows that there are subtle differences that exist in the interpretation 
and implementation of the Act between different territorial and regional 
authorities. This position was consistently confirmed from the preliminary to the 
final research analyses. The research has shown that due cognisance to these 
differences would minimise jurisdictional conflicts between coordinating 
authorities when dealing with those recovery issues that arise from hazard events 
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that cut across geographical boundaries. Prior consideration of conflicting 
requirements could therefore result in harmonisation and subsequently, working 
agreements before any disaster. 
In summary, improvements are needed to make the RMA cater for the issues that 
could arise during large-scale recovery programmes. Procedural arrangements 
need to be eased off for critical reconstruction projects by allowing a bypass of 
stipulated procedures. The study also show that implementation of the RMA 
would benefit from uniformity in implementation across councils and regions to 
forestall jurisdictional conflicts. Specific recommendations to improve the RMA 
are described further in chapter seven. 
6.1.3 The Building Act 2004 
The Building Act (BA) is the legislative document that regulates building work 
and its performance in New Zealand. The Act essentially prescribes the 
requirements of the national building code in a manner that ensures that buildings 
and associated features meet certain performance standards like durability, fire 
safety, sanitation, moisture control, energy efficiency and access. Detailed review 
of the BA and what its implementation could mean to disaster reconstruction have 
been given in section 3.3.3 of chapter three. A summary of the key issues in this 
legislative document was presented in Table 3.5 to include: 
• The implication of the building consent process and compliance requirements 
on reconstruction work.  
• The effect of procedural arrangements for damage evaluations (on-the spot 
assessment) on reconstruction progress. 
• Approval and certification of Building Consent Authorities (BCAs) under the 
Act. 
• Training requirements for new and external evaluators/assessors involved in 
recovery service after a disaster. 
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• Insurance cover for buildings with section 71-74 notices etc. 
• Liabilities for decision making under the Act.   
It became evident from the issues outlined above that there were gaps in 
knowledge which had to be addressed by the current study so that the BA does not 
pose an impediment to the realisation of major reconstruction programmes in New 
Zealand. The gaps identified in chapter three included the following (as 
summarised in Table 3.5): 
• Limited knowledge on the means by which stipulated procedures in the Act 
can be simplified so that the Act caters well for reconstruction after significant 
disaster events.  
• Lack of guidelines for special waiver or modification of the provisions of the 
Act for reconstruction projects. For example the extension of the validity 
period of an issued building consents beyond one year. 
• The empowerment of BCAs for discretionary application of BA provisions in 
circumstances where expediency may be necessary. 
• The harmonisation of certain regulatory provisions between the BA, RMA 
(environmental legislation) and CDEM Act (emergency management 
legislation). 
The knowledge gaps outlined above became the cornerstone of the third aspect of 
the current study (the research depicted in Figure 1.1). The knowledge gaps were 
resolved into four main themes (see 5.7.1 to 5.7.4 in chapter five) under which a 
set of statements/questions were administered to building and environmental 
development practitioners in the form of an opinion survey. There was further 
investigation to verify the survey results by engaging subject matter expert (the 
opinions of the subject matter expert were presented in 5.10.3 of chapter five) to 
comment on the research outputs. The four themes that came out from the 
research under the BA are described in the following paragraphs.   
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The BA and its implementation  
In the review of past recovery reports, especially for the two case studies 
considered in chapter three; there was indication that reconstruction activities 
could have been achieved at a shorter time span. There was evidence to suggest 
that the procedural requirements for consent processing for both building and 
environmental developments impacted on recovery. For example the processing 
of building consents at the early stages of reconstruction created a bottleneck 
(AELG, 2005), hence recovery took longer than anticipated (Becker et al., 2008; 
Rowan, 2005). Spee (2008) conclude also that delayed recovery during the Matata 
flooding incident was the result of development control requirements (for both 
building and environment), which caused longer term health related problems 
than the actual disaster. 
The current study has realised results that are consistent with previous research 
investigations that conclude that building and environmental legislation may 
become burdensome during disaster recovery (Marano & Fraser, 2006; Meese et 
al., 2005). A significant percentage of participants to the opinion survey confirm 
that strict application of the provisions of the BA may impact on the efficiency of 
reconstruction works. There is also significant agreement that the implementation 
of BA provisions for large scale reconstruction programmes could become 
cumbersome and that local councils could struggle to meet stipulated 
requirements. Therefore, the study concludes that the BA could pose impediments 
to the timely realisation of reconstruction and recovery objectives in New 
Zealand. 
Simplifying the Consent Process 
Following on from the problem of implementing the BA during disasters in New 
Zealand, the research study identified the simplification of the consent process as 
a key issue worthy of further investigation. This stems from the knowledge gaps 
on how stipulated procedures could be simplified and whether there could be 
waivers or modifications made to enable reconstruction works under the Act.  
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The current research finds issues around the building consent process and 
compliance requirements under the BA. Some of these issues were highlighted 
above. Though the research investigations have not yielded significant clarity on 
how the stipulated consent process could be simplified. The general view held by 
survey participants is that there are benefits in implementing the BA which cannot 
be substituted by a deregulated framework. The research finds that New Zealand 
communities are more likely to be adversely affected by a relaxation of the 
provisions for thoroughness in the processing of (re)building consents. The 
implementation of the Act seems obligatory and territorial local authorities cannot 
act otherwise. The research therefore concludes that the benefits for controlled 
development after a disaster outweigh any desire for speed of disaster recovery.  
The research finds that consent processing problems were perceived by significant 
number of research participants to be more of a logistic issue that could be 
resolved through adequate resourcing of building development control 
departments. This will enable the departments to meet processing demands during 
a large scale reconstruction programme. This view is shared by the subject matter 
expert that verified the research investigations.  
The Clarity of BA Provisions 
A third theme which was investigated by the research was the clarity of certain 
provisions in the BA. Specific mention was made of damage inspection 
procedures; insurance cover to consenting authorities; and the implications of 
section 71-74 notices. These issues had been identified in the literature review and 
further reinforced at the early stages of the research by the focus group members.  
The research finds that damage inspection procedures in past disaster incidents are 
inadequate and needed reviewing to reflect the demands for rapid assessment 
following a disaster. However in the course of the current research programme, 
significant development had been made towards improving damage inspection 
procedures. The NZSEE  produced a guideline for Territorial Authorities on 
building safety evaluations (New Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineers, 
2009). The guideline is based on international best practice for safety evaluations 
by engineers and damage assessors. According to Mike Stannard, this document 
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was trialled in the Gisborne earthquake (2008) and more recently in the Padang 
earthquake, Indonesia (2009) with good results. However the current study 
highlights the need to provide appropriate training to external personnel whose 
services are likely to be engaged or donated following a significant hazard event. 
This issue seems not to have been covered in the current safety evaluation 
document (New Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineers, 2009). 
The research finds that both the provisions of the BA concerning insurance cover 
for consent authorities and section 71-74 notices are insignificant. There is a 
widely held view that these set of issues can be settled politically with the right 
government will and support. For example compensation policies may be 
reviewed to accommodate community needs in larger scale disasters, even though 
this may not be expressly provided for in legislative documents. This was the case 
with Earthquake Commission (EQC) compensation payments made after the 
Waihi ground subsidence in 2001.  
The BA and other regulatory documents  
The reviews in chapter three reveal that certain BA provisions may need to be 
harmonised with environmental (RMA) and emergency management (CDEM 
Act) legislation so that there is consistency of interpretation on issues that border 
around reconstruction and recovery. The Act is administered by the Department of 
Building and Housing (DBH) and at the operational levels by Building Consent 
Authorities (BCAs). The regulation of other legislative document is different, for 
example, regulation of the RMA is achieved through district and regional plans; 
while the BA is nationally derived and administered. This may cause tension 
between these ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ systems of control (MWH, 2004). 
Similar conflicts were suggested in the processing of consents when both building 
and resource consents are necessary to authorise proposed developments (MWH, 
2004). Simply assuring a cross reference of related parts of these legislative 
documents could minimise misinterpretations and any associated implementation 
problems.  
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Finally, in the light of current developments (i.e. the production of building 
evaluation guidelines) it might be necessary to incorporate building evaluation in 
the BA as a step towards achieving early recovery in the event of a disaster. 
6.2 Other General issues of concern 
The research has shown that there is concern for the capacity of New Zealand to 
recover from a major disaster event. Particular consideration needs to be given to 
the availability, accessibility and means by which disaster resources are applied, 
by responding agencies. Of note is the integration of external resources (in the 
form of aid and assistance) into any major recovery programme in New Zealand. 
For example, building safety evaluation guidelines have not catered for the 
engagement of external evaluators. The need to introduce package inductions that 
will enable external resources to come to quick grips with disaster management 
initiatives cannot be overstated. 
The research also gives credence to collaborative arrangements aimed at 
achieving recovery objectives. There is no doubt that large scale disaster will 
overwhelm local response and assistance of one form or another will help 
recovery efforts. The manner in which this collaboration is achieved deserves 
attention. The study concludes that collaborative arrangements are needed 
between territorial and regional authorities for information exchange and shared 
commitments through pre-agreed arrangements. This could be in the form of 
memoranda of understanding, which could outline arrangements on how recovery 
can be achieved through the collaborative efforts of disaster-affected councils or 
regions.  
Finally an issue the research emphasises is the need to break down organisational 
and agency silos that may exist within response and recovery agencies. Current 
silo mentality amongst agencies results in barriers to efficient and effective 
recovery. The development of shared recovery priorities are therefore encouraged 
to break down existing silos and contribute to all-of-community recovery 
perceptions.  
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Chapter Seven 
General Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.0 Introduction 
The chapter outlines the original contributions made by the research to post-
disaster reconstruction knowledge and provides a review of the research 
objectives and how these objectives were achieved during the research 
programme. A list of recommendations for changes to parts of the three legislative 
documents (CDEM Act, RMA and BA) under review is presented, together with 
other changes that could facilitate improved implementation of significant 
reconstruction programmes in New Zealand. The chapter concludes with an 
identification of areas of further research that could extend this current study. 
7.1  Original Contributions 
The following paragraphs outline the contributions that the research study has 
made to the body of knowledge recognised as Legislation in Post-disaster 
Reconstruction.  
The research reinforces generally held views that certain provisions in building 
and development control legislation may hinder the achievement of post disaster 
reconstruction objectives. Previous research reports on New Zealand disasters 
indicate that legislation may hinder reconstruction, but the current research has 
gone further to articulate the deficient aspects of these legislative documents 
which would have to be addressed. The study places emphasis on three legislative 
documents (CDEM Act, RMA and BA) which it has shown may impact the 
implementation of reconstruction programmes in a major natural disaster in New 
Zealand. 
Apart from articulating the deficiencies in the three legislative documents, the 
research study outlines improvements that could be made to these legislative 
documents. Attempt is made to refer to parts or clauses, specific to the three 
documents (CDEM Act, RMA and BA), that could make them robust enough to 
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be implemented during the reconstruction of the built environment in a major 
disaster.  
The research study shows that there has to be synergy of objectives amongst 
emergency management legislation with building and development control 
legislation. For example the planning documents on recovery management, 
prepared by the MCDEM, could be enhanced by integrating relevant aspects of 
the RMA and BA that are applicable during reconstruction activities. Such 
harmonious provisions in all disaster-related legislation would make for robust 
implementation of recovery policies.  
7.2 Review of Objectives 
The principal focus of the current study was the improvement of existing 
legislation and regulatory frameworks for reconstruction so that they could 
facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of reconstruction programmes 
after large-scale natural disasters in New Zealand. Conclusions to the four 
objectives stated in section 1.3 of chapter one are outlined in the following 
sections.   
Objective 1: To review New Zealand’s emergency management framework; its 
guidelines on recovery operations; and related emergency management 
legislation.  
New Zealand’s emergency management was reviewed by studying government 
policy documents and guidelines. The research traced the development of the 
emergency management framework from inception to its current form. Emergency 
management in New Zealand began as a conventional response system to more 
advanced disaster management across 4Rs of reduction, readiness, response and 
recovery. This is a holistic approach to disaster management which has been 
acclaimed in several literatures. Section 2.6 shows clearly the structure and 
operational framework for recovery and in particular, reconstruction of the built 
environment after a disaster in New Zealand. Further analysis of the recovery 
framework was presented in chapter three, with section 3.3 making reference to the 
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CDEM Act and its implication to reconstruction. Other recovery related legislation 
such as the RMA and BA were discussed in chapter three. Generally, chapter three 
shows how parts of the three legislative documents under review could impact the 
implementation of reconstruction programmes in New Zealand.  
The study gave contextual background to these discussions by reviewing 
fundamental disaster management concepts in chapter two. For example chapter 
two gives the definition of disasters, the nature of disaster impacts, post disaster 
coordination and reviews response, recovery and reconstruction within the context 
of the research focus. Chapter two and three therefore underpin the research study 
as it pursues the remaining research objectives. 
Objective 2: To identify constraints that may be posed by existing legislative 
and regulatory provisions, in particular those contained in the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management (CDEM) Act, Resource Management Act (RMA) 
and the Building Act (BA), to the realisation of reconstruction objectives.  
The constraints that the three legislative documents (CDEM Act, RMA and BA) 
pose to the achievement of reconstruction objectives were identified through 
several means. These means are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Firstly the study reviewed recovery reports and commentaries on the three 
legislative documents to reveal their practical implications to post-disaster 
reconstruction activities. The reviews are contained in chapter three which 
culminated in a summarisation of the findings in a tabular format (see Table 3.5). 
The study shows clearly the issues of concern in implementing the three 
legislative documents at post disaster reconstruction by referencing relevant parts 
of the legislative documents in bold characters. 
Secondly the study evaluated recovery after previous disaster events in New 
Zealand and overseas. The evaluations were covered in sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
Information on the disasters were obtained from government reports on the 
incident, post-event studies and other commentaries. The local case studies 
focussed on the reconstruction and recovery activities that took place, to 
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demonstrate the challenges that the implementation of the CDEM Act, RMA and 
BA posed to the reconstruction process. While the overseas disasters provided 
lessons on legislative changes that had to be made to allow for reconstruction 
activities to progress after the events. The evaluation of the local and overseas 
disasters shows that emergency, building and environmental legislation can 
become sources of vulnerability in disaster recovery. If legislation is inappropriate 
then reconstruction objectives may become inefficient and ineffective.   
Finally a workshop was organised to identify the barriers to reconstruction in New 
Zealand. Legislation was one of the four aspects deliberated upon by industry 
practitioners. The workshop was organised as a focus group study with the key 
issues identified in the preliminary investigations posed to the participants. The 
focus group came up with research priorities in post disaster reconstruction, most 
of which the current study addressed. Section 5.1 covers the results of the focus 
group study. The results show that there are deficient parts of recovery-related 
legislation which needed to be improved so that they facilitate significant 
reconstruction programmes in New Zealand.  
The research investigations to meet this second objective provided information 
which was investigated further using a larger group of research participants. This 
further investigation is discussed under objective three below.  
Objective 3: To investigate whether building and development control officers, 
and other disaster management practitioners, envisage problems in the post-
disaster recovery process that are specifically caused by deficiencies in 
legislation.  
Objective three is an extension of the research investigations carried out under 
objective two. The objective was to solicit wider research participation (by 
practitioners). The research investigation commenced by administering an online 
questionnaire to building/development control officers, and disaster management 
practitioners in New Zealand. The results of the questionnaire were presented in 
section 5.2 to 5.9 using simple descriptive analyses; charts and tables; ranking etc. 
for ease of understanding. The survey results largely confirm the deficiencies 
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envisaged in the implementation of the three legislative documents, which were 
initially identified under objectives one and two.  
Further to the questionnaire survey, the study sought validation of the research 
results using subject matter experts (SMEs). Three SMEs were identified in the 
research to verify and extend the research results. A discussion of the research 
verification exercise including some transcripts of the SMEs opinions are presented 
in section 5.10. Generally the verification exercise yielded information which is in 
consonance with the previous research results on the deficient parts of the three 
legislative documents. The SMEs provided valuable suggestions for improving 
legislation. These suggestions were shown clearly in the discussions in section 5.10.  
This third objective concluded the research aspects of the study and permitted a 
synthesis of all the information gathered to be presented in chapter six.    
Objective 4: To suggest improvements to recovery-related legislation and 
regulatory provisions.  
The aim of objective 4 is to answer the research question posed in section 1.1 as 
follows: What improvements can be made to existing disaster-related legislation 
and regulatory provisions so that they facilitate the implementation of significant 
reconstruction programmes in New Zealand?  
The study had employed a multi method approach involving interviews, document 
analyses, focus group study, online survey and research verification using subject 
matter experts. This approach yielded information which supported the research 
hypothesis in section 4.4: that some of the contents of the three Acts would need to 
be reviewed so that they facilitate the implementation of significant reconstruction 
programmes.  
The research results relating to the three Acts were published as intermediate 
research outputs, which included peer-reviewed conference and journal papers; and 
book chapter. A list of all the research publications generated from the current study 
is included at Appendix C. Copies of some selected publications are included at 
Appendix D2 to D7. The research also made a submission to the Local Government 
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and Environment Committee, New Zealand Parliament in April 2009; where 
portions of the RMA that could be simplified and streamlined were suggested (see 
Appendix D1).  
This research report suggests specific improvements that could be made to the three 
legislative documents to make them robust to facilitate the implementation of 
reconstruction programmes in New Zealand. It refers to parts and clauses within the 
CDEM Act, RMA and BA that need reviewing; and provides action points for 
policy changes by government and responsible agencies. The research also 
recommends general areas of improvement to disaster management practice in New 
Zealand. The complete recommendations from this study are given in section 7.3 
below. 
7.3 Recommendations 
The recommendations arising from the current research study are presented in 
three sub-sections namely: specific, general and recommendation for future work.  
7.3.1  Specific Recommendations 
The following specific recommendations are made for improving the three 
legislative documents that have been the focus of this study programme. The 
recommendations are designed to facilitate both the efficient and effective 
reconstruction of the built environment after a significant disaster in New 
Zealand. Reference is made where possible to portions of the legislative 
documents that may be affected by these recommendations. These are to serve as 
action points for appropriate policy considerations.  
Recommendations relative to the CDEM Act 
• The study recommends an enhanced approach to civil defence and emergency 
management by the coordinating ministry (MCDEM). The current study 
believes that MCDEM could be made more pro-active by extending provisions 
within the CDEM Act beyond emergency services to cover recovery 
management. This would facilitate the holistic performance around the 4Rs 
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(reduction/mitigation, readiness/preparedness, response and recovery). The 
study shows that recovery planning and arrangements within the CDEM Act 
needs to be improved. 
Action: Review the CDEM Act and other planning documents with a view to 
strengthening recovery planning and management across all sectors involved 
in disaster management in New Zealand.   
• The study recommends the re-evaluation of the currently temporary position of 
National Recovery Coordinator to facilitate all recovery planning and 
management initiatives. It is suggested that the position be made permanent to 
reflect the importance attached by MCDEM to recovery management in any 
scale of disaster.  
Action: Review Section 29 and 30 on appointment and function of a Recovery 
Coordinator. 
• The study recommends clearer distinction between the terms ‘emergency’ and 
‘disaster’ within the CDEM Act. The term ‘disaster’ could convey more clearly 
the severity of a hazard event and the importance of individual and community 
recovery after the event.  
Action: Review Section 3 and 4 on Purpose and Interpretation of the Act. 
• The study recommends greater alignment of the CDEM Act with both the 
Resource Management Act and Building Act so that all recovery-related 
provisions within these documents are streamlined to avoid misinterpretations 
and conflicting implementations.  
Action: Review appropriate planning and guideline documents on recovery 
planning management that are produced by the Ministry of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management.  
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Recommendation relative to the Resource Management Act 
• The RMA should streamline the process for determining projects of national 
significance. There needs to be great clarity on projects that could be 
considered nationally significant. Criteria such as the cost of a project, scale of 
the project, sphere of influence on the public etc. may be established; but most 
importantly there should be a specific criterion that identifies critical 
reconstruction projects following large-scale disasters as nationally significant. 
This criterion should refer to Level 4 and 5 event types (regionally and 
nationally significant emergencies defined in CDEM Group Plans). This will 
be consistent with the provisions for immediacy, necessity and sufficiency 
contained in Section 330 of the Act. 
Action: Appropriate review of Part 6AA on Proposals of National Significance 
so that it recognises critical infrastructure projects as being nationally 
significant.  
• The study recommends the inclusion in membership a Recovery Manager or 
National Recovery Coordinator (if appointed) into the Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA) or any Board of Inquiry. This is to facilitate the 
consenting of nationally significant re-instatement projects especially after 
disasters. 
Action: Review of Part 4A on Environmental Protection Authority to include 
membership of Recovery Managers or National Recovery Coordinators on the 
EPA board. 
• The RMA has been a source of frustration in previous recovery programmes 
largely because of procedural requirements and other provisions for wide 
consultation. It is recommended that the scale of consultation/public 
notification be limited in a manner that permits a speedy approval process. 
Improvement to consent processes would help to tackle the expected spike in 
consent application for minor works in the aftermath of a disaster. 
 213 
Action: Review Section 93-95 to limit the scope of public notifications in 
catastrophes, possibly limiting decisions to the new Environment Protection 
Authority (EPA). 
• The RMA should demand greater consideration of recovery issues by 
Territorial Authorities and Councils. Recovery planning and management 
should be incorporated into regional and district plans, to enhance their quality 
in Post-Disaster Management. Current emphasis seems to be more on 
prevention/avoidance and mitigation of hazards.  
Action: Review Section 62, 67 and 75 to contain ‘recovery from catastrophes’.  
Recommendations relative to the Building Act 
• The study recommends improvements to the logistics and operational 
arrangements for tackling consent processing during disasters. This is 
necessary to tackle the anticipated spike in consent applications that could arise 
after large-scale destruction to the built environment in New Zealand. 
Consideration of resourcing issues is paramount and most importantly is the 
deployment of specialist personnel. Personnel may be sourced locally or 
externally (overseas), hence training and packaged-induction schemes may 
need to be prepared for seconded or contracted external resource persons so 
that they come to grips with local procedures within a short duration. In 
probably the same context, Territorial Authorities and Councils would need to 
prepare modalities for collaborative working in advance of a disaster event. 
Action: Review relevant sections of legislative documents that will allow for 
collaboration in disaster management. (Reference to typical sections given 
later) 
• Similar to the above, the study recommends the incorporation of the new 
building safety evaluation guidelines into the BA. The study believes that there 
should be a specific mandate for rapid building evaluation to enable individual 
and community recovery after disasters 
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Action: Introduce a new section to deal with Building Safety Evaluations 
within the BA  
• The study recommends the preparation of policies and guidelines for the 
exercise of discretionary powers during disasters by Building Consent 
Authorities (BCAs).  
Action: Review Section 124-130 on the Powers of Territorial Authorities in the 
event of a catastrophe; Sections 41, 48 and 93 related to the bypass of normal 
consent processing arrangements.  
• The study recommends that consideration be given to the issue of parity 
between Certificates of Acceptance (COA) granted in retrospect, and Code of 
Compliance Certificates (CCC). This should allay any fear that the difference 
between these certificates relates to process rather than conformance to 
building standards.  
Action: Review Sections 91-99A to address parity of the CCC and COA.  
7.3.2 General Recommendations 
The following general recommendations are made to facilitate post disaster 
reconstruction processes in New Zealand. 
• The study recommends the development of a National Policy Statement that 
provides an overarching framework/guideline for post-disaster reconstruction. 
This would bring all post-disaster considerations into a single document but 
with references to related legislation. The study suggests that the following 
issues are covered by the Policy Statement: 
- Definition of hazard types referred to in the National Policy Statement. 
- Guidelines on the collaboration of stakeholders during recovery. The policy 
should encourage stakeholders to consider recovery beyond their existing 
commercial decisions and silos. 
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- Framework and guidelines for external aid and assistance e.g. training 
requirements for external resource persons during a catastrophic response 
and recovery programme. 
- Process-based information on recovery and the reconstruction of the 
physical environment under different disaster scenarios.  
- Description of the relationships between all disaster-related legislation (and 
development and re-development control guidelines). This will provide a 
framework for the alignment of all related legislation so that the subtle 
differences that exist under current systems are eliminated. 
• The study recommends the establishment of memoranda of understanding 
(MoU) between neighbouring Councils and Territorial Authorities. Such 
memoranda may address the following issues: 
- Procedural arrangements and protocols that will ensure coordinated, 
uniform and consistent implementation of recovery objectives across 
respective disaster management agencies. 
- Prescription of responsibilities and liabilities for harmonious relationships 
amongst parties. 
- Modalities for information dissemination and sharing. 
- Modalities for resource sharing and deployments, especially for external aid 
and assistance; and their participation in recovery programmes. 
- Training and induction issues for personnel. 
Parts of legislative documents that may influence the establishment of 
memoranda of understanding between councils and territorial authorities 
includes, but not limited to:   
a) Section 137 of the Local Government Act on ‘Joint Local Government 
Arrangements and Joint Arrangements with Other Entities’. 
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b) Sections 12-24 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act on ‘Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Groups’.  
c) Part 4 of the Resource Management Act on ‘Functions, Powers, and Duties 
of Central and Local Governments’, and   
d)  Sections 212–247 of the Building Act on ‘Responsibilities of Territorial and 
Regional Authorities’.  
7.3.3  Recommendations for future work 
This research study recognises its limitations and improvements. It therefore 
suggests the following areas for future research work to improve knowledge in 
legislation and regulation for post disaster reconstruction in New Zealand.  
• The research has concentrated on specific research priorities identified at a 
workshop organised in April 2006. These priorities were outlined in section 
5.1.2 and included in the complete workshop report at Appendix A3. The 
remaining research priorities not covered by the current research are hereby 
suggested for future studies and they include:  
- determining the extent of liabilities for reconstruction works by approving 
authorities and where such liabilities lie. The current research gave a 
cursory description of the cautious approach to disaster management 
decisions by responsible persons/authorities, explaining how this practice 
could lead to loss in pragmatic decisions. It would be useful to know how 
liable disaster management decision-makers are, especially when incorrect 
decisions are made; what the extent of these liabilities are; and what effect 
these liabilities could have on overall recovery.   
- determining public acceptance issues for needed changes in legislation. 
The current research has identified aspects of three legislative documents 
that need reviews and realignment, but stops at this. It is hereby suggested 
that a study into public perception of these reviews and their acceptability 
would extend the research and provide interesting knowledge on the 
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workability of the reviews. Suffice it to say that there are ongoing 
amendments to these three legislative documents (some of which the 
current study has made inputs to), therefore further studies to investigate 
the impact of the new changes and those that have been recommended in 
this study, would be appropriate. 
• The research was limited to a study of the implementation of the CDEM Act, 
RMA and BA as they relate to post disaster reconstruction in New Zealand. It 
recognises that other legislative documents that may impact on reconstruction 
works have not been included in the current study. It is, therefore, 
recommended that future studies be commissioned to investigate the impact of 
other pieces of legislation on reconstruction activities.  
• During the course of this research, several developments had taken place. 
Some government ministries and departments had embarked upon reviews and 
amendments to their operating procedures, emergency management plans, and 
guideline documents. Significantly the Resource Management Act (RMA) and 
Building Act (BA) are in a constant state of flux. Recent amendments to these 
documents came to effect in September 2009 and March 2008 respectively. 
The study therefore recommends future research investigations into the effect 
that these recent changes may have on reconstruction objectives.               
7.4 Conclusion 
This research has addressed a critical gap in post disaster reconstruction literature 
in New Zealand by systematically addressing the issues that surround the 
implementation of three legislative documents (the CDEM Act, RMA and BA) 
that are pertinent to post disaster reconstruction achievement. The evaluation of 
these legislative documents confirm that some of their regulatory provisions may 
constrain reconstruction efforts; cause multi-agency responsibility and 
coordination issues; and result in a general loss of pragmatic decision making by 
disaster practitioners.  
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The research has shown that although there are benefits in controlling the 
reconstruction of the built environment with these building and environmental 
legislation; recovery agencies however would need to be proactive in designing 
ways of managing their implementation to meet reconstruction objectives. The 
regulatory framework for post disaster reconstruction needs to be well articulated 
and integrated in its implementation so that it provides effective means of 
reducing and containing disaster vulnerabilities. Such integrated approaches 
would facilitate both post-disaster reconstruction and other sustainable 
development programmes.  
There is a greater imperative to have appropriate frameworks and systems in place 
before a larger scale disasters event in New Zealand, because it has been spared 
the destructions and wide scale devastations that occur frequently around its 
neighbouring countries. Therefore any action it takes towards an accelerated 
recovery must be both conscious and concerted.  
It is hoped that the current study has provided an insight into the needed pre-
planning considerations and of the set of actions/policy initiatives that could be 
taken to forestall secondary disasters as a result of inappropriate legislation. 
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1   Overview of Resilient Organisations 
 
‘Resilient Organisations’ is a six year research project designed to assist New Zealand 
organisations to recover economic competitiveness after hazard events by improving their 
resilience.  This programme is funded by the Foundation of Research Science and Technology 
(FRST). The research programme is a collaborative project between the University of 
Canterbury, University of Auckland, and Kestrel Group.  
 
The programme integrates the planning, prioritisation and deployment and legal issues faced 
by New Zealand organisations for their readiness, response and recovery processes. The 
programme is divided into three inter-related objectives:  
  
1. Organisational planning for hazard events 
2. Prioritisation and deployment of physical and human resources for recovery 
3. Legal and contractual frameworks  
 
For full details of the research programme, check www.resorgs.org.nz 
 
 
 
2   Introduction 
 
A workshop was held to identify the challenges and barriers to post-disaster reconstruction in 
New Zealand to help guide research under Objective 3 of the Resilient Organisations project. 
The workshop brought together people with relevant experience in post-disaster 
reconstruction and/or specialist knowledge of the regulatory, legislative and contractual issues 
that could influence reconstruction. A list of attendees is given in Appendix A. 
 
This report summarises the key issues from the workshop and develops these issues into 
research directions.  On the basis of both student and funding resources available, the report 
identifies the research that will be carried out as part of the current FRST funded research 
project. Other research from the priority list could potentially be carried out in the future if 
further research resources become available.  
 
The report is organised into the four key areas considered during the workshop: legislative 
and regulatory issues, coordination of reconstruction, contractual issues and resource issues. 
 
 
2.1  Workshop Objectives 
• To explore the challenges and opportunities for reconstruction in a post-disaster 
situation; 
• To prioritise research efforts on those reconstruction issues that are most critical, 
and that the research team might be able to realistically influence; 
• To identify potential barriers and opportunities for engaging the reconstruction 
stakeholders in addressing these issues. 
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2.2  Workshop Format  
The workshop started with presentations from David Hopkins, David Middleton and Jason Le 
Masurier, giving an overview of the research to date, the workshop aims and setting the scene 
for post-disaster reconstruction in New Zealand. Workshop participants were then divided 
into four groups to brainstorm and discuss the main issues of reconstruction under the 
headings of:  
 
• Legislation and regulation  
• Contracts and procurement 
• Resources 
• Co-ordination of reconstruction 
 
After the breakout session, participants reconvened to report back the main issues identified; 
these are summarised in the sections of the following report. The main issues were then 
plotted on a matrix in terms of their importance and the ability of the research to influence. 
The issues were subsequently ranked and research outputs identified. The issues identified 
and the research priorities are summarised in this report. 
 
Several of the issues raised at the workshop tend towards the operational aspects of 
emergency management and recovery and as such are specific to the government and NGO 
organisations in place. These lie outside the scope of the current Resilient Organisations 
research project. However, the research team would be happy to develop research proposals 
with relevant organisations to address those issues that are specific to their operations. 
 
 
 
 
3   Legislation and Regulation 
The various regulations that apply to routine construction provide for the safe development of 
infrastructure, capital improvements and land use, ensuring preservation and environmental 
protection. If the legislation and regulatory processes are well formulated they should not only 
be an effective means of reducing vulnerability to disasters, but also a means of facilitating 
reconstruction projects. However, legislation cannot be used for purposes other than those for 
which it is intended and where there is no provision in relevant legislation for post-disaster 
situations it can provide a barrier to reconstruction. For example, if all the routine 
construction regulatory and legislative processes are followed after a major disaster, it is 
unlikely that regulatory bodies would be able to cope with the volume of work.  
 
 
3.1  Issues Identified: Legislation and Regulation 
 
During the workshop, the following issues were identified and ranked as high priority for 
research. 
 
A1. Extent of liability for reconstruction and where it lies. 
A2. Simplification of consenting process for reconstruction. 
A3. Study of gaps in legislation and wider government initiatives and the consequent 
constraints on recovery. 
A4. Public acceptance of identified changes in legislation. 
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3.2  Research Priorities: Legislation and Regulation  
 
An understanding of how legislation can facilitate or constrain reconstruction following a 
disaster is one of the original core aspects of Objective 3 of the Resilient Organisations 
project. Research will therefore be progressed in this area with James Rotimi (University of 
Canterbury PhD student) focussing on this aspect. 
 
Research objectives 
Aa1. Critically review the goals for and processes within the existing New Zealand 
legislation and guidelines for post-disaster reconstruction. 
Aa2. Identify the legislative and regulatory factors that governed the effectiveness of past 
reconstruction programmes and determine the relationships and levels of influence of 
these factors. 
Aa3. Develop scenarios with a range of disaster magnitudes that can be used to measure the 
effectiveness of existing and proposed reconstruction programme frameworks. 
Aa4. Develop process models that describe the existing legislative and regulatory 
framework  as it applies to reconstruction and identify critical constraints within that 
framework. 
Aa5. Postulate improved regulatory processes and model and evaluate their response to the 
identified scenarios so as to quantify their improvement. 
Aa6. Recommend a suitable framework for reconstructing New Zealand’s built 
environment affected by a major disaster. 
 
Outputs 
The research outputs, expected to be of benefit to stakeholders of the post-disaster 
reconstruction process, including disaster managers, insurance companies and property 
owners, are as follows: 
 
Ab1. Process models that will make explicit the statutory recovery process from damage 
assessments to the completion of reconstruction projects. 
Ab2. Models of alternative processes and responsibilities for the coordination of 
reconstruction during and after emergencies to promote improved coordinating and 
monitoring arrangements for reconstruction. 
Ab3. Best practice guidelines for reconstruction works under different disaster scenarios. 
 
Further details are given in Appendix B on how these research priorities and outputs will be 
achieved, together with estimates of the timescale for completion.  (Delivery time for research 
in this area is dependent on whether we secure funding to allow the current PhD student to 
move to full-time study). 
 
 
 
4 Contracts and procurement 
 
A variety of contractual relationships to procure construction projects are used in New 
Zealand. Procurement is critical as it determines the overall framework for construction, 
embracing the structure of responsibilities, risks, and authorities of the stakeholders; these 
issues are especially important for smooth delivery of post-disaster reconstruction. New forms 
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of procurement such as partnering and alliancing are proving beneficial in improving the time, 
cost and quality performance in project delivery and may be applicable to reconstruction 
works. 
Responsibility for payment for post-disaster reconstruction projects is a complex issue, 
involving national and local government, insurance companies and private organisations and 
individuals. Spending the money wisely is important and priorities need to be established. 
Cost-reimbursement payment mechanisms are often used for emergency works as there is a 
large degree of uncertainty over the scope and cost of the work.  This places a large portion of 
the risk with the owner. If the construction sector work with infrastructure owners to prepare 
in readiness for a disaster, the outcome following a disaster will inevitably be more efficient 
and predictable than an ad hoc response. 
 
4.1  Issues Identified: Contracts 
 
During the workshop, the following issues were identified and ranked as high priority for 
research. 
 
B1. Analysis of money flow for different subsections, e.g. fully insured, under-insured and 
uninsured. 
B2. Suggested formats for pre-registration of contractors and for setting of rates for post-
disaster work. 
B3. Review of whether or not it is likely to be socially acceptable to impose controls on 
industries in a post-disaster environment. 
B4. Review of international experience for how contractual issues have been managed. 
 
 
4.2  Research priorities: Contracts 
 
Contractual arrangements for reconstruction following a disaster are one of the original core 
parts of Objective 3 of the Resilient Organisations project. Research will be progressed with 
Kelvin Zuo (University of Auckland PhD student) focussing on this aspect. 
 
Research objectives 
Ba1. To examine international experience for how contractual issues have been managed. 
Ba2. To analyse who pays for reconstruction, the mechanism of payment and the contractual 
issues involved in payment for reconstruction.  
Ba3. To examine contractual pre-registration of contractors and for setting of rates for post-
disaster work. 
 
Outputs 
Bb1. Recommendations on contractual arrangements and contract types for disaster 
reconstruction. 
Bb2. Recommendations on how the contractual payment mechanisms should work during 
reconstruction following a disaster and analysis of money flow for different 
stakeholders, e.g. fully insured, under-insured and uninsured. 
Bb3. Recommendation on how the construction industry can pre-register contractors for post 
disaster work and what rates should apply.  
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Further details are given in Appendix B on how these research priorities and outputs will be 
achieved, together with estimates of the timescale for completion. 
 
 
 
 
5. Resources 
 
New Zealand is resource constrained generally. There have been various studies carried out 
into resource requirements in post-disaster situations.  The issue is highlighted in the new 
National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan (July, 2006) which states that:  
‘effective response and recovery may necessitate mobilisation of all (New Zealand’s) 
available resources’. 
 
5.1  Issues Identified: Resources 
 
During the workshop, the following issues were identified and ranked as high priority for 
research. 
 
C1. Cataloguing requirements and current availability of the full range of resource for 
reconstruction, then reflecting on sequencing/critical path/bottlenecks for their 
mobilisation. 
C2. Analysis of the gap between logistics planning and mobilisation for reconstruction 
C3. Ability to get offshore / national resources into a disaster zone. 
C4. Identifying barriers to getting suppliers to do pre-event planning and generally engaging 
industry in a shared awareness. 
C5. Prior commitment of resources and impact of regulators. 
C6. Assessing the practicalities and worth of a continuously updated national database of 
available resources. 
 
 
5.2  Research Priorities: Resources  
 
Research in this area overlaps with some aspects of the Objectives 1 and 2 of the Resilient 
Organisations research project. 
 
Research objectives 
Ca1. To examine and compare the reconstruction resource requirements of various 
organisations (Some aspects of this are being researched by Beshram Singh, a 
University of Auckland Masters student). 
Ca2. To assess the availability of national and regional resources and their ability to be 
brought into a disaster zone (Some aspects of this are being carried out by Heri 
Setiawan, University of Canterbury PhD student, as part of Objective 2 of the Resilient 
Organisations research project, but a full analysis would require specific funding). 
Ca3. To understand the barriers to getting industry to do pre-event planning (not currently 
planned, but could be carried out as part of a proposed preparedness benchmarking 
project aligned with Objective 1 of the Resilient Organisations research project, if 
funding is secured). 
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Potential Outputs 
Cb1. A catalogue of the reconstruction resource needs of both public and private sector 
organisations and homeowners and suggested mechanisms for prioritising the allocation 
of resources. 
Cb2. A GIS database of the extent of regional and national resources and an assessment of 
resource availability and mobilisation for various disaster scenarios.  
Cb3. Summary of the preparedness of the industry  and recommendations of the ways of 
engaging the industry in pre-event planning. 
 
Further details are given in Appendix B on how these research priorities and outputs might be 
achieved. 
 
 
 
 
6 Coordination of Reconstruction 
 
Responsibility for response and early recovery post disaster is well defined in the National 
Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan (MCDEM, 2006). However, responsibility for 
coordination and management of a major programme of reconstruction of housing and other 
infrastructure is not clear in the legislation and guidance and this lack of clarity has been 
proven to create barriers to reconstruction following previous disasters.  The management and 
coordination of reconstruction following recent disaster events has fallen to insurance 
companies, the Earthquake Commission and local authorities; however none of these entities 
has a specific remit to work outside of their own interests. 
 
 
6.1  Issues Identified: Co-Ordination  
 
During the workshop, the following issues were identified and ranked as high priority for 
research. 
 
D1. Establish criteria for assessing Local Government capability to coordinate 
reconstruction. 
D2. Gap analysis for coordination capacity – function provision versus resources. 
D3. Analysis of potential impacts of jurisdictional boundaries. 
D4. Greater analysis of the issues inherent in the transition from response to recovery. 
D5. Characteristics of leaders/leadership required for effective recovery. 
 
6.2  Research Priorities: Co-Ordination  
 
Research objectives 
Da1. To understand the priority reconstruction needs of a community during the response and 
recovery stages (being carried out by John Hewitt University of Auckland PhD student). 
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Da2. To undertake a gap analysis for coordination capacity in terms of function provision 
versus resources (on hold).  
Da3. To propose criteria for assessing Local Government capability to coordinate 
reconstruction (on hold). 
Da4. To analyse the potential impacts of jurisdictional boundaries on reconstruction (on 
hold). 
Da5. To define the talents required of people to operate effectively in times of crisis and 
strategies for developing these talents (on hold).  
 
Potential Outputs 
Db1. A checklist to evaluate reconstruction priorities. 
Db2. A map of New Zealand’s capacity for coordination of post-disaster reconstruction for 
various scales of disaster in various locations (on hold). 
Db3. A checklist of criteria, for self assessment or survey, to enable Local Government 
organisations to assess their current and required capability for coordinating 
reconstruction (on hold). 
Db4. A catalogue of potential conflicting reconstruction issues between government 
jurisdictions for several geographically widespread disaster scenarios (on hold). 
 
Further details are given in Appendix B on how these research priorities and outputs might be 
achieved. 
 
 
 
7 Other Issues from the Workshop 
 
There was significant overlap in the discussions between the four areas identified above.  
Some other broad issues raised in the workshop, that cut across those given above, are as 
follows: 
 
E1. Community requirements in terms of reconstruction sequencing and how this maps 
across to co-ordination. 
E2. Community acceptance of changes in legislation in advance of and following a disaster. 
E3. Insurance mechanisms for reconstruction and in particular the insured/uninsured 
interface – what to do with uninsured? 
E4. Ways to bring relevant stakeholders/industries together to managed shared risks. 
 
Research in these areas is not currently envisaged under the existing Resilient Organisations 
research project due to limited research resources and a lack of clear alignment with the core 
themes of the Resilient Organisations project.  However, if additional funding is forthcoming 
in the future we would be happy to work with the funding organisation to develop research 
objectives to address these issues. 
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8 The Next Stages 
 
8.1  Feedback and involvement in the research proposed 
 
The research will involve significant interaction between the researchers and key stakeholders 
of reconstruction – in particular the workshop participants. The research team would welcome 
expressions of interest from the workshop participants to provide more detailed input into 
each of the proposed research objectives given in this report and/or suggestions of names of 
relevant key people who may have an interest and who we should approach. 
 
We would also welcome feedback on this report and any other suggestions as to how the 
quality and value of the research outcomes could be improved. In addition we would be very 
pleased to hear of any sources of funding which would allow objectives of particular interest 
to an organisation, that are currently on hold, to be moved to the ongoing research schedule. 
 
 
8.2  Timeline 
 
Time lines are given in the attached summary tables (Appendix B) for the various outputs. As 
the outputs become available we will forward them on to stakeholders and participants in the 
research. 
 
 
8.3  Dissemination of research findings 
 
Progress of the research will be shown on the Resilient Organisations website 
(www.resorgs.org.nz).  As the research outputs are completed they will be disseminated to 
interested parties in the form of project reports. When opportunities arise the research findings 
will be presented in academic journals and at national and international conferences. 
 
The Resilient Organisations team will be hosting the 2008 conference for I-Rec (International 
Group for Research and Information on post-Disaster Reconstruction) in Christchurch 
Wednesday 30 April – Friday 2 May 2008.  This is a bi-annual conference which brings 
together international practitioners and researchers on post-disaster reconstruction. The focus 
of the conference will be on the four themes discussed in this document.   
 
 
 
 
9 Conclusion 
 
Despite the extensive research and planning that has already been undertaken by various 
organisations in New Zealand, there remain challenges and opportunities for improving the 
processes for reconstruction in a post-disaster situation. A key challenge is to overcome the 
apparent division between those who, in practice, take responsibility for reconstruction and 
those who set policy and legislation. It is important therefore that the further research engages 
with a broad range of reconstruction stakeholders, to overcome such barriers. 
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Appendix A  Workshop Attendees 
 
Bruce Shephard – EQC 
Hugh Cowan – EQC  
John Balmforth – AMI 
Anita Middleton, IAG  
Laurie Brady – AMI 
Dean Myburgh – SOLGM and Manukau City Council 
Terry Winyard - Tauranga City Council 
Roger Crimp – Telecom 
Geoff Swainson – Local Government NZ 
Graham Rowe – NZ Society for Earthquake Engineering 
Andrew Hazelton – Hazelton Law  
David Middleton – EQC 
Simon Chambers – MCDEM 
David Oughton 
Rian van Schalkwyk – Greater Wellington Regional Council 
Dave Bates – Transit NZ 
Reagan Potangaroa – Unitec 
Braden Austin - Manawatu Wanganui Infrastructure Recovery Manager 
John Christianson – Connell Wagner 
David Hopkins – David Hopkins Consulting 
Richard Sharpe - Beca 
Rudolph Kotze – Transit NZ 
Ian Page - BRANZ 
Adrian Bennett - Building Research 
 
Research Team  
1. Dave Brunsdon 
2. Erica Seville  
3. Andre Dantas  
4. Jason Le Masurier  
5. Suzanne Wilkinson 
6. Bruce Deam 
7. James Rotimi (Ph.D. student)  
8. Kelvin Zuo (Ph.D. student)  
9. John Hewitt (Ph.D. student)
 
 
 
 
 
Research Summary: Regulation and Legislation 
 
Issue Research output How  Who to consult When 
Critically review the goals for and processes 
within the existing New Zealand legislation 
and guidelines for post-disaster 
reconstruction. 
Literature review James Rotimi 
(part-time 
PhD student) 
MCDEM December 2006 
Identify the legislative and regulatory factors 
that governed the effectiveness of past 
reconstruction programmes and determine 
the relationships and levels of influence of 
these factors. 
Case studies Ditto Stakeholders in reconstruction 
following past disasters 
(insurance companies, 
lifelines, local government) 
December 2007 
Develop scenarios with a range of disaster 
magnitudes that can be used to measure the 
effectiveness of existing and proposed 
reconstruction programme frameworks. 
 Ditto Disaster recovery managers December 2008 
Develop process models that describe the 
existing legislative and regulatory 
framework as it applies to reconstruction and 
identify critical constraints within that 
framework. 
Process models that will make explicit 
the statutory recovery process from 
damage assessments to the completion 
of reconstruction projects. 
Ditto Lawyers, regulators,  December 2009 
Postulate improved regulatory processes and 
model and evaluate their response to the 
identified scenarios so as to quantify their 
improvement. 
Models of alternative processes and 
responsibilities for the coordination of 
reconstruction during and after 
emergencies to promote improved 
coordinating and monitoring 
arrangements for reconstruction 
Ditto  December 2010 
Recommend suitable framework for 
reconstructing New Zealand communities 
affected by a major disaster. 
Best practice guidelines (in the form of 
manuals) for reconstruction works 
under different disaster scenarios. 
Ditto  December 2010 
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Research Summary: Contracts and procurement 
 
Issue Research output How Who to consult When 
To examine international 
experience for how 
contractual issues have been 
managed. 
 
Recommendations on contractual 
organisations and contract types for 
disaster reconstruction  
Kelvin Zuo, PhD 
Student Univ. of 
Auckland, funded by 
FRST Resilient 
Organisations 
Construction 
Industry 
December 
2006 
To analyse who pays for 
reconstruction, the 
mechanism of payment and 
the contractual issues 
involved in payment for 
reconstruction. 
Recommendations on how the 
contractual payment mechanisms 
should work during reconstruction 
following a disaster and analysis of 
money flow for different stakeholders, 
e.g. fully insured, under-insured and 
uninsured. 
Ditto Stakeholders in 
reconstruction 
following past 
disasters 
(insurance 
companies, 
lifelines, local 
government) 
December 
2008 
To examine contractual pre-
registration of contractors 
and for setting of rates for 
post-disaster work 
 
Recommendation on how the 
construction industry can pre-register 
contractors for post disaster work and 
what rates should apply.  
On hold   
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Research Table: Resources 
 
Issue Research output How Who to consult When 
To examine and 
compare the 
reconstruction 
resource requirements 
of various 
organisations 
A catalogue of the reconstruction resource 
needs of both public and private sector 
organisations and homeowners and suggested 
mechanisms for prioritisation the allocation of 
resources 
Beshram Singh, ME 
thesis student, Univ. 
of Auckland 
Public and 
private sector 
organisations 
and 
homeowners 
August 2007 
To assess the 
availability of 
national and regional 
resources and their 
ability to be brought 
into a disaster zone 
The communication and information sharing 
aspects of this issue are being addressed as 
part of Objective 2 research, with the 
development of a dynamic GIS framework for 
supporting the effective mobilisation of 
resources. 
Heri Setiawan, PhD 
student Univ. of 
Canterbury (working 
under Objective 2 of 
Res. Orgs. Research 
project) 
Lifelines 
organisations 
Prototype 
available Aug. 
2007, testing 
in 2008 
To understand the 
barriers to getting 
industry to do pre-
event planning  
Summary of the preparedness of the industry  
and recommendations of the ways of 
engaging the industry in pre-event planning  
On hold, could be 
conducted as part of a 
resilience 
benchmarking study 
under Res. Orgs. 
Objective 1 
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Research Table: Coordination of reconstruction 
 
Issue Research output How Who to consult When 
To understand the 
priority reconstruction 
needs of a community 
during the response 
and recovery stages 
A checklist to evaluate reconstruction 
priorities 
John Hewitt, PhD 
student Univ. of 
Auckland 
Architects, town 
planners, 
communities 
facing 
reconstruction 
By 2009 
To undertake a gap 
analysis for 
coordination capacity 
in terms of function 
provision versus 
resources. 
A map of New Zealand’s capacity for 
coordination of post-disaster reconstruction 
for various scales of disaster in various 
locations. 
On hold   
To propose criteria 
for assessing Local 
Government 
capability to 
coordinate 
reconstruction 
A checklist of criteria, for self assessment or 
survey, to enable Local Government 
organisations to assess their current and 
required capability for coordinating 
reconstruction. 
On hold   
To analyse the 
potential impacts of 
jurisdictional 
boundaries on 
reconstruction 
A catalogue of potential conflicting 
reconstruction issues between government 
jurisdictions for several geographically 
widespread disaster scenarios. 
On hold   
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_____________________________________________ 
THESIS TITLE:  AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POST-
DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGIES IN NEW ZEALAND 
This brief is a summary of recommendations for the review of some aspects of legislation around disaster 
recovery in New Zealand. It is a work-in-progress serving to keep the research team informed of matters that 
arose from an opinion survey of disaster practitioners. It is intended for the considerations of supervisory 
members only.   
Scope 
This brief covers recommendations for the reviews of some aspects of three Acts; the Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Act; the Building Act (BA) and the Resource 
Management Act (RMA). These Acts have been the focus of the current research and the 
object of an on-line questionnaire that was administered to disaster practitioners between 
March and April 2008.  
To put the recommendations in proper context, the research questions are presented 
followed by an outline of the issues of concern (ex ante) and an outline of the survey results 
(ex post) for each Act. Attempt has been made to make reference to portions of the 
legislative documents where possible. 
The Research Question 
• What improvements could be made existing legislation and regulatory provisions so that 
they facilitate the implementation of large scale reconstruction programmes in New 
Zealand? 
Outline of areas of concern in Legislation 
Building Act (2004) 
• Building Consent process and compliance requirements.  
• Procedural arrangements for building/damage evaluations (on-the spot assessment). 
• Approval and certification of BCAs and IQPs. 
• Training requirements for new and external evaluators/assessors. 
• Insurance cover for buildings with section 71-74 notices etc. 
• Decision making liabilities etc.  
Resource Management Act (1991) 
• Resource consent process and statutory requirements. 
• Consultation in the RMA. 
• RMA and pragmatism of post disaster decisions. 
• Conflicts during implementation of RMA and BA. 
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Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act (2002) 
• Adequacy of statutory powers for recovery. 
• Extension of Recovery Coordinators powers beyond declared emergency period. 
• Recovery modalities, adequate? 
• Application of CDEM vis-à-vis BA and RMA, Any conflict? 
Other Issues 
• NZ recovery capacity. 
• Effect of resource availability. 
• Collaboration amongst TAs and Councils. 
• Public acceptance of legislative reviews.  
Outline of Survey Results and Findings 
Building Act (2004) 
• There is little doubt that building consent processing will slow down reconstruction work 
BUT respondents are not in favour of a short cut to the process OR outright 
deregulation. The general opinion is that the benefits for ‘development control’ outweigh 
those of speedy recovery. 
• Consent processing problems perceived more as a logistic issue that could be resolved 
through adequate resourcing (availability of Assessors, Engineers etc). 
• BCAs and IQPs are central to post-disaster reconstruction. The certification process 
must be flexible yet robust. 
• Pro-active rather than reactive response/recovery is generally preferred. 
Reconstruction would also benefit from prior arrangements (detailed modalities for 
action and re-action). 
Resource Management Act (1991) 
• Current resource consent process is burdensome BUT necessary. Concern is for 
individual house owners who may be frustrated by the process post-disaster. 
• RMA will impact reconstruction activities and programmes. Emphasis placed on 
consultation may slow the anticipated rate of recovery. Some flexibility is desired. 
• Recovery Managers should be able to veto certain RMA requirements/provisions to allow 
for reconstruction work to progress with little hindrance.  
• Jurisdictional conflicts may arise in RMA implementation between TAs and local councils. 
There are subtle differences between the implementation/interpretation of the RMA 
and District Plans; these may become sources of conflicts. 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act (2002) 
• There should be provisions for the extension of Recovery Coordinators tenure beyond 
the 28days stipulated.  
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• Recovery Coordinators statutory powers should extend beyond a declared emergency 
period. This would allow for more pragmatic decisions during response and recovery 
activities. 
• Greater coordination responsibilities expected from CDEM officials under the Act.  
• Clearer linkages between the CDEM Act and RMA envisaged particularly in the realm of 
hazard reduction activities.    
Draft Recommendations 
The following recommendations are made to facilitate both efficient and effective 
reconstruction of the built environment after a significant disaster. Reference is made 
where possible to portions/aspects of legislation that may be affected by the 
recommendations.  
Relative to the Building Act 
The building consent process is a potential bottleneck considering that there will be a spike 
of applications that could overwhelm the capacity of BCAs and IQPs. The process needs to 
be simplified by allowing approvals to be granted in retrospect, this is without a compromise 
to applicable building codes. There are only two situations where the consent process can be 
bypassed under current BA provisions. One is if an application was made by a building owner 
under ‘urgency’; and the other is reliant on local council prerogatives. In the latter situation, 
works can be carried out if such is certified with a Producer’s Statement certificate (PS) or 
for reasons of safety. There needs to be a broader acceptance of PS certificates than 
would be the case under normal circumstances.  It is expected that BCAs prepare policies 
and guidelines on how this discretionary powers can be exercised.  
Action:  BCAs to prepare such policies as a matter of priority. 
  Review sectn: 41, 48 and 93 of BA, for bypass of normal consent processing. 
Review sectn: 124-… OR New Sectn on: Powers of TAs in the event of 
catastrophe.  
In similar vein, BCAs need to address concerns of parity between Certificates of 
Acceptance (COA) granted in retrospect (as above) and Code of Compliance Certificates 
(CCC). It is feared that COAs may not be acceptable to private insurers and there is the 
likelihood of reduced ‘sale values’ of properties with a COA. The BA has to allay such fears 
by providing a clause which would explain that the difference is the result of process 
rather than in performance standard.    
Action:  Review sectn: 96-99 of BA, to address parity of CCC and COA. 
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Training and re-training of Inspectors, Assessors and Evaluators must be given priority. 
Particularly packaged-induction schemes need to be prepared for loaned/external resource 
persons so that they come to grips with local procedures in a short duration. It is important 
that the modalities for the exchange of resources persons be prepared in advance of a 
disaster event. 
Action:  Review of relevant sectn Local Govt Act (2002). 
Relative to the Resource Management Act 
The RMA has been a source of frustration in previous recovery programmes largely because 
of procedural requirements for wider consultations. It is recommended that the scale of 
consultations/public notification be limited in a manner that permits a speedy approval 
process. 
Action:  Review sectn 93-95 to limit the scope of public notifications in catastrophes, 
possibly limiting decisions to the new Environment Protection Agency 
(modalities not clear yet). 
The RMA should demand greater consideration of the importance of recovery after hazards 
by TAs and councils. This should be incorporated in regional and district plans.  Current 
emphasis is on prevention/avoidance and mitigation of hazards. 
 Action:  Review sectn 62, 67 and 75 to contain ‘recovery from catastrophes’.  
Relative to the CDEM Act 
There should be greater integration of the CDEM with the RMA and BA so that all 
respective recovery-related policies are streamlined to avoid misinterpretations.  
Action:  Review relevant sectn CDEM Act, BA and RMA to harmonise aspects 
concerning relationship between these documents. 
The CDEM agencies have to be pro-active in facilitating the 4Rs (reduction/mitigation, 
readiness/preparedness, response and recovery activities). More emphasis is needed on 
reduction activities. For example, CDEM group should be more involved in the long term 
community planning of the local (or regional) councils - LTCCP. Their involvement would 
ensure that District plans have stronger hazard-resilient principles and undertones. 
Action:  Review CDEM Act to expand scope of MCDEM activities beyond coordination 
of emergency activities. 
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General Recommendations 
The study recommends the development of a National Policy Statement that provides an 
overarching framework/guideline for post-disaster reconstruction. This would bring all 
post-disaster considerations into a single document but with references to related 
legislation. Issue that could be covered by the Policy Statement include: 
• Definition of hazard types that will refer to the policy. 
• Guidelines on collaboration of stakeholders towards recovery (above current 
suggestions). Recovery considerations to transcend commercial decisions and silos. 
• Addressing external aid and assistance. 
• Cross referencing to related legislation/guidelines. 
• Relationship and harmonisation of related legislation (both development and re-
development control guidelines)  
• Process-based information under different disaster scenarios 
Action:   MCDEM, MEF, DBH to facilitate development of National Policy Statement 
The study recommends the establishment of memoranda of understanding between 
neighbouring councils and TAs. Such MoUs could address the following issues: 
• Procedural arrangements for the implementation of salient differences between local 
regulations e.g. District Plans. 
• Responsibility and Liability issues as a fall out from joint decisions. 
• Modalities for information dissemination and sharing. 
• Modalities for resource sharing and deployments. 
• Training and Induction of personnel. 
• External aid/assistance and their participation in recovery. 
Action:  Review relevant sectns of the LG Act and CDEM Act.  
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APPENDIX B2 
SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS WITH INDUSTRY EXPERTS (18 & 19 JULY, 2006) 
1.0 Rian Van Schalkwyk (Coordinator, Recovery Management Forum) 
Rian was receptive and forthcoming as to the level of assistance we could get from him. 
He gave an overview of the functioning of the command and operational centres of the 
Wellington Emergency Management Department, explaining however that both centres 
were not completely immune to the risks of being dysfunctional in the event of large-
scale disasters. The up side is that 90% of previous incidents have been relatively small 
scale. 
Comments on Research Objectives 
He agreed with most of the issues raised in the research proposal, but cautious that 
there needs to be a fine balance between the demands for expediency after disasters 
and the protection of the environment, which the RMA stands for. The former case may 
increase the risks & vulnerabilities of communities (e.g. depositing disaster debris in 
flood paths). 
Rian is of the opinion that different disaster scenarios were taken into consideration 
when preparing regional group plans. James will need to look at these documents closely 
to avoid duplication. 
He complained about the poor impact that his public education campaigns for disaster 
preparedness have made on the community. Surveys give only 1% increase (26 to 27% 
from the previous year’s poll) in the level of preparedness of the community in spite of 
monies committed. 
On appointed Recovery Coordinators, he explained that they had little powers to 
coordinate recovery coupled with interferences from political backers, they mostly 
lacked any formal training in Disaster management, which could impair effective 
decision-making and commitment during reconstruction works. 
Available Study Resources 
• Recovery framework – developed from the recovery groups brainstorming 
sessions. 
• Phoenix Workshop (Bi-monthly) – a meeting of the 16 regional recovery managers 
where the details of each regions activity in the intervening period are discussed. 
Next meeting will be 6-8 weeks and James may be invited to participate. 
• National Emergency Management Exercise (end of November ’06) – A 3-day 
exercise to check the level of preparedness of Emergency agencies using the 
Wellington fault scenario. All aspects of reduction, readiness, response and 
recovery might be put to test. James may be invited to witness the exercise. 
Action points 
• To send email requesting contact details of all Regional Recovery Managers. 
• To request for document detailing recovery framework. 
• Link up with the regions disaster recovery manager. 
• To maintain contact and active communication flow. 
Useful links: www.wrcdemng.govt.nz 
2.0 Hugh Cowan (EQC) 
Hugh confirmed EQC’s support for the research programme. He considered the 
research focus topical and relevant to the achievement of post-disaster reconstruction 
objectives in New Zealand. 
Comments on research objectives 
• Need to choose disaster case studies from countries with similar social, cultural, 
economic etc. setting as New Zealand. Therefore to exclude Kobe earthquake, 
Asian Tsunami etc. from the case studies. Northridge/Santa Monica earthquakes 
or cases from Europe may be more relevant. 
• Lessons can be learnt from the Napier (1931) earthquake, particularly the 
enactments made by the Bara Council and other measures on resource a llocation, 
Urban Renewal etc. 
Available Study Resources 
• EQC Bulletin – A rich source of information on recovery issues. 
• Post-Earthquake Reconnaissance Reports (e.g. Northridge earthquake, Asian 
Tsunami etc.) would provide information on what lessons were learnt, usefulness 
and if such information have been used. 
• Data from the Insurance and Claims department on coordination, speeding-up of 
application processes, application of EQC policies etc.  
Action Points 
• To maintain contact and active communication flow. 
 
3.0 Roger Crimp (Telecom) 
Roger explained that the effectiveness of reconstruction/restoration work is 
determined by the priorities attached to the damaged facilities. Priority of lifelines like 
Telecom is the restoration of services, not necessarily rebuilding of built 
infrastructure. The speed by which restorations can be made is often times dependent 
on the speed of non-Telecom structures that terminate Telecom’s services i.e. customer 
premises. These premises would often need to wait for insurance payouts before being 
constructed after a major disaster. The CDEM Act gives priority to Telecom, which may 
facilitate its work during disasters. 
RMA and OSH requirement may be an impediment because of the large volume of 
consent applications. 
Incidents that have had major impacts on Telecom services are flooding incidents in 
Manawatu etc. and snowstorms (e.g. Canterbury 2006). Telecom has a national 
agreement with OPUS for assistance in the event of major service outages. The 
agreement covers areas of impact assessment, skills shortages etc. 
Comments on Research Objectives 
• Advised to consider how effectiveness of reconstruction programmes will be 
measured because of the different priorities attached to damaged facilities. 
• To incorporate lifelines in the process models and demonstrate its criticality to 
achieving efficiency and effective reconstruction programmes. 
• Consider the use of the impact assessment as against damage assessment in the 
literature. 
• The word best practice guidelines preferred to manuals.  
• Need to make clear the benefits of the research to the community and lifelines. 
• Consider rainstorm at Sydney, Australia in the case study because of the impact 
on different lifeline agencies. 
• May need to narrow down scope of research the effects of the RMA and CDEM 
Act on reconstruction works. 
• Plan effectively the information gathering approach to lifeline agencies. May not 
be very receptive to r research works. 
Available Study Resources 
• Report on post-impact assessment of performances e.g. Auckland power outage, 
flooding and snowstorms etc. 
• Disaster impact on storage of fuel (recently published). 
Useful Links 
Brian Porter (telecom) – for Auckland power outage report. 
Rodney Walker (Work Management Officer) – for flooding & snowstorms report. 
John Lamb (Engineering Lifelines Coordinator) – for report on storage of fuel. 
Laurie brady (AMI Insurance) - for report on Sydney rainstorm. 
4.0 Peter Kingsbury (MCDEM Canterbury) 
Peter gave an overview of the MCDEM Emergency Management Planning offices located 
in Wellington, Auckland and Christchurch. 
He and Simon Chambers are prepared to assist the research in whatever form possible. 
He hinted on the possibility of scholarship grant to research students in the area of 
procurement and contractual processes. Jason is to inform Suzanne of this development. 
Available Study Resources 
• Prepared regional group plans have included strategic recovery objectives. This 
gives information on different regional priorities, disaster scenarios 
(probabilities) and disaster case studies (actual). James is to request for a CD 
compilation of these group plans. 
• Organisational and operational structure of MCDEM from which the right people 
within the hierarchy can be identified for interviews. James is to request for 
this. 
• Since the submissions of the RMA reviews, Messrs Anthony Harper is currently 
interviewing Emergency Management personnel to find out their experiences on 
actual events in relation to the RMA etc. James is to meet with Paul Rogers 
(representative of the Law firm). 
• Listing of some of the regional EMO’s that may be disposed to the research 
study, Mark Harrison, Shane Bailey, Richard Steele, John Thornston, John 
Mitchell, Dallas Bradley etc. James is to request this list from Simon Chambers. 
Useful Links 
• Lifelines that may be consulted: Orion, Mighty River Power (for Auckland power 
outage) etc. 
5.0 David Brunsdon (Chairman, Engineering Lifelines Group) 
David was instrumental to our meeting with Roger Crimp at Telecom. He had discussed 
the research objectives with his project manager, Torben Poirot. Torben leaves for 
Vancouver, Canada for a PhD programme in Disaster Management.  
Comments on Research Objectives 
• Advised to demonstrate the importance of the research output to all 
stakeholders. 
• Plan effectively the interview/questioning techniques to lifelines. 
• Be more specific i.e. narrow down scope of research. 
Useful Links 
• Torben Poirot may be a useful academic resource in terms of research 
methodology and will need to establish a symbiotic relationship.  
• Other lifelines: gas pipelines, VECTOR (power services), Water & Energy Supplies 
etc. 
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February, 2008 
 
Participant Information Sheet  
Topic: An Evaluation of the Implementation of Post-Disaster Reconstruction Strategies 
under the Resource Management and Building Acts in New Zealand. 
 
This project is being carried out by James Olabode Bamidele Rotimi as a requirement for the 
award of a Doctor of Philosophy degree, under the supervision of Dr. Bruce Deam.  
The aim of this project is to facilitate both efficient and effective reconstruction of the built 
environment after disasters, through the implementation of enabling provisions within the 
Resource Management Act and Building Act. 
You are invited to participate in this survey as a professional who has knowledge of 
legislation that may influence post-disaster reconstruction of the built environment. It will be 
highly appreciated if you can fill out the attached questionnaire and supply any additional 
information which you may find useful based on your experience. Completion of the 
questionnaire should take approximately 20 minutes. 
The questionnaire has the following objectives: 
 To determine the effect that existing provisions within the Resource Management and 
Building Act will have on the reconstruction of the built environment after major natural 
disaster events in New Zealand. 
 To determine how the span of control and liabilities of appointed Recovery Coordinators 
could be enhanced through legislation, so that they retain control of reconstruction after 
the initial response. 
 To determine how the existing arrangements for emergency readiness and response can 
be extended to cater for the longer-term recovery period especially after the expiration of 
declared state of emergencies. 
 To determine how the consenting process can be simplified and made more responsive to 
potential higher demands during the reconstruction period, reducing the frustrations 
experienced under the current process. 
As a follow-up to this questionnaire, the researcher may ask you to participate in an 
interview to discuss your responses. You will be able to review the transcript of this 
interview. 
 
You are assured of strict confidentiality in the research process and in subsequent publications. 
All identifying features of you or your organisation will be coded. You are free to ask the 
researcher to not use any of the information you have given, and, if you wish, you can ask to 
see the report before it is submitted for examination.  
 
 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury’s Human 
Ethics Committee (Ref. No. 2007/148). If you have any questions or concern about the 
research, please contact Dr. Deam by email (bruce.deam@canterbury.ac.nz) or phone him on 
03 364 2601. 
 
APPENDIX B4 
 
 
February, 2008 
 
CONSENT FORM  
An Evaluation of the Implementation of Post-Disaster Reconstruction Strategies 
under the Resource Management and Building Acts in New Zealand. 
 
I have read and understood the description of the above-named project. On this basis I 
agree to participate as a subject in the project, and I consent to publication of the results 
of the project with the understanding that anonymity is preserved. 
I understand that I may at any time withdraw from the project, including withdrawing any 
information I have provided. I understand also, that I can review the transcript of any 
follow-up interview. 
 
 
 
Name (Please print): …………………………………………………………….  
Signature:  
Date: 
 
Note: Completed form may be sent back by Fax to 09 8156795 
 APPENDIX B5 
Questionnaire Analysis 
SECTION 1:  
A.  How often do you make reference to the following Acts? 
The Acts Very 
Often 
Rarely Never 
CDEM Act (N=79) 27 
(34.2%) 
28 
(35.4%) 
24 
(30.4%) 
RMA (N=75) 45 
(60.0%) 
22 
(29.3%) 
8 
(10.7%) 
BA (N=75) 41  
(54.7%) 
22 
(29.3%) 
12 
(16.0%) 
 
B. How would you rate your understanding of the following Acts? 
The Acts Not Much Average High Very 
High 
N/A 
CDEM Act (N=77) 23 
(29.9%) 
24 
(31.2%) 
14 
(18.2%) 
13 
(16.9%) 
3 
(3.9%) 
RMA (N=75) 14  
(18.7%) 
21 
(28.0%) 
13 
(17.3%) 
27 
(36.0%) 
0 
( ) 
BA (N=75) 17  
(21.2%) 
23 
(28.8%) 
22 
(29.3%) 
10 
(13.3%) 
3 
(3.8%) 
 
C Please indicate the Acts/Regulations that are useful in the discharge of your 
duties. 
S/No Acts/Regulations Response 
1 Local Government Act 2002  61 
(76.2%) 
2 District Plan 22 
(27.5%) 
3 Earthquake Commissions Act 1993 15 
(18.8%) 
4 Housing Improvement Regulations 1947 8 
(10%) 
5 Historic Places Act 1993 24 
(30%) 
6 Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 12 
(15%) 
 
 
 
SECTION 2: 
Qs. Please rate the following statements according to how best they represent your 
opinion of the CDEM Act 
Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral/ 
Unsure 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
The statutory powers of appointed 
Recovery Coordinators as contained 
in the CDEMA are NOT adequate 
for large-scale disasters. (N=61) 
3 
(4.9%) 
 
11 
(18.0%) 
34 
(55.7%) 
12 
(19.7%) 
1 
(1.6%) 
Recovery Coordinators have enough 
powers to decide on reconstruction 
priorities under the present 
regulatory framework. (N=61) 
3 
(4.9%) 
15 
(24.6%) 
32 
(52.5%) 
11 
(18.0%) 
0 
The maximum specified days (28) 
for which Recovery Coordinators 
are appointed need to be extended 
beyond the declared emergency 
period. (N=61) 
4 
(6.6%) 
26 
(42.6%) 
30 
(49.2%) 
1 
(1.6%) 
0 
Extending emergency powers 
beyond the emergency period may 
NOT facilitate reconstruction 
works. (N=61) 
2 
(3.3%) 
18 
(29.5%) 
29 
(47.5%) 
11 
(18.0%) 
1 
(1.6%) 
 
The CDEMA provides for a speedy 
implementation of reconstruction 
projects. (N=61) 
0 10 
(16.4%) 
36 
(59.0%) 
14 
(23.0%) 
1 
(1.6%) 
Large scale implementation of 
reconstruction projects have been 
catered for under the current 
regulatory regime. (N=61) 
0 6 
(9.8%) 
38 
(62.3%) 
15 
(24.6%) 
2 
(3.3%) 
There is NO foreseeable hindrance 
to reconstruction posed by the 
CDEMA. (N=61) 
0 13 
(21.3%) 
40 
(65.6%) 
5 
(8.2%) 
3 
(4.9%) 
There are potential areas of 
conflict in the implementation of 
the CDEMA with other legislation 
during the recovery phase. (N=60) 
4 
(6.7%) 
20 
(33.3%) 
33 
(55.0%) 
3 
(5.0%) 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 3: 
Qs. Please rate the following statements according to how best they represent your 
opinion of the Building Act 
Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral/ 
Unsure 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Strict application of the BA 
provisions will affect efficiency of 
construction operations (N=66) 
14 
(21.2%) 
23 
(34.8%) 
19 
(28.8%) 
9 
(13.6%) 
1 
(1.5%) 
The consents/approval procedure 
outlined in the BA may become 
cumbersome during large scale 
disaster reconstruction. (N=66) 
19 
(28.8%) 
32 
(48.5%) 
7 
(10.6%) 
5 
(7.6%) 
3 
(4.5%) 
Councils will NOT struggle to meet 
the requirements for consent 
processing after a major disaster 
event (N=66) 
3 
(4.5%) 
7 
(10.6%) 
7 
(10.6%) 
31 
(47.0%) 
18 
(27.3%) 
The BA is clear as to the damage 
inspection procedure on built 
facilities (N=66) 
1 
(1.5%) 
11 
(16.7%) 
41 
(62.1%) 
12 
(18.2%) 
1 
(1.5%) 
There is NO potential for conflicts 
while applying the BA and other 
Acts relating to the reconstruction 
of the built environment. (N=66) 
0 
0 
4 
(6.1%) 
23 
(34.8) 
31 
(47.0%) 
8 
(12.1%) 
The BA consent application process 
is NOT a major source of concern 
in post-disaster reconstruction. 
(N=64) 
3 
(4.7%) 
13 
(20.3%) 
20 
(31.2%) 
20 
(31.2%) 
8 
(12.5%) 
There could be jurisdictional 
conflicts (i.e. between local and 
regional councils) in the 
implementation of BA provisions 
after a major disaster. (N=65) 
5 
(7.7%) 
24 
(36.9%) 
16 
(24.6%) 
17 
(26.2%) 
3 
(4.6%) 
The current insurance cover 
(liabilities) for Building Consent 
Authorities (BCA) and their 
Independent Qualified Persons 
(IQP) is adequate for decision 
making (N=63) 
2 
(3.2%) 
19 
(14.3%) 
43 
(68.3%) 
8 
(12.7%) 
1 
(1.6%) 
There are enough provisions for 
bypassing consent processing in the 
BA for post-disaster 
reconstruction (N=5) 
4 
(6.2%) 
12 
(18.5%) 
33 
(50.8%) 
12 
(18.5%) 
4 
(6.2%) 
Section 71-74 Notices in the BA 
will prevent some disaster-affected 
property owners from receiving 
compensation (N=63) 
4 
(6.3%) 
13 
(20.6%) 
44 
(69.8%) 
1 
(1.6%) 
1 
(1.6%) 
The arrangements made by councils 
for the on-the-spot assessment of 
damaged properties are adequate. 
(N=65) 
0 
0 
14 
(21.5%) 
25 
(38.5%) 
20 
(30.8%) 
6 
(9.2%) 
The building consent and compliance 
process must be followed through 
irrespective of the scale of the 
disaster. (N=65) 
6 
(9.2%) 
33 
(50.8%) 
10 
(15.4%) 
14 
(21.5%) 
2 
(3.1%) 
 
SECTION 4: 
Qs. Please rate the following statements according to how best they represent your 
opinion of the Resource Management Act 
Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral/ 
Unsure 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
The RMA will not impede the 
effective achievement of 
reconstruction of built 
infrastructure. (N=62) 
2 
(3.2%) 
20 
(32.3%) 
15 
(24.2%) 
22 
(35.5%) 
3 
(4.8%) 
The RMA will have a negative 
effect on efficiency during 
reconstruction works. (N=62) 
3 
(4.8%) 
26 
(41.9%) 
14 
(22.6%) 
15 
(24.2%) 
4 
(6.5%) 
There is the possibility of conflict 
between the different tiers of 
government concerning the 
implementation of the RMA. (N=61) 
5 
(8.2%) 
33 
(54.1%) 
14 
(23.0%) 
7 
(11.5%) 
2 
(3.3%) 
The application process for 
resource consent will NOT slow 
down reconstruction programmes. 
(N=62) 
4 
(6.5%) 
10 
(16.1%) 
12 
(19.4%) 
33 
(53.2%) 
3 
(4.8%) 
The RMA places too much emphasis 
on consultation. (N=62) 
3 
(4.8%) 
12 
(19.4%) 
22 
(35.5%) 
21 
(33.9%) 
4 
(6.5%) 
The consultation process needs 
NOT to be limited in scope because 
of reconstruction demands. (N=62) 
2 
(3.2%) 
22 
(35.5%) 
24 
(38.7%) 
13 
(21.0%) 
1 
(1.6%) 
The RMA will NOT become a 
regulatory burden on disaster-
affected property owners. (N=62) 
1 
(1.6) 
21 
(33.9%) 
10 
(16.1%) 
29 
(46.8%) 
1 
(1.6%) 
Recovery Managers should be 
allowed to veto some aspects of the 
RMA, where there is a clear need to 
do so. (N=62) 
3 
(4.8%) 
23 
(37.1%) 
17 
(27.4%) 
15 
(24.2%) 
5 
(6.5%) 
There could be jurisdictional 
conflicts between councils and 
regions etc during reconstruction 
works under the RMA. (N=62) 
3 
(4.8%) 
31 
(50.0%) 
12 
(19.4%) 
13 
(21.0%) 
3 
(4.8%) 
The RMA was a source of 
frustration in previous disaster 
situations. (N=62) 
1 
(1.6%) 
6 
(9.7%) 
43 
(69.4%) 
7 
(11.3%) 
5 
(8.1%) 
 
SECTION 5 
A. Please indicate what you feel about the following suggested solutions to 
operational/logistic problems associated with large scale disasters 
Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral/ 
Unsure 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Continuous training of 
emergency personnel (N=61) 
30 
(49.2%) 
28 
(45.9%) 
1 
(1.6%) 
2 
(3.3%) 
0 
Disaster exercises and 
personnel role plays (N=61) 
23 
(37.7%) 
29 
(47.5%) 
5 
(8.2%) 
4 
(6.6%) 
0 
Public disaster awareness 
campaigns (N=61) 
29 
(47.5%) 
28 
(45.9%) 
3 
(4.9%) 
1 
(1.6%) 
0 
Pre planned programmes and 
courses of action (N=61) 
24 
(39.3%) 
33 
(54.1%) 
4 
(6.6%) 
0 0 
Others, please specify:       
 
B. Please indicate your priorities on how large scale reconstruction may be facilitated 
by the following. 
 High 
Priority 
Low Priority Not 
Necessary 
Not Sure 
Prior MoUs between 
responders (councils, 
lifelines). N=61 
42 
(68.9) 
11 
(18.0%) 
3 
(4.9%) 
5 
(8.2%) 
Accelerated registration of 
BCAs and IQPs. (N=61) 
23 
(37.7%) 
16 
(26.2%) 
14 
(23.0%) 
8 
(13.1%) 
Selective implementation of 
parts of legislation for 
expediency (eg. disposal of 
debris requirements in the 
RMA) (N=61) 
27 
(44.3%) 
23 
(37.7%) 
4 
(6.6%) 
7 
(11.5%) 
The development of a 
National Reconstruction 
Policy Statement (overaching 
policy document for 
reconstruction) N=61 
31 
(50.8%) 
14 
(23.0%) 
8 
(13.1%) 
8 
(13.1%) 
Others, please specify:     
 
 
 
C. Are there memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between different regions for 
resource sharing during a major disaster? (N=66) 
Yes 27 (40.9%) 
No 10 (15.2%) 
Not Sure 29 (43.9%) 
  
D. Do the MoUs extend to councils within the regions? (N=64) 
Yes 17 (26.6%) 
No 14 (21.9%) 
Not Sure 33 (51.6%) 
 
E.  If MoUs exist between councils, please indicate how well these set of issues have 
been clearly expressed in the documents 
 
Details of MoUs 
Mentioned & 
Clearly 
Expressed 
Mentioned 
BUT not 
clearly 
expressed 
Not 
mentioned 
Not Sure 
Procedural arrangement 
(responsibilities, liabilities 
etc.( between the 
regions/councils. (N=45) 
7(15.6%) 12(26.7%) 4(8.9%) 22(48.9%) 
Information 
dissemination/sharing. 
(N=45) 
11 (24.4%) 11(24.4%) 2(4.4%) 21(46.7%) 
Personnel sharing & 
deployment arrangements. 
(N=42) 
14(17.5%) 7(16.7%) 0 21(50.0%) 
Operational logistics & 
assistance. (N=46) 
9(19.6%) 11(23.9%) 5(10.9%) 21(45.7%) 
External aid/assistance & 
their participation. (N=45) 
5(11.1%) 11(24.4%) 7(15.6%) 22(48.9%) 
Any other issue     
 
F. How would you rate New Zealand’s preparedness for a large-scale reconstruction 
programme? (N=61) 
Very prepared 0 
Prepared 6 (9.8%) 
Moderately prepared 33 (54.1%) 
Not prepared 16 (26.2%) 
Cannot Say 6 (9.8%) 
SECTION 6: TRANSCRIPT OF RESPONSES TO OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS 
(For anonymity participants have been identified with codes P001  to P080) 
A. Reasons for choosing ‘Not Much’ understanding or ‘N/A’ of any of the three 
Acts.   
Any potential Civil Defence issues discuss directly with Council's Civil Defence 
Officer. (P002)                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Have no responsibilities with Building Act. (P004)                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act not well publicised or used in my 
everyday role. (P005)                                                                                                                                                                 
I rarely if ever have need to use these in my role. (P006) 
I am an Emergency Manager involved in CDEM and Rural Fire.  I rely on others for 
information regarding the RMA and Building Act. (P008)                                                                                                                           
Lack of formal training. (P009)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Involvement is with the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act, not the Building 
Act. (P010) 
Not required to use in my role, I will reference the appropriate staff when 
required. (P012)                                                                                                                                                                         
I have some knowledge of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act in my 
capacity as a headquarters manager for civil defence matters. I however rarely 
refer to this legislation in my capacity as Principal Planner. (P022)                                 
I am a team leader for Building Controls; although I participate in Civil Defence I 
am not involved in the management. (P023)                                                                                                                                         
Because I have had no involvement in that area. (P024)                                                                                                                                                
Involved in Emergency Management. (P026)     
I have not really had much training.  (P029)                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Council has lead officer in the form of - Emergency Management Manager, and 
whilst Building Compliance liase on procedure and protocols in the event of an 
incident/event, any actions we take would be taken under the provisions of the 
Building Act 2004. (P032) 
There has been little need for me to have knowledge of the Civil Defence and 
Emergency Act. The Resource Management Act and the Building Act are used 
regularly and so my knowledge of them is much greater. (P034)                                                 
Not a core responsibility in my role. (P035)                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Not relevant to my areas of responsibility and of little relevance (other than some 
particular parts) to the work of a regional council. (P039)                                                                                                                      
I don’t use them much and I don’t need much knowledge of them to do my job. 
(P040)                                                                                                                                                                                    
Role is policy and reactive to emergencies, but in context of Building Act only. 
(P041)                                                                                                                                                                            
BA not so relevant to CDEM work which has its own Act. RMA relevant to reduction 
and readiness work. (P042)                                                                                                                                                         
Limited involvement. (P045)                                              
My employment relates primarily to Emergency Management procedure, although it 
will be developing into hazard reduction etc. (P062)                                                                                                                                
Not really relevant to the day to day activity in Health. (P063)                                                                                                                                                                                                    
I leave this to the relevant experts; not my field. (P064)                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Never had to use it. Know nothing about it. (P067)                                             
Have a working knowledge only. Reliant on Planning section and Building compliance 
section to provide resources and response post disaster. (P069)                                                                                                                  
The Building Act has no relevance to my work. (P070)                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
CDEM Act and relevant documentation provides CDEM practitioners with a recovery 
framework. However, Recovery Plans differ from CDEM Group to Group and there 
does not exist a National Recovery Plan that facilitates reconstruction objectives. 
The Building… (P074) 
Don't need to reference very often. (P077)                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Don’t work with them often. (P079)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
B.  Other issues connected to the BA and post disaster reconstruction. 
The ability of designers to produce sufficient details to allow reconstruction to 
begin and the ability of builders to source sufficient materials. (P005)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Not applicable in my role as HR Unit coordinator. (P006)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Reconstruction will be slowed up to be manageable for TLA's as there will be a lack 
of materials and tradespeople to do the work. We need good systems to carry out 
assessments and record what they are for future reference. Most serious cases will 
also require assessment by a structural engineer. The availability of engineers will 
be another delaying factor. (P019)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Availability of qualified inspectors. (P025)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
It is up to the earthquake commission to decide if they will pay out on section 71 - 
74 political influences may affect this area. The Idea of the Building act hand its 
purpose and principles have a large and important effect on society to throw those 
principles out in the reconstruction phases may make society the loser.  (P028)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Council's are obliged to adhere to the Accreditation requirements. (P029)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Lack of qualified staff for BCA's may mean time delays. Licensing regime for 
builders will create shortage of necessary skills for supervision/monitoring. (P033)  
I do not understand the question on conflicts with Regional Councils. Their BA role 
is limited to dams!  The availability of staff is problematic, but reversion to paper 
based systems will stand us in good stead. Application of the Building Code will 
ensure that "practical/pragmatic" building solutions post-disaster do not become 
additional problems in the recovery period eg during after shocks. (P035)                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
The BA allows for emergency or urgent works to be assessed and enabled. (P041)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
I am not a Building Control Manager so are unable to answer appropriately the 
questions above. (P043)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
There may be a need for some application of common sense in disaster situations 
which may not apply at other times. (P045)  
Works are able to be carried out without BA approval provided that:  1) It is for 
reasons of safety and  2) It is certified for both design and construction through a 
PS4 certificate. (P051)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Perception that a COA is less robust than a BC, which could affect future 
value/sale for properties that need urgent remedial work after an event.  (P052)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
The Building Act provisions tend to conflict with the Resource Management Act at 
the re-construction stage, particularly where Section 10A of the RMA allows an 
activity to be carried out as of right, under the "Existing Use Rights" provisions. If 
a building affected by disaster is rebuilt again, the Consent Authority under the BA 
is mandated to require the property owner to register a Section 72 notice on the 
affected title, which may affect the right to the property being insured, etc.     
While one Act facilitates the re-building process, another sets off a series of 
inhibitions to the affected property. (P055)  
Sections 96-99 would be promulgated to ease the process. (P057)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Some questions are hard to answer because of the lack of relevancy. Insurance 
provisions and compensation are not relevant to any decision making under the BA.   
Potential for conflict exists between BA and RMA but has no affect on a decision on 
whether or not to issue a building consent. The only way to 'By-pass' the building 
consent process is to apply for an exemption or if the work has been done under 
urgency, confirm with a certificate of acceptance. In any of these situations the 
work has to be documented, an application made and the council assess compliance 
with respect to the building code to... (P065) 
Certificate of Acceptance (COA) work is currently viewed with extreme caution.  
Many COA applications are not accepted and of those that are accepted very few 
will receive a COA, the liability risk is too high as there has been no council 
inspections of the work. In a major damage event most homeowners will want to 
proceed on the basis of a COA and can legally do so, I would be very surprised if 
any council granted the COA on completion. With this council I have argued the 
case for actual building inspections during the COA process where repair/ 
replacement only is being completed. To date I have got n… (P066) 
The immediate impact on communities post disaster and the need for all forms of 
temporary accommodation will require relaxation of all sorts of conditions; this will 
not mean the best practice can be followed up in the future. Communities must be 
seen to return as quickly as possible to some sort of normality. Communities are 
best where possible left on their own properties and in the community that they 
know. (P069)                                                                                                                                                                                                        
C. Suggested solutions to operational/logistic problems associated with large scale 
disasters. 
Better co-ordination between Emergency Services, particularly on training matters. 
(P001)  
A major advantage of training and exercises is staff from the various sectors get 
to know each other and work together more effectively both in risk reduction and 
avoidance (District and Regional Plans, etc), during emergencies and post-event 
recovery.  (P010)                                  
Political buy-in from Local Authorities and Central Govt agencies to all the above is 
very important. More Central Government funding/support in areas where national 
planning makes more sense then piecemeal efforts in regions. (P011)                                                                     
Training, or at least awareness programmes, should be included for council staff 
throughout the organisation e.g. Resource Consent officers, Asset Management 
Officers, RMA Monitoring Officers etc.  (P032)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
The role of Reduction is imperative. It is through understanding of likely effects 
under any given scenario, that programming can be forecast. You can then be 
proactive rather than reactive and have an accurate plan of action ready to go. This 
is what would be 'honed' in the exercises.  (P051)                                                                                                                                                                                       
Local Council staff should be encouraged to become Emergency Officials too. 
(P055)                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Good training is essential; standard operating procedures allow flexibility in 
responding.  Role plays in quick time are valuable however nothing beats responding 
to a real event. Public campaigns are useful however to many people switch off (just 
like TV adverts disappear) if there is… (P066) 
Public education is essential. There is an expectation in N.Z. that restoration of 
communities with the minimum of delay can be achieved. This is not the case as has 
been shown with many relatively minor events compared to what happens in other 
Countries. We are for instance a cashless… (P069)  
MoUs with neighbouring countries. (P078)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
D. Comments on means by which large scale reconstruction programmes may be 
facilitated. 
The example of debris disposal can be avoided by identifying the potential need and 
pre-planning, rather than "selective" implementation (observance?) of the RMA. 
(P010)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
RMAs not an impediment if have right relationships in place and know how to use the 
tools it provides like emergency works provisions in a disaster. (P017)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Co-ordinated, uniform and consistent application of provisions of Building Act by 
Councils within a region. Regional co-operation and production of common protocols 
and procedures. (P032)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
We already have too much policy - what we need is sound contingency planning with 
an element of compulsion to it. (P033)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
There is a clear need to identify what can, and cannot, be done under 'emergency 
works'. This will negate the potential backlog of regulatory 'red tape' whilst still 
providing surety of maintaining acceptable standards. Bypassing the regulatory 
[provision] is a 'licence' to build substandard buildings. (P051)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Improvements to RMA and BA to better provide for emergency works, AND better 
training and information to support Councils using these provisions (there is 
currently a lot of inconsistency in how emergency works provisions under the RMA 
are implemented, for example). (P052)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Integration between the CDEMA, RMA and the BA is crucial. These three 
legislative instruments have parallel processes in my view which seldom interact. For 
example, the CDEMA is somehow silent on 'Reduction', says a lot about Readiness, 
Response and Recovery. I believe the reduction phase is crucial to ensure less 
occurrences of disasters in New Zealand. Also, the CDEM Group, I believe should 
make more submissions to the RC process, particularly where development is 
proposed in places that are in close proximity to hazard-prone areas. That is not 
the case at present. I believe the CDEM Group should be more proactive, and stand 
as the mediator and/or integrator between emergency procedures/provisions 
across different sectors in NZ. Somehow, this crucial function of 'reduction' has 
been left to the RMA - there's got to a clear linkage between the RMA and CDEMA 
in this regard, which should then tie into the BA.  Further to this the CDEM group 
should be more involved in the long term community planning of the local (or 
regional) councils - LTCCP. Their involvement would see that resulting District plans 
have stronger hazard-resilient principles/undertones to facilitate the building of 
sustainable communities - meaning less disaster to respond to. (P055) 
I have real concerns about the building act, it simply does not allow any movement 
and the DBH are ramping up (their words) of the requirements in regard to 
providing full drawings and details of ANY work.  Our building unit will not cope in a 
Gisborne level event.  Some form of national response to building and land damage is 
required so that homeowners and councils have a guideline to follow.  Liability issues 
abound in building now, after an event even greater. (P066)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Too little and certainly too late. The restoration of utilities alone cost wise is 
horrendous even on a good day with the normal maintenance on local utilities and 
services. Past emergencies in NZ have seen Local Authorities procrastinate for 
months; this will not be acceptable post major event. (P069)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
E.  Other issues connected with MoUs between councils in New Zealand. 
Through Civil Defence activation (declared emergency) resources can be shared 
across Regions/Districts. (P016)                                                     
The MoU is set up for sharing resources (ability to process consents and 
Inspections) but not specifically for disaster situations. (P027)            
We form part of the Nelson-Tasman Civil Defence Group. Not sure if we have a 
MOU but we are equal participants in a regional Civil Defence Plan. (P035) 
You need to discuss this with our Civil Defence Officer. (P043)                                                                                       
These MOU are expressed through Group Civil Defence plans - high level, but do 
incorporate a commitment to resource sharing. (P052)                    
MoUs are very generic and the intent is to implement a resource (including 
personnel) sharing arrangement.  I personally think the MOUs need to… (P062) 
Our Council does not have any memorandums of understanding except with 
neighbouring councils who will also be impacted in a post disaster situa… (P065) 
There is a loose cluster group in this area, building staff do discuss issues but as 
far as I am aware there are no inter council support agree. (P066) 
The Group Civil Defence Plan and the associated Local Authorities are starting to 
embrace and see the value of joint approach to resource sharing. (P069) 
 F. Reasons given for response to NZ state of preparedness. 
 Small country, reasonable distance away from closest large neighbour. It will take 
time to obtain materials for reconstruction. (P005) 
 Limited media exposure to civil defence exercises and their outcomes would 
indicate there is a level of preparedness (P006) 
 NZ is a small country with a reasonably resilient population.  We will NEVER be 
'Very Prepared' as no two disasters are ever the same.  We have spent considerable 
time and money in promoting being 'on your own for three days'.  I believe this is 
now largely understood.  In fact my experience in Taiwan suggests the larger the 
event the smaller the outrage.    While many in the industry feel the restructuring 
over recent years is detrimental to effective 'response' I take a different view.  I 
think we have a far better idea of what our resources are and where they can be 
located.  Hence we are moderately prepared.  (P008) 
 Small country small resources, lack of comprehensive and consistent CD response 
and resourcing in district councils. (P009) 
 I know how we are placed but cannot express an opinion on NZ as a whole. (P010) 
 NZ does not have resources to deal with this and there has only been slow progress 
as far as I am aware with regard to gain the correct long term assistance from 
overseas   (P011)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 I think NZ has learnt lessons from worldwide disasters and we could our own 
disaster. (P012) 
 NZ has the capability to deal with a disaster recovery plan but does not necessarily 
have the resources immediately on hand. In terms of Wellington as the example 
given it is strategically the worst metropolis given there is only one road in and out 
of the city. (P014) 
 Apart from the consent process, there are the logistics to consider of finding an 
adequate workforce and provision of materials in the time when supply routes and 
availability are at a premium. (P016)   
 In my experience people react appropriately regardless of statutory systems. 
National assistance needs to be guided or controlled by local people. (P019) 
 No direct experience. In addition, the building industry can barely keep up with 
demand right now... let alone an unprecedented demand. (P020) 
 Communications between regional authorities and district authorities are not very 
cohesive at times. (P020) 
 As I see it New Zealand is well prepared for the type of event that occurs 
frequently i.e. floods, storms. However preparedness for a major Wellington 
earthquake is moderate. I do not see this as a criticism, just a fact that it is simply 
not possible to really be prepared for that type of event. (P022) 
 All Councils will have a civil defence management. How well it is implemented will 
depend on the Council. (P023) 
  Outcomes from exercises i.e. capital quake are slow in being identified and improved 
on. (P025)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 The Emergency Management team in the Hutt City is well organised.  For a major 
event it will depend on the co-operation of a number of organisations (Police, Fire, 
Councils and Government) to be deemed Very Prepared. (P027)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 Its what I have been lead to believe until the disaster happens no one knows how 
prepared you are no matter how good the planning it Depends what happened who 
survived and access available to the areas of disaster. (P028)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 Considerable work has gone into contingency planning. (P029) 
 In the area of building consents etc there has been minimal activity except for 
localised events in the past, however for Emergency Management and Lifelines 
there is an active liaison and activities group in the Wellington Region. (P030)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 The recent EQ event at Gisborne clearly showed that, whilst councils can react and 
can deal with such events, that they are not sufficiently prepared to deal with it 
effectively as they could.  Regular refresher training is required for all stake 
holders, including mock events, following the implementation of any procedural 
documentation. Post disaster recovery provisions need to be tested on a regular and 
planned basis.   (P032) 
 I have no confidence that we are prepared with the necessary response systems at 
a national level to assist communities as they try to help themselves.  (P033)  
 This is quite a difficult question to answer in a national context. I am familiar with 
the District Plan in this District, but have no idea how District Plan's in other 
Districts would affect the level of preparedness achievable for those Districts. In 
this District I do not see the District Plan or Resource Management Act as being as 
major barrier to reconstruction following a disaster.  (P034)   
 USA particularly south and south east have numerous events (Hurricane), which 
really keeps their pencils sharp as it were. A million people evacuated off the 
Caribbean coast in 24 hrs. No problems.  Practice makes perfect. (P037)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 I see no evidence that the Government has addressed this issue. (P039) 
 Even if we understand the scale of the job and what would be involved I don’t think 
it is something that can be prepared for.  (P040)    
 I believe there is insufficient logistical provision for any major disaster recovery, 
i.e. lack of current lack of air support heavy lift and transport capability to the 
level that may be required in a major event. Also not covered by naval access to 
beach landing. (P041)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 Only two recent national scale exercises held - Capital Quake (2006?) and Ruamoko 
2008. Quite a lot of planning has been undertaken but very little on the ground 
exercising. (P042)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 We are doing civil defense exercises continuously. There is a national exercise 
coming up shortly.  However I am sure for a national emergency we will never be 
fully prepared. (P043)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 Have had limited recent exposure to major disasters recently, since 1980s flooding, 
to test preparedness. (P045) 
 A very worthwhile re-focusing of CDEM has taken place over the past 5 years or so, 
including its mainstreaming within Internal Affairs. The present Minister Rick 
Barker has taken an active interest in developing CDEM capacity and there have 
been several good initiatives e.g. 'get ready get through'.  So - we are better 
prepared than the US was with respect to Katrina. But - I think you have hit the 
nail on the head drawing attention to the potential difficulties, particularly under 
the Building Act, likely to be faced during recovery. (P049) 
 Current emphasis is on recovery of essential infrastructure. The sourcing of skilled 
labour together with required materials is not the role of Civil Defense as it is a 
private property owners’ responsibility. You would find that the hold-up will be with 
Insurance inspections to evaluate properties prior to work being started that will 
create the backlog.  (P051) 
 I simply don't believe that it is possible to prepare for a disaster of that magnitude 
other than having a recovery plan in place for those left to follow as far as 
practicable. (P054)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 In my view, this generation of NZ has not been opportuned to participate in or 
experience the reconstruction phase of a 'large-scale' disaster. There are so many 
issues that could be a barrier to this reconstruction process. The major one being 
the geography of Wellington itself. It is bounded by water and high grounds (I 
believe); Major parts are probably no more than 2m also what mode of transport will 
help arrive on? What about the co-ordination of international relief? Where will the 
debris go, into the sea? What about recovery of survivors etc... To my 
understanding, I think the re-construction process would be complex and 
challenging and I'm not aware of Wellington’s level of preparedness... (P055) 
 New Zealand is too small a country to be able to provide the level of assistance 
required in a short time period. (P056) 
 EM teams are well prepared, but the general public have the attitude "the big one 
will come eventually, but hopefully it won't affect me!". (P057) 
 Based on observed experience with smaller earthquakes in NZ and disaster 
recovery after floods. (P060) 
 While we do not have a lot of processes in place, as a single jurisdiction we have the 
capacity and will to direct resources to the task in hand. (P063) 
 Knowledge of the state of preparedness of this Council. There is no real 
appreciation of what a big earthquake for example would be like. There is a public 
perception that the recent Gisborne incident was a big earthquake for example. 
(P065)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 Not prepared, I see a general conception that a; government will provide, b; councils 
will assist locally. There is little thought given to extended disaster situations, we 
tell people to prepare for 3 days.  Our own plans indicate that we will be without 
essentials such as mains water, sewage, gas, power, telephone for up to and 
exceeding 42 days. Sure we will be able to provide some of those in limited amounts 
but that is not what people are hearing nationally. In major disaster such as a 
Wellington quake of R+7 we will have huge problems.  My greatest concern is sewage 
and contamination of ground water and sea areas. Disposal of sewage is not being 
addressed and we do not tell people NOT TO USE THE… (P066)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 We do a lot of talking and theorising in this Country with bugger all practical action. 
Many Local Authorities sill pay lip service to this most serious of problems. They 
are happy to talk about problems and carry out planning, but never to any real 
extent. Life Lines is a wonderful opportunity for Authorities to seriously kick start 
a really good snap shot of the security of their infrastructure and maintenance 
programme. It Authorities are not prepared to take the basic first life lines step 
then how the hell does the rest work? (P069)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 No one would know what to do, where to start, how to even survive something like 
hurricane Katrina.  Reconstruction would take years. (P071)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 Whilst many plans exist at local, regional and national levels, coupled with the 
relationships that have developed to the extended CDEM community, many realisms 
need to be addressed. Public realism needs to accept that in this event, they are 
responsible for their own and their families safety, which means personal 
preparedness. This is an ongoing battle for CDEM agencies and whilst some headway 
is being made, there is still a long to go. Nationally, a lead role needs to be taken in 
much of the planning activities. With no National Recovery plan for the Wellington 
Earthquake, it is left to region and local recovery plans to grapple with the issues 
where clear national governance exists. (P074)      
 Consents processes are lengthy; no prefabrication facilities readily available for 
transitional housing, transport routes in south island are of poor quality. (P078) 
 Some thinking has been done but not nearly enough. (P079)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 Much work has been done to plan or such events. However more planning is required, 
especially with respect to reconstruction. Contract management and coordination of 
resources need attention. (P080)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B6 - Verification Questionnaire CDEM Act 
 __________________________________________________ 
Department of Civil and Natural Resources Engineering 
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Te Whare Wānanga o Waitaha Telephone:  +64-3-364 2250 
Private Bag 4800 Facsimile: +64-3-364 2758 
Christchurch 8020  New Zealand Website: www.civil.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
 
 
 
October, 2009 
 
Participant Information Sheet  
Topic: An Evaluation of the Implementation of Post-Disaster Reconstruction Strategies under 
the Resource Management and Building Acts in New Zealand. 
 
This questionnaire is a follow-on exercise to an online survey administered in February/March 
2008. The data from the online survey have been analysed and the results are now presented to you 
for verification and additional input. 
The aim of the research project is to facilitate both efficient and effective reconstruction of the built 
environment after significant disasters in New Zealand, by implementing enabling provisions 
within the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002), Resource Management Act (1991) 
and Building Act (2004). 
You are invited to participate in this survey as a professional who has knowledge of legislation that 
may influence post-disaster reconstruction of the built environment. It will be highly appreciated if 
you can fill out the attached questionnaire and supply any additional information which you may 
find useful based on your experience.  
You are assured of strict confidentiality in the research process and in subsequent publications. All 
identifying features of you or your organisation will be coded. You are free to ask the researcher 
not to use any of the information you have given, and if you wish, you can ask to see the report 
before it is submitted for examination.  
 
Completion of the questionnaire should take approximately 15 minutes. 
 
 
 
 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury’s Human Ethics 
Committee (Ref. No. 2007/148). If you have any questions or concern about the research, please 
contact Dr. Deam by email (bruce.deam@canterbury.ac.nz) or phone him on 03 364 2601. 
 
 
 
SECTION A – AREAS OF CONCERN IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATION 
The following issues relate to the CDEM Act. An initial survey had highlighted the issues as deserving 
consideration so that reconstruction programmes can be executed with the least hindrance. 
You are required to indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the statements made under each 
sub-section on a scale of 1 to 5. 1 being Strongly Agree and 5 being Strongly Disagree. 
Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002) 
St.1 - The statutory powers for directing all emergency services have to be extended beyond a declared 
emergency period, so that consistency in policy is ensured across the transition phases of emergency 
response and recovery. Much more leadership responsibilities should be permitted by the Act allowing for 
pragmatic decision making by MCDEM officials. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
 
St.2 - There is a need to streamline emergency response and recovery activities by different stakeholder 
agencies towards common goals and objectives. In other words, even though individual agencies (e.g. 
lifelines) have their recovery objectives, the CDEM Act should commit these agencies to a larger recovery 
programme to be coordinated by MCDEM. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
 
St.3 - There has to be clearer linkage between the CDEM Act and other legislative documents in all aspects 
of disaster management. A streamline of parallel provisions and operating procedures within these legislative 
documents (CDEM Act, RMA and BA) will benefit disaster management. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SECTION B – GENERAL ISSUES PERTAINING CDEM IN NEW ZEALAND 
Qs 1 – Could you provide information on what you see as significant impediment to the realisation of post 
disaster reconstruction under current CDEM framework (Alternatively: Do you see the current CDEM 
framework capable of supporting the activities of Recovery Managers/Coordinators in the event of a large 
scale reconstruction programme?)   
 
  
 
Qs 2 - Could you provide information on significant policy changes either on-going or in the near future that 
has emphasis on allowing for more effective/efficient reconstruction or recovery after disasters in New 
Zealand (especially outside the issues I have raised above).   
 
 
 
SECTION C – OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATION 
IN NEW ZEALAND 
St.1 - There is a need to address how government agencies (and councils) can collaborate to exchange 
information and share commitments in the event of a disaster. It has been suggested that councils should 
prepare memoranda of understanding (MoU) with pre-conceived arrangements on how recovery can be 
achieved through the collaborative efforts of affected councils or regions. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
St.2 – Responsible organisations need to be encouraged to breakdown existing silos so that common 
recovery priorities can be achieved. Prior research shows that current silo mentality amongst agencies result 
in barriers to efficient and effective recovery. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
St.3 – Disaster recovery legislation has not provided enough for the issues around the use of external 
resources in a disaster event. Availability, accessibility and means by which disaster resources are applied, 
require the attention of responding agencies, especially where external resources are brought in to help with 
the task of a major recovery programme. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
SECTION D – DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION  
 
Please indicate how well you understand the provisions of these three Acts (please tick) 
 Very Well Not Very Well Not At all 
CDEM Act    
Resource Management Act    
Building Act    
 
Please indicate with a tick which of this applies to you 
Type of organisation you work in Lifelines (Telecom, Transit NZ etc)  
Research and Education  
Private/Consultancy (Disaster Mngt, Legal, Engnrg 
etc) 
 
Government Dept (MCDEM, DBH, MfE etc)  
Insurance including EQC  
Territorial/Local Councils  
Others, please specify: 
 
 
NZ Region/Island North Island  
South Island  
Gender Male  
Female  
Place(s) in which you have 
practiced. 
New Zealand only   
Overseas only  
Both   
Work Experience Above 20yrs  
16-20 years  
11- 15 yrs  
6 – 10 yrs  
0 – 5 yrs  
Highest Qualification  Postgraduate  
Degree or Equivalent  
Diploma  
Others  
 
APPENDIX B7 - Verification Questionnaire RMA 
 __________________________________________________ 
Department of Civil and Natural Resources Engineering 
 
University of Canterbury 
Te Whare Wānanga o Waitaha Telephone:  +64-3-364 2250 
Private Bag 4800 Facsimile: +64-3-364 2758 
Christchurch 8020  New Zealand Website: www.civil.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
 
 
 
October, 2009 
 
Participant Information Sheet  
Topic: An Evaluation of the Implementation of Post-Disaster Reconstruction Strategies under 
the Resource Management and Building Acts in New Zealand. 
 
This questionnaire is a follow-on exercise to an online survey administered in February/March 
2008. The data from the online survey have been analysed and the results are now presented to you 
for verification and additional input. 
The aim of the research project is to facilitate both efficient and effective reconstruction of the built 
environment after significant disasters in New Zealand, by implementing enabling provisions 
within the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002), Resource Management Act (1991) 
and Building Act (2004). 
You are invited to participate in this survey as a professional who has knowledge of legislation that 
may influence post-disaster reconstruction of the built environment. It will be highly appreciated if 
you can fill out the attached questionnaire and supply any additional information which you may 
find useful based on your experience.  
You are assured of strict confidentiality in the research process and in subsequent publications. All 
identifying features of you or your organisation will be coded. You are free to ask the researcher 
not to use any of the information you have given, and if you wish, you can ask to see the report 
before it is submitted for examination.  
 
Completion of the questionnaire should take approximately 15 minutes. 
 
 
 
 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury’s Human Ethics 
Committee (Ref. No. 2007/148). If you have any questions or concern about the research, please 
contact Dr. Deam by email (bruce.deam@canterbury.ac.nz) or phone him on 03 364 2601. 
 
 
 
SECTION A – AREAS OF CONCERN IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATION 
The following issues relate to the RMA and other general issues around the implementation of post-disaster 
reconstruction programmes. An initial survey had highlighted the issues as deserving consideration so that 
reconstruction programmes can be executed with the least hindrance. 
You are required to indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the statements made under each 
sub-section on a scale of 1 to 5. 1 being Strongly Agree and 5 being Strongly Disagree. 
Resource Management Act (1991) 
St.1 - Resource consent processing and statutory requirements are burdensome but necessary. However the 
logistics of consent processing during chaotic response and recovery deserves consideration particularly in a 
large-scale disaster event. Some flexibility is desired in procedural requirements for householders who may 
be frustrated by the process rather than the purpose of the Act. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
 
St.2 – The RMA should consider critical infrastructure that are likely catalyst to community recovery as 
projects of national significance. Thus their execution could be fast-tracked with minimal notification 
procedures. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
St.3 – The RMA should allow for pragmatic decision making post disaster. Within boundaries of reason, 
Recovery Managers should be able to veto certain RMA requirements to allow for reconstruction work to 
progress with little hindrance. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
 
St.4 – There are subtle differences in the interpretation and implementation of the Act between different 
territorial and regional authorities, which may become potentials for jurisdictional conflicts between 
coordinating councils (especially where a hazard event cuts across geographical boundaries).  
(1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
SECTION B – OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATION 
IN NEW ZEALAND 
St.1 - There is a need to address how government agencies (and councils) can collaborate to exchange 
information and share commitments in the event of a disaster. It has been suggested that councils should 
prepare memoranda of understanding (MoU) with pre-conceived arrangements on how recovery can be 
achieved through the collaborative efforts of affected councils or regions. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
St.2 – Responsible organisations need to be encouraged to breakdown existing silos so that common 
recovery priorities can be achieved. Prior research shows that current silo mentality amongst agencies result 
in barriers to efficient and effective recovery. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
 
St.1 – Disaster recovery legislation has not provided enough for the issues around the use of external 
resources in a disaster event. Availability, accessibility and means by which disaster resources are applied, 
require the attention of responding agencies, especially where external resources are brought in to help with 
the task of a major recovery programme. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
SECTION C: COMMENTS SPECIFIC TO THE RMA SUBMISSION (See attached document)  
Please provide your general comments on the issues that were raised in the submission to the Select 
Committee on Local Government and Environment in April 2009.  
 
SECTION D – DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION  
Please indicate how well you understand the provisions of these three Acts (please tick) 
 Very Well Not Very Well Not At all 
CDEM Act    
Resource Management Act    
Building Act    
 
Please indicate with a tick which of this applies to you 
Type of organisation you work in Lifelines (Telecom, Transit NZ etc)  
Research and Education  
Private/Consultancy (Disaster Mngt, Legal, Engnrg 
etc) 
 
Government Dept (MCDEM, DBH, MfE etc)  
Insurance including EQC  
Territorial/Local Councils  
Others, please specify: 
 
 
NZ Region/Island North Island  
South Island  
Gender Male  
Female  
Place(s) in which you have 
practiced. 
New Zealand only   
Overseas only  
Both   
Work Experience Above 20yrs  
16-20 years  
11- 15 yrs  
6 – 10 yrs  
0 – 5 yrs  
Highest Qualification  Postgraduate  
Degree or Equivalent  
Diploma  
Others  
 
APPENDIX B8 - Verification Questionnaire BA 
 __________________________________________________ 
Department of Civil and Natural Resources Engineering 
 
University of Canterbury 
Te Whare Wānanga o Waitaha Telephone:  +64-3-364 2250 
Private Bag 4800 Facsimile: +64-3-364 2758 
Christchurch 8020  New Zealand Website: www.civil.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
 
 
 
October, 2009 
 
Participant Information Sheet  
Topic: An Evaluation of the Implementation of Post-Disaster Reconstruction Strategies under 
the Resource Management and Building Acts in New Zealand. 
 
This questionnaire is a follow-on exercise to an online survey administered in February/March 
2008. The data from the online survey have been analysed and the results are now presented to you 
for verification and additional input. 
The aim of the research project is to facilitate both efficient and effective reconstruction of the built 
environment after significant disasters in New Zealand, by implementing enabling provisions 
within the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002), Resource Management Act (1991) 
and Building Act (2004). 
You are invited to participate in this survey as a professional who has knowledge of legislation that 
may influence post-disaster reconstruction of the built environment. It will be highly appreciated if 
you can fill out the attached questionnaire and supply any additional information which you may 
find useful based on your experience.  
You are assured of strict confidentiality in the research process and in subsequent publications. All 
identifying features of you or your organisation will be coded. You are free to ask the researcher 
not to use any of the information you have given, and if you wish, you can ask to see the report 
before it is submitted for examination.  
 
Completion of the questionnaire should take approximately 15 minutes. 
 
 
 
 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury’s Human Ethics 
Committee (Ref. No. 2007/148). If you have any questions or concern about the research, please 
contact Dr. Deam by email (bruce.deam@canterbury.ac.nz) or phone him on 03 364 2601. 
 
 
 
SECTION A – AREAS OF CONCERN IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATION 
The following issues relate to the Building Act. An initial survey had highlighted these issues as deserving 
consideration so that reconstruction programmes can be executed with the least hindrance in New Zealand. 
You are required to indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the statements made under each 
sub-section on a scale of 1 to 5. 1 being Strongly Agree and 5 being Strongly Disagree. 
Building Act (2004) 
St.1 – There has to be a realignment of BA provisions with the RMA and CDEM Act. For example conflicts 
are envisaged with the application of ‘existing use rights’ under s10 of the RMA. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
 
St. 2- There are subtle differences in the implementation of BA provisions between local councils (in relation 
to District Plan requirements). These differences may impact the implementation of reconstruction projects 
that cut across regional boundaries.   (1,    2,    3,    4,    5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
  
 
 
   
 
St.3 – There is need to address the disparity in the interpretation of Code Compliance Certificate (CCC) and 
Certificate of Acceptance (COA) by home owners as this may affect the marketable value of properties with 
either of the two certificates.  (1,    2,    3,    4,    5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
  
St. 4 – Section 70-74 notices should be reviewed in the light of the effect that a major disaster could have on 
a large geographical area and the implication on insurance cover to affected properties. Further 
categorisation may be necessary to accommodate buildings exposed to minor natural hazards.   
(1,    2,    3,    4,    5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
   
St.5 - Pro-active rather than reactive response/recovery is generally preferred in disaster management. The 
current research shows that reconstruction activities would benefit from prior arrangements, which provide 
detailed modalities for action and re-action under the Building Act provisions in New Zealand.  
(1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
St.6 - Building consent processing and compliance requirements under the Building Act cannot be avoided in 
any disaster. What is needed is a resourcing of building control departments to cater for the spike in 
applications after disasters. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
St.7 - The capabilities of territorial and regional authorities to make decisions on built facilities that are 
affected by a disaster are a great influence on recovery progress. The BA should cause councils to prepare 
training and packaged inductions for operating procedures during disasters when situations become chaotic. 
(1,    2,    3,    4,    5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
 
St.8 - Rapid property evaluation for damages during the early phases of response is a pre-cursor to/and 
determinant of the success of subsequent recovery and reconstruction activities. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
SECTION B – OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATION 
IN NEW ZEALAND 
St.1 - There is a need to address how government agencies (and councils) can collaborate to exchange 
information and share commitments in the event of a disaster. It has been suggested that councils should 
prepare memoranda of understanding (MoU) with pre-conceived arrangements on how recovery can be 
achieved through the collaborative efforts of affected councils or regions. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
St.2 – Responsible organisations need to be encouraged to breakdown existing silos so that common 
recovery priorities can be achieved. Prior research shows that current silo mentality amongst agencies result 
in barriers to efficient and effective recovery. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
St.3 – Disaster recovery legislation has not provided enough for the issues around the use of external 
resources in a disaster event. Availability, accessibility and means by which disaster resources are applied, 
require the attention of responding agencies, especially where external resources are brought in to help with 
the task of a major recovery programme. (1,   2,   3,   4,   5) 
Please provide comments to support your response above: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SECTION C – DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION  
 
Please indicate how well you understand the provisions of these three Acts (please tick) 
 Very Well Not Very Well Not At all 
CDEM Act    
Resource Management Act    
Building Act    
 
Please indicate with a tick which of this applies to you 
Type of organisation you work in Lifelines (Telecom, Transit NZ etc)  
Research and Education  
Private/Consultancy (Disaster Mngt, Legal, Engnrg 
etc) 
 
Government Dept (MCDEM, DBH, MfE etc)  
Insurance including EQC  
Territorial/Local Councils  
Others, please specify: 
 
 
NZ Region/Island North Island  
South Island  
Gender Male  
Female  
Place(s) in which you have 
practiced. 
New Zealand only   
Overseas only  
Both   
Work Experience Above 20yrs  
16-20 years  
11- 15 yrs  
6 – 10 yrs  
0 – 5 yrs  
Highest Qualification  Postgraduate  
Degree or Equivalent  
Diploma  
Others  
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 3rd April 2009 
 
 
SUBMISSION on the Resource Management  
(Simplifying and Streamlining) Amendment Bill 
 
To: The Local Government and Environment Committee 
 
Introduction 
This submission on the Resource Management Act (Simplifying and Streamlining) 
Amendment Bill is from Resilient Organisations. 
The Resilient Organisations research group is a multi-disciplinary group of researchers and 
practitioners that is New Zealand based and with global reach.  A collaboration between top 
New Zealand research Universities and key industry players, including the University of 
Canterbury and the University of Auckland, Resilient Organisations is funded by the NZ 
Foundation for Research, Science and Technology.  The research group represents a 
synthesis of engineering disciplines and business leadership aimed at transforming NZ 
organisations into those that both survive major events and thrive in the aftermath.  The 
research group consists of 17 core researchers and dozens of industry partners and advisors.   
We are committed to making New Zealand organisations more resilient in the face of major 
hazards in the natural, built and economic environments.  Resilient organisations are able to 
rebound from disaster and find opportunity in times of distress. They are better employers, 
contribute to community resilience and foster a culture of self reliance and effective 
collaboration. 
A major aspect of research embarked upon by the research team is the analysis of New 
Zealand’s legal frameworks for reconstruction – specifically the CDEM Act, RMA and Building 
Act. The research looks at the relevance of these Acts to post-disaster reconstruction, and to 
determine whether they would help or hinder significant post-disaster reconstruction 
programmes. 
There is strong research evidence to suggest that the RMA (which is the focus of our current 
submission) and other legislation will constrain reconstruction efforts in New Zealand 
should there be a major national disaster. We are therefore of the opinion that the current 
review and realignment of the RMA is timely. We are hopeful that the review will result in a 
APPENDIX D1 
robust framework for both environmental and other physical re-development programmes 
after a major disaster. 
Resilient Organisations can be contacted at: 
Attention: Dr. Erica Seville 
Department of Civil and Natural Resources Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
Private Bag 4800 
Christchurch. 
Ph: +64 21 456 706  
Fax: +64 3 364 2758 
Email: erica.seville@canterbury.ac.nz 
www.resorgs.org.nz  
Should you consider that an oral defence is necessary in support of this submission, Resilient 
Organisation wishes that the following be allowed to appear before your committee:  
• Dr Erica Seville, University of Canterbury 
• Associate Professor Suzanne Wilkinson, University of Auckland 
• James Rotimi, Unitec 
 
  
Summary 
Resilient Organisations is in support of the intent of this Amendment Bill.  A simplified and 
streamlined framework for considering resource management decisions will be of particular 
importance in a post-disaster environment, when the sheer volume and complex nature of 
consent applications are likely to overwhelm current arrangements.   
We therefore make specific suggestions under some of the themes that have been 
identified by the Ministry for Environment.  
 
Specific Suggestions 
Theme 2: Streamlining processes for projects of national significance 
The Ministry for Environment has proposed key changes for streamlining projects of 
national significance through the proposed formation of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). We provide the following suggestions: 
• There needs to be great clarity on projects that could be considered nationally 
significant. Criteria such as the cost of a project, scale of the project, sphere of influence 
on the public etc. may be established; most importantly there should also be a specific 
criterion added that identifies reconstruction programmes following large-scale 
disasters as nationally significant.  
We suggest the criterion should refer to Level 4 and 5 disaster event types (which are 
regionally and nationally significant respectively, as defined in CDEM Group Plans). We 
believe this is consistent with the provisions for immediacy, necessity and sufficiency 
contained in Section 330 of the Act.  
 
Theme 3: Creating an Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) 
The Ministry for Environment has proposed the establishment of the EPA as an independent 
business unit to handle nationally significant consent applications. We suggest the following: 
• That a Recovery Manager or National Recovery Coordinator (if appointed) be co-opted 
into membership of the Agency or any Board of Inquiry set up to review environment 
matters in the event of a large scale disaster. 
Membership of the EPA by key officer(s) engaged in recovery programmes is essential so 
that consenting of nationally significant re-instatement projects could be better 
facilitated.    
 
Theme 4: Improving plan development and plan change processes 
Recommendations made by the Ministry for Environment for improving plan development 
and plan change processes are to be commended. However we wish to make the following 
specific suggestions: 
• That the revised RMA should require Territorial Authorities and Councils to give greater 
consideration to recovery after disasters in their regional and district plans.  We observe 
that the current focus of regional and district plans is skewed towards the prevention, 
avoidance and mitigation of hazards (pre-event planning). Whilst not limiting the 
importance of this current focus, we are of the opinion that Councils could be made 
more proactive by considering and incorporating post-event issues into their plans. 
• That upon consideration and inclusion of recovery issues, there is a need to ensure 
neighbouring areas align their regional and district plans as differences can impede the 
implementation of reconstruction projects that may spread across geographical 
boundaries.  
 
Theme 5: Improving resource consent process 
We are in support of the recommendations made by the Ministry for Environment 
concerning the improvement of the current RMA consent process. Such recommendations 
will go a long way to reducing the current procedural burden experienced by consent 
applicants.  
Resilient Organisations are very concerned by an expected spike in consent applications for 
minor works in the aftermath of a major disaster.  Our research indicates there are likely to 
be severe limitations in the capacity of Councils to process these applications within the 
timeframes required, significantly hampering the community’s ability to recover.  An 
improvement in the consent process particularly for minor repairs and replacements will be 
beneficial to post-disaster recovery efforts as to business as usual construction.  
 
Theme 6: Improving national tools (NPS/NES) 
Resilient Organisations suggest the development of a National Policy Statement on Recovery 
that will provide an overarching framework/guideline for post-disaster reconstruction work. 
We consider this is a responsibility for all disaster management agencies including the 
Ministry for Environment.  
Such a NPS would bring all post-disaster considerations into a single document. We suggest 
a cross-reference system within this NPS with associated legislation like the RMA, Building 
Act, and other environmental standards.  
Some of the issues that could be covered by this National Policy Statement include (but are 
not restricted to): 
• Definition of hazard types that will be referred to in the policy. 
• Guidelines on collaboration of stakeholders towards recovery and mechanisms by which 
recovery considerations transcend existing commercial decisions and silos. 
• Addressing external aid and assistance e.g. training requirements for external resource 
persons during a catastrophic response and recovery programme. 
• Process-based information on recovery and the reconstruction of the physical 
environment under different disaster scenarios  
• Description of the relationships between all disaster-related legislation (and 
development and re-development control guidelines). This will provide a framework for 
the alignment of all related legislation so that the differences that exist under the 
current system are eliminated. 
 Conclusions 
While Resilient Organisations is in support of the intent of this Amendment Bill, our 
submission highlights the need to ensure that the unique challenges posed by a post-
disaster environment are addressed.   
Our research indicates that there are significant barriers created by the current RMA 
arrangements that would significantly hamper an efficient and effective post-disaster 
reconstruction effort.  The proposed amendments, with minor changes as suggested, create 
a real opportunity for New Zealand to be in a better position to rebuild and recover when a 
major disaster strikes. 
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Introduction  
The vulnerability of New Zealand to most forms of natural disaster demands its proactive 
engagement in management programmes that will not only reduce these impacts but 
increase its resilience to future events as well. The need for post-disaster reconstruction 
policy guidelines that will address these objectives cannot be overstated.  
In spite of a well acclaimed capacity for response and recovery, New Zealand has a 
relatively low experience in the management of large scale catastrophes. The character 
of recent natural events have been confined to rural communities, are of low-magnitude 
and with relatively low scope of impact on the physical environment. Several major 
natural disaster scenario and exercises have indicated that there will be considerable 
physical, economic and social challenges on the task of reconstruction and recovery if, 
and when such disasters occur. 
The study on which this paper is based explores improvement on the existing legislative 
and regulatory framework so as to allow for the implementation of large-scale 
reconstruction programmes in New Zealand. It seeks to address the following pertinent 
questions: 
• How will the existing legislation and regulatory provisions be made to facilitate the 
implementation of large scale reconstruction programmes?  
• How can a balance be achieved between the needs for speedy reconstruction 
programmes and the specific requirements for regulatory compliances? 
Motivation 
Motivation for the current study came from a stakeholder workshop held in Wellington, 
2006, where implementation problems that may be experienced during post-disaster 
reconstruction were highlighted (Full report is available on www.resorgs.org.nz/pubs.htm). 
Some other commissioned studies (MWH, 2004; Page, 2005; AELG, 2005; and Messrs 
Anthony Harper, 2006) report on potential gaps and inconsistencies in recovery 
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legislation; and the possibility of procedural constraints in the implementation of current 
policy guidelines.  
There are therefore opportunities for improving the existing legislation and regulatory 
provisions so as to guide the performance of reconstruction works in achieving resilience 
in New Zealand. The study believes that without appropriate policy guidelines, there could 
be loss of vital momentum of action resulting from delays caused by restrictive provisions; 
loss of commitment to the reconstruction process by disaster practitioners who are unable 
to apply pragmatic solutions to real-time reconstruction problems; inabilities to introduce 
measures for risk and vulnerability reduction; and finally an overall impairment of 
community recovery and quality of life. 
The Research 
The study involved a documentary analysis of past reconstruction programmes both 
locally and internationally so as to record the set of policy approaches pursued during the 
reinstatement of built facilities. Focus is made on the adjustments made to subsisting 
legislations to allow for reconstruction programmes to be progressed. These set of 
information provided relevant benchmarks for suggested improvements to New Zealand 
reconstruction policies. 
Following this was an evaluative study of three regulatory policy documents; Civil 
Defense and Emergency Management Act (2002), Building Act (2004) and the Resource 
Management Act (1991), with the aid of an online survey of disaster management 
practitioners within New Zealand. The questionnaire was designed to provide a synthesis 
of views for improving post-disaster reconstruction processes within a regime of supportive 
regulatory provisions and implementation guidelines. 
Conclusion  
The need for a national policy framework for post-disaster reconstruction cannot be 
overemphasized. Putting a robust reconstruction framework in place before the ‘major 
one’, would demonstrate a conscious approach to achieving the desired objectives for 
building resilience in New Zealand communities. 
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Abstract 
 
Legislation that applies to routine construction provides for the safe development of infrastructure, capital 
improvements and land use, ensuring preservation and environmental protection, however there is often little 
provision in legislation to facilitate reconstruction projects.  Much existing legislation was not drafted to cope 
with an emergency situation and was not developed to operate under the conditions that will inevitably prevail 
in the aftermath of a severe disaster.  If well articulated and implemented, the regulations should not only 
provide an effective means of reducing and containing vulnerabilities (disaster mitigation), but also a means of 
facilitating reconstruction projects. 
 
The purpose of this work is to examine how reconstruction differs from routine construction, focussing on the 
interrelated reconstruction challenges of allocation of responsibility for coordination, scarcity of resources and 
the application of legislation and regulations that were written for routine construction rather than post-disaster 
reconstruction. 
 
Case studies of reconstruction following recent small scale disasters in New Zealand are presented to support 
the points raised. Extrapolation of the main issues to larger scale disasters identifies some significant challenges 
which, if not addressed in advance, are likely to hinder the reconstruction process.  
 
The paper concludes that whilst routine construction processes have proved adequate for small-scale disasters, 
the greater degree of coordination required for programmes of reconstruction following a larger disaster has not 
been adequately addressed in policy and legislation. 
 
Keywords: Reconstruction; Coordination; Legislation; Regulation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Disaster management and the need to develop a resilient community capable of recovering 
from disasters is of increasing concern in many countries. The recovery process may present 
an opportunity for improvement in the functioning of the community, so that risks from 
future events can be reduced while the community becomes more resilient. The effectiveness 
of the process will depend on how much planning has been carried out and what 
contingencies are put in place prior to the disaster. 
 
In preparation for disasters there is often an emphasis on readiness and response, with poor 
understanding and little consideration given to the implications of recovery (Angus 2005). 
Experience has shown that recovery is often carried out by modifying routine construction 
processes on an ad hoc basis following a disaster. Whilst this can work reasonably well for 
small scale disasters, the effectiveness of reconstruction could be improved by modifying the 
legislative and regulatory framework in advance of a disaster. For larger scale disasters there 
is a greater imperative to have appropriate systems in place in advance, to allow effective 
coordination and delivery of reconstruction works. 
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This paper defines reconstruction within the overall disaster management context and 
explores the issues of reconstruction frameworks though case studies of recent flood events 
in New Zealand.  
 
 
RECONSTRUCTION IN A POST-DISASTER SITUATION 
 
Two stages can be identified in reconstruction activity following a disaster, generally referred 
to as response and recovery. The response stage is concerned, among other things, with 
clearing debris, making damaged structures safe, erecting temporary structures and restoring 
basic levels of transportation, sanitation, communication and power. The response stage tends 
to receive the most attention, both prior to an event in terms of planning, preparation and 
research of the processes; and after an event in terms of media and general public interest and 
expediency of regulatory processes.   
 
Recovery is an integral part of the comprehensive emergency management process (Sullivan 
2003). It refers to all activities that are carried out immediately after the initial response to a 
disaster situation. This will usually extend until the community’s capacity for self-help has 
been restored. In other words, the end-state is when the assisted community reaches a level of 
functioning where it is able to sustain itself in the absence of further external intervention 
(Sullivan 2003). The components of recovery as defined by the Ministry of Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management (MCDEM, 2005a) are shown in Figure 1. This paper is 
concerned principally with the built environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Components of recovery (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 
2005a) 
 
Recovery is defined as “the coordinated efforts and processes to effect the immediate, 
medium and long-term holistic regeneration of a community following a disaster” (MCDEM 
2005). Recovery requires a concerted approach that will support the foundations of 
community sustainability and capacity building and which will eventually reduce risks and 
vulnerabilities to future disasters. Jigyasu, (2004) describes an increase in vulnerability of 
local communities after the Latur earthquake in India, where sustainable recovery 
interventions were poorly planned and implemented. 
 
 
REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR 
RECOVERY 
 
In comparison to routine construction, there is often little provision in legislation to cater for 
post-disaster reconstruction processes as part of recovery. When an official state of 
emergency is declared following a major disaster special powers become available and 
routine statutory processes can be circumvented. However, once the state of emergency has 
been lifted the routine statutory processes become applicable, which can create sluggishness 
in the recovery process.  The recovery stage can last several years and eventually transitions 
back to the point when construction processes can be considered routine. 
 
To ensure robustness in the process, the rational starting point is the setting up of an 
institutional infrastructure for emergency management, which will formulate public policies 
for mitigation, response and recovery (Comerio 2004). These recovery policies should then 
be integrated into other emergency management areas as well as policies of sustainability and 
community capacity building (Coghlan 2004). The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (MCDEM) in New Zealand encourages a holistic approach to the issue of 
recovery planning and believes this will be most effective if it is integrated with the 
remaining 3Rs of reduction, readiness and response (MCDEM, 2005a).  
 
New Zealand’s recovery planning and management arrangements are contained in the 
National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy (MCDEM, 2004). Recovery is 
delivered through a continuum of central, regional, community and personal structures 
(Angus, 2004).  
 
Responsibility for coordination of recovery will be determined by a number of factors 
including the scale of the disaster. The MCDEM, together with cluster groups of agencies, 
coordinate planning at the central level. Regional and Territorial authorities are encouraged 
to produce group plans that will suit peculiar conditions of their local areas. However, unless 
lines of responsibility are made clear, management of recovery may involve an element of 
competition between central, regional and local levels of government for control of the 
process (Rolfe and Britton, 1995).  
 
Unless provision is made for recovery in regulations and legislation that apply to routine 
construction, then the coordination and management of a major programme of reconstruction 
could become cumbersome and inefficient. For example it is unlikely that coordinating 
authorities and regulatory bodies would be able to cope with the volume of work, due to 
shortfalls in experienced personnel. 
 
 
EXPERIENCES IN RECENT NATURAL DISASTERS 
 
In recent years there have been two locally significant disasters due to flooding events, at 
Manawatu in 2004 and Matata in 2005. The circumstances of these events are described 
briefly and some lessons learnt are summarised below. 
 
The Manawatu Flood 
Flooding in Manawatu was caused by heavy rain and gale force winds from the 14th to 23rd of 
February 2004. A Regional State of Civil Emergency was declared on 17th February. The 
flooding caused over 2,000 people to be evacuated from their homes at the height of the 
event. Many rivers breached their banks and considerable areas of farmland were inundated 
by silt and floodwaters. There was significant damage to infrastructure with damage to roads, 
bridges, and railways. In addition, there were telecommunication, power, gas and water 
supply outages to tens of thousands of people. Remarkably no lives were lost as a direct 
result of the event. 
 
Recovery costs are estimated at $160-180million for the rural sector and $120million for 
roads and council infrastructure. In addition $29.5 million and $3.5 million will be required 
to stop future flooding of the lower Manawatu and Rangitikei rivers respectively. 
 
The Matata Debris Flow 
A debris flow occurred on the 18th of May 2005 when a band of intense rain fell in the 
catchments behind Matata in the Bay of Plenty region. This triggered floods and several large 
debris flows.  
The highly erosive debris flows cleaned out the valley bottoms and destabilised the slopes 
along the channel, causing secondary landslides. The debris flows were structurally 
damaging to all buildings and bridges in their paths and at several locations the associated 
debris floods also were structurally damaging. 
In response to the Matata disaster a Civil Defence Emergency was declared on 18th May 2005 
and this remained in place until the end of May. Total government valuation including land 
value and capital value of properties affected along the flood path hazard was estimated to be 
$9,740,000 for unsafe buildings and $2,937,000 for buildings subject to restricted use. 
 
Reconstruction following the floods 
Reconstruction was carried out through collaboration between CDEM agencies, local 
authorities, utility companies and insurance companies during recovery in the two cases. 
For the Manawatu-Wanganui region recovery was coordinated through the regional council’s 
new CDEM Group arrangements under the provisions of the Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Act (CDEM Act) 2002. For the other territorial authorities the event was 
managed through their Civil Defence Act 1983 arrangements. The CDEM Act provides a 
structure appropriate for dealing with events such as the floods and did not introduce any 
structures or procedures that hindered authorities in dealing with the event. In Matata the 
state of emergency was extended to allow work to be completed on critical road access routes 
but still only lasted two weeks.  
 
The roading authorities did not diverge from normal legislation and regulations and building 
consents were sought and granted as usual. Road users were consulted and kept updated on 
reconstruction issues. 
 
A source of frustration for utility companies in the Manawatu flood event according to AELG 
(2005) was the time taken to develop an understanding with the Regional Council about 
emergency actions that would cover all situations under the Resource Management Act, 
rather than require a formal process for each activity. A particular issue arose when the 
Regional Council initially required that slip material should be disposed of in a designated 
landfill; subsequently they allowed a more pragmatic approach which meant that slip material 
could be moved and redeposited locally. 
 
The road funding authority, Transfund, should ideally become involved as early as possible 
following a disaster since Transfund has direct access to government funds. However this 
was not the case following the Manawatu floods and it is likely that more could have been 
done to secure certainty over funding in the early stages of recovery which would have 
helped with the physical works prioritisation process.  
 
Recovery at Matata relied heavily on Central Government funding since the local council had 
a small number of rate payers and insufficient funds to cover the recovery costs itself. 
Funding took some time to come through whilst government requested and were awaiting 
details of the costs. This frustrated the local population. 
 
Overall there was little difference between the routine construction process and the 
reconstruction process, due to the fact that the disasters were of a relatively small scale. The 
parties normally involved during routine construction projects were also involved during the 
reconstruction and using existing relationships eased the process.  During the initial recovery 
stage local contractors volunteered their time, but this needed careful management. National 
scale contractors were a valuable source of resources, since they were able to use their 
networks to mobilise resources from the whole country. 
 
CHALLENGES FOR LARGER SCALE DISASTERS 
 
Coordination of reconstruction 
Whilst relying on routine processes proved adequate in many ways for these small-scale 
disasters, a higher level of coordination and management would be needed for programmes 
of reconstruction following a larger disaster. CDEM agencies are provided with certain 
powers under the CDEM Act to direct reconstruction, however, these powers can only be 
exercised in a declared emergency situation. When a declaration is lifted, the designated 
Recovery Manager has no statutory power to direct resources for recovery. If they were to 
direct activities using powers under the Act the agency would become responsible for the 
oversight and management of those activities; since CDEM agencies do not generally have 
the resources and skills for these tasks, they are reluctant to take on such responsibility 
(AELG, 2005).  Clearly there is still a need for coordination once a state of emergency 
ceases, and this role may be beyond the capacity of  local authorities and insurance 
companies who have generally taken on this responsibly for smaller scale disasters. 
 
EQC provides statutory funds to cover losses incurred by individual property owners as a 
result of natural disasters. This arrangement is clearly inefficient in a large-scale disaster and 
it has been suggested by Page (2005) for example, that bulk reconstruction contracts should 
be awarded by the EQC so as to relieve house owners from sourcing and managing the 
process. The EQC trialled a coordinated response to the Te Anau earthquake of 2003, using a 
large single contractor to coordinate and manage the recovery works on its behalf. The 
relatively small scale damage of this particular event did not allow definitive conclusions to 
be drawn on the benefits of such a coordinated approach, but coordination was clearly an 
improvement on the situation where individual property owners competed for the services of 
a limited number of building contractors. 
 
MCDEM Director’s Guidelines (2005b) proposes a management structure for coordinating 
recovery and it recommends the setting up of various task groups to achieve recovery 
objectives. Under the ‘Built Environment Task Group’ are sub-task groups for various parts 
of the built environment. For example, the ‘Residential Housing Subtask Group’ would be 
responsible to:  
 
‘repair, reconstruct or relocate buildings – obtaining fast-track building and other consents, 
sufficient builders and materials, coordinating skilled trades and their work standards’ 
 
This is a very challenging responsibility for the task force to take on and does not appear to 
concur with what has happened in practice following recent disasters. 
 
Reconstruction resources 
The processing of building consents at the early stages of reconstruction and recovery after 
an event has been identified as a potential bottleneck. Access to normal resource levels will 
be unlikely and inevitably there will be shortages of qualified people to handle impact 
assessments and consent processing. A more flexible approach to the standard consent 
process would be necessary to expedite the process and help cope with the high volume of 
consent applications after a major disaster.  
 
In terms of overall human resources Page (2004) suggests that the construction industry 
could cope effectively with a medium sized disaster if the base work load was at an average 
level, but a large scale disaster coinciding with a high base load could require up to 180,000 
additional construction industry workers (this is based on an event causing $10billion worth 
of damage in the Wellington region and with a base work load 7% higher than current 
levels). Hopkins, (2004) in a similar study estimates a combined resource requirement for 
reinstatement to be about $7.73 billion. The National Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Plan, due to come into force in July 2006, acknowledges New Zealand may need to mobilise 
all nationally available resources because it has finite capacity and capability for response 
and recovery. 
 
Hazard and risk assessment 
The need for a focussed assessment of potential hazards after an event cannot be 
overemphasised as it will enable the determination of risk levels and put in place the 
mechanism for avoiding any increase in those risks by limiting future developments in those 
areas. 
 
The new Building Act (2004) requires that Territorial Authorities must not grant building 
consents on land subjected to natural hazards unless they can be protected from the hazard 
and, where waivers are granted, it requires that notices be placed on the land to indicate the 
risk of natural hazards they are exposed to. Implementing this Act will have far reaching 
implications on insurance claims as the Earthquake Commission Act indicates that the EQC 
is not liable to settle any claim where there is an identified large risk. Current revisions to the 
mapping of vulnerable natural disaster zones may prevent existing properties from being 
compensated at all. 
 
The CDEM Act is the only piece of legislation that requires specific identification of hazards 
by councils. However, the scope of this identification is limited to the hazards already 
identified through the Resource Management Act (RMA) process and for which building 
works have been undertaken in hazard zones. Hazard identification can only be inferred from 
other pieces of legislation such as the Building Act and RMA where in the course of 
discharging council duties, information concerning natural hazards is deemed collected.  
 
The implication of council’s inability to gather information on hazards is that development 
control outside recognised hazard zones are limited, thus the provisions of the various acts 
concerning land use cannot be effectively applied. For the incident at Matata, the extents of 
the flood and debris flow were outside known hazard zones.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The task of reconstruction after a major event can be an onerous challenge. It requires 
deliberate and coordinated efforts of all stakeholders for effective and efficient recovery of 
the affected community. The paper has shown that the issues surrounding the implementation 
of the pieces of legislation concerning reconstruction after a major disaster are complex and 
interrelated. Though the existing regulatory framework seems to point to the right direction, 
more issues have to be addressed in practice.  
 
Legislation cannot be used for purposes other than those for which it is intended and there 
appears to be little provision in several areas of legislation for post-disaster situations. These 
polices need to be revised before hand as hasty revisions during the course of reconstruction 
works do not provide the best solution to major disaster problems. 
 
Should the routine regulatory and legislative processes be followed after a major disaster it is 
unlikely that regulatory bodies would be able to cope with the volume of work.  
The conflicts in the interpretation of the different pieces of legislation need to be harmonised, 
whilst the roles and responsibilities of the various CDEM agencies and other stakeholders 
need to be made clear. The apparent division between those who, in practice, take 
responsibility for reconstruction and those who set policy and legislation create barriers that 
need to be overcome. Failing this, implementation of reconstruction works will be 
cumbersome in the event of a major disaster. 
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Abstract 
New Zealand has extensive infrastructure networks and localised, dense urban 
populations that make it vulnerable to natural disasters. When they occur, the 
effects can be devastating on the natural and built environment. Organisations 
therefore need to be well prepared, rather than rely on a reactive recovery 
process after an event.  
As one aspect of a major programme of research in New Zealand, the authors 
address the recovery issue in terms of how the local legislative and regulatory 
frameworks either facilitate or hinder reconstruction projects and 
programmes. If well articulated and implemented, the regulations should not 
only provide an effective means of reducing and containing vulnerabilities 
(disaster mitigation), but also a means of facilitating reconstruction projects.  
This paper highlights the interrelated reconstruction challenges of allocation 
of responsibility for coordination, scarcity of resources and the application of 
legislation and regulations that were written for routine construction rather 
than post-disaster reconstruction. Examples of reconstruction following 
recent small scale disasters in New Zealand are presented to support the 
points raised. The paper concludes that whilst routine construction processes 
have proved adequate for small-scale disasters, the greater degree of 
coordination required for programmes of reconstruction following a larger 
disaster has not been adequately addressed in policy and legislation. 
Keywords: Reconstruction; Legislation; Regulation 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand invests heavily in relative terms, in research and development of 
disaster management plans. Government agencies such as the Ministry of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM), Earthquake Commission (EQC), 
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Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited (GNS), and Resilient 
Organisations research programme funded by the Foundations for Research 
Science and Technology, have current research objectives to address pressing 
disaster management needs. Though disaster management and the need to develop 
a resilient community capable of recovering from disasters has become topical, 
focus until recently has been mainly on reduction, readiness and response and 
Angus (2005) suggests that there is poor understanding of recovery and little 
consideration is given to the implications of recovery in New Zealand.  
In comparison to routine construction, there is little provision in several areas of 
legislation to cater for post-disaster reconstruction processes. Following a major 
disaster it is unlikely that coordinating authorities and regulatory bodies would be 
able to cope with the volume of work due to shortfalls in experienced personnel, thus 
the coordination and management of a major programme of reconstruction could 
become cumbersome and inefficient. 
THE RECOVERY FRAMEWORK 
The MCDEM in New Zealand encourages a holistic approach to the issue of 
recovery planning and believes this will be most effective if it is integrated with the 
remaining 3Rs of reduction, readiness and response. The definition of recovery 
encapsulates the expectations of recovery as “the coordinated efforts and processes 
to effect the immediate, medium and long-term holistic regeneration of a community 
following a disaster” (MCDEM 2005)  
Recovery requires a concerted approach that will support the foundations of 
community sustainability and capacity building and which will eventually reduce risks 
and vulnerabilities to future disasters. Jigyasu, (2004) describes an increase in 
vulnerability of local communities after the Latur 1993 earthquake in India, where 
sustainable recovery interventions were poorly planned and implemented. The 
rational starting point is the setting up of an institutional infrastructure for emergency 
management, which will formulate public policies for mitigation, response and 
recovery (Comerio 2004). These recovery policies should then be integrated into 
other emergency management areas as well as policies of sustainability and 
community capacity building (Coghlan 2004). New Zealand’s recovery planning and 
management arrangements are contained in the National Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Strategy (MCDEM 2004). Recovery is delivered through a continuum 
of central, regional, community and personal structures (Angus 2004). 
Management of recovery may involve an element of competition between central, 
regional and local levels of government for control of the process (Rolfe and Britton, 
1995). The MCDEM, together with cluster groups of agencies, coordinate planning at 
the central level. Regional and Territorial authorities are encouraged to produce 
group plans that will suit peculiar conditions of their local areas. Other discussion 
documents produced at the national level like Focus on Recovery: A holistic 
framework for recovery; and Recovery Planning both released in 2004, give context 
to recovery planning while the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 
(CDEMA) 2002 provides the legislation and the foundations for the New Zealand 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) environment. 
Legislation that applies to routine construction provides for the safe development of 
infrastructure, capital improvements and land use, ensuring preservation and 
environmental protection, however there appears to be little provision in several 
areas of legislation to facilitate reconstruction projects.  Much existing legislation was 
not drafted to cope with an emergency situation and was not developed to operate 
under the conditions that will inevitably prevail in the aftermath of a severe seismic 
event (Feast, 1995).  
Pieces of legislation that make reference to building work include, but are not 
restricted to the following: 
• Building Act 1991 and 2004 
• Resource Management Act 1992 
• Housing Improvement Regulations 1947 
• Historic Places Act 1993 
This paper will consider the problems associated with the implementation of some of 
these pieces of legislation particularly in relation to recovery, so as to gain insight 
into the appropriateness of the CDEM framework. 
THE RECOVERY PROCESS 
Recovery is an integral part of the comprehensive emergency management process 
(Sullivan 2003). It refers to all activities that are carried out immediately after the 
initial response to a disaster situation. This will usually extend until the community’s 
capacity for self-help has been restored. In other words, the end-state is when the 
assisted community reaches a level of functioning where it is able to sustain itself in 
the absence of further external intervention (Sullivan 2003). 
The effectiveness of the process will depend on how much planning has been 
carried out and what contingencies are provided for in preparing for the disaster. It is 
expected that recovery and reconstruction works will restore the affected community 
in all aspects of its natural, built, social and economic environment.  
The recovery process may present an opportunity for improvement in the functioning 
of the community, so that risk from future events can be reduced while the 
community becomes more resilient.  
Recovery is an enabling and supportive process, thus the heart of recovery is 
community participation. Consultation and communication is encouraged especially 
in identifying community needs and for collective decision making amongst all 
stakeholders. This way all stakeholders understand the process and their 
commitment towards agreed objectives is ensured. Typical stakeholders will include: 
• Asset owners (may be private or public and the business community) 
• Lifeline Agencies 
• CDEM groups (national, territorial and local government departments, police, fire 
brigade, relief and welfare agencies, health and safety personnel etc)  
• Insurance companies 
• Non-governmental agencies (charities, funding organisations etc.) 
• Construction and reinstatement organisations 
The recovery process will typically follow a conceptualised model (Figure 1) 
comprising five key stages (Brunsdon and Smith 2004) which are discussed below.  
• Impact Assessment - This is the information gathering stage in the recovery 
process aimed at gaining knowledge on the impact of the disaster event on 
individuals, community and the environment. It involves all stakeholders as it is at 
this stage that the necessary inspections and surveys (needs assessment) are 
carried out that will form the basis for all reinstatements activities. The needs 
assessments will include building inspections, insurances, and health and safety 
assessments. 
Success of this stage will depend on the levels of communication, consultation 
and planning between all stakeholders. The process must lend itself to reviews 
and updating to take account of new information at later stages. 
• Restoration Proposal - This is the stage where decisions are made on whether to 
repair, replace or abandon affected properties. These decisions are reached 
based on the input of the impact assessment activities. Realistic proposals for 
meeting the anticipated recovery task are presented for funding organisations 
consideration. 
• Funding Arrangements – in New Zealand affected parties may have access to 
two types of funds: funds from private insurance companies and from 
government. (Residential property owners are insured by the EQC, New 
Zealand’s primary provider of natural disaster insurance. EQC insures against 
damages caused by earthquake, natural landslips, volcanic eruption, 
hydrothermal activity, and tsunami). Secondary funding may come from charity 
organisations and external donor agencies.    
• Regulatory Process – design and regulatory approvals are sought for the 
reinstatement of damaged facilities. Processing of resource consents is usually 
painstaking and the target of approving authorities is to ensure that considerable 
level of resilience is incorporated in all developments. New knowledge gained on 
risk from hazards after the disaster will assist approving authorities to correct 
former design concepts to mitigate future disaster risk.  
• Physical Construction - This is the regeneration stage in the recovery process 
where every aspect of the community and its environment (natural, built, social 
and economic environments) return to normalcy. Experience has shown that it is 
difficult to return to the pre-event status quo but effort is made to restore the 
functions of the affected community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RECENT NATURAL DISASTERS 
In recent years there have been two locally significant disasters due to flooding 
events, at Manawatu in 2004 and Matata in 2005. The circumstances of these 
events are described briefly and some lessons learnt are summarised below. 
The Manawatu Flood 
Flooding in Manawatu was caused by heavy rain and gale force winds from the 14th 
to 23rd of February 2004. A Regional State of Civil Emergency was declared on 17th 
February. The flooding caused over 2,000 people to be evacuated from their homes 
at the height of the event. Many rivers breached their banks and considerable areas 
of farmland were inundated by silt and floodwaters. There was significant damage to 
infrastructure with damage to roads, bridges, and railways. In addition, there were 
telecommunication, power, gas and water supply outages to tens of thousands of 
people. Remarkably no lives were lost as a direct result of the event. 
Impact Assessment 
Restoration Proposal 
Physical Construction 
R
es
ou
rc
es
 &
 T
im
e 
Funding Arrangements 
Regulatory process 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
C
on
su
lta
tio
n 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
Figure 1: Key Stages in Recovery Process (Brunsdon and Smith 2004) 
 
Recovery costs are estimated at $160-180million for the rural sector and $120million 
for roads and council infrastructure. In addition $29.5 million and $3.5 million will be 
required to stop future flooding of the lower Manawatu and Rangitikei rivers 
respectively. 
The Matata Debris Flow 
A debris flow occurred on the 18th of May 2005 when a band of intense rain fell in the 
catchments behind Matata in the Bay of Plenty region. This triggered floods and 
several large debris flows.  
The highly erosive debris flows cleaned out the valley bottoms and destabilised the 
slopes along the channel, causing secondary landslides. The debris flows were 
structurally damaging to all buildings and bridges in their paths and at several 
locations the associated debris floods also were structurally damaging. 
In response to the Matata disaster a Civil Defence Emergency was declared on 18th 
May 2005 and this remained in place until the end of May. Total government 
valuation including land value and capital value of properties affected along the flood 
path hazard was estimated to be $9,740,000 for unsafe buildings and $2,937,000 for 
buildings subject to restricted use (WDC Recovery Report Nr. 06). 
 
Reconstruction following the floods 
Reconstruction was carried out through collaboration between CDEM agencies, local 
authorities, utility companies and insurance companies during recovery in the two 
cases. 
For the Manawatu-Wanganui region recovery was coordinated through the regional 
council’s new CDEM Group arrangements under the provisions of the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act (CDEM Act) 2002. For the other territorial authorities 
the event was managed through their Civil Defence Act 1983 arrangements. The 
CDEM Act provides a structure appropriate for dealing with events such as the 
floods and did not introduce any structures or procedures that hindered authorities in 
dealing with the event. In Matata the state of emergency was extended to allow work 
to be completed on critical road access routes but still only lasted two weeks.  
The roading authorities did not diverge from normal legislation and regulations and 
building consents were sought and granted as usual. Road users were consulted 
and kept updated on reconstruction issues. 
A source of frustration for utility companies in the Manawatu flood event according to 
AELG (2005) was the time taken to develop an understanding with the Regional 
Council about emergency actions that would cover all situations under the Resource 
Management Act, rather than require a formal process for each activity. A particular 
issue arose when the Regional Council initially required that slip material should be 
disposed of in a designated landfill; subsequently they allowed a more pragmatic 
approach which meant that slip material could be moved and redeposited locally. 
The road funding authority, Transfund, should ideally become involved as early as 
possible following a disaster since Transfund has direct access to government funds. 
However this was not the case following the Manawatu floods and it is likely that 
more could have been done to secure certainty over funding in the early stages of 
recovery which would have helped with the physical works prioritisation process.  
Recovery at Matata relied heavily on Central Government funding since the local 
council had a small number of rate payers and insufficient funds to cover the 
recovery costs itself. Funding took some time to come through whilst government 
requested and were awaiting details of the costs. This frustrated the local population. 
Overall there was little difference between the normal building process and the 
reconstruction process, due to the fact that the disasters were of a relatively small 
scale. The parties normally involved during routine construction projects were also 
involved during the reconstruction and using existing relationships eased the 
process.  During the initial recovery stage local contractors volunteered their time, 
but this needed careful management. National scale contractors were a valuable 
source of resources, since they were able to use their networks to mobilise 
resources from the whole country. 
CHALLENGES FOR LARGER SCALE DISASTERS 
Coordination of reconstruction 
Whilst relying on routine processes proved adequate in many ways for these small-
scale disasters, a higher level of coordination and management would be needed for 
programmes of reconstruction following a larger disaster. CDEM agencies are 
provided with certain powers under the CDEM Act to direct reconstruction, however, 
these powers can only be exercised in a declared emergency situation. When a 
declaration is lifted, the designated Recovery Manager has no statutory power to 
direct resources for recovery. If they were to direct activities using powers under the 
Act the agency would become responsible for the oversight and management of 
those activities; since CDEM agencies do not generally have the resources and skills 
for these tasks, they are reluctant to take on such responsibility (AELG, 2005).  
Clearly there is still a need for coordination once a state of emergency ceases, and 
the responsibly for this is generally taken up by local authorities and insurance 
companies. 
EQC provides statutory funds to cover losses incurred by individual property owners 
as a result of natural disasters. This arrangement is clearly inefficient in a large-scale 
disaster and it has been suggested by Page (2005) for example, that bulk 
reconstruction contracts should be awarded by the EQC so as to relieve house 
owners from sourcing and managing the process. The EQC trialled a coordinated 
response to the Te Anau earthquake of 2003, using a large single contractor to 
coordinate and manage the recovery works on its behalf. The relatively small scale 
damage of this particular event did not allow definitive conclusions to be drawn on 
the benefits of such a coordinated approach, but coordination was clearly an 
improvement on the situation where individual property owners competed for the 
services of a limited number of building contractors. 
MCDEM Director’s Guidelines (2005) proposes a management structure for 
coordinating recovery and it recommends the setting up of various task groups to 
achieve recovery objectives. Under the ‘Built Environment Task Group’ are sub-task 
groups for various parts of the built environment. For example, the ‘Residential 
Housing Subtask Group’ would be responsible to:  
‘repair, reconstruct or relocate buildings – obtaining fast-track building and other 
consents, sufficient builders and materials, coordinating skilled trades and their work 
standards’ 
This is a very challenging responsibility for the task force to take on and does not 
appear to concur with what has happened in practice following recent disasters. 
Reconstruction resources 
 
The processing of building consents at the early stages of reconstruction and 
recovery after an event has been identified as a potential bottleneck. Access to 
normal resource levels will be unlikely and inevitably there will be shortages of 
qualified people to handle impact assessments and consent processing. A more 
flexible approach to the standard consent process would be necessary to expedite 
the process and help cope with the high volume of consent applications after a major 
disaster.  
 
In terms of overall human resources Page (2004) suggests that the construction 
industry could cope effectively with a medium sized disaster if the base work load 
was at an average level, but a large scale disaster coinciding with a high base load 
could require up to 180,000 additional construction industry workers (this is based on 
an event causing $10billion worth of damage in the Wellington region and with a 
base work load 7% higher than current levels). Hopkins, (2004) in a similar study 
estimates a combined resource requirement for reinstatement to be about $7.73 
billion. The National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan, due to come into 
force in July 2006, acknowledges New Zealand may need to mobilise all nationally 
available resources because it has finite capacity and capability for response and 
recovery. 
 
 
 
 
Hazard and risk assessment 
The need for a focussed assessment of potential hazards after an event cannot be 
overemphasised as it will enable the determination of risk levels and put in place the 
mechanism for avoiding any increase in those risks by limiting future developments 
in those areas. 
The new Building Act (2004) requires that Territorial Authorities must not grant 
building consents on land subjected to natural hazards unless they can be protected 
from the hazard and, where waivers are granted, it requires that notices be placed 
on the land to indicate the risk of natural hazards they are exposed to. Implementing 
this Act will have far reaching implications on insurance claims as the Earthquake 
Commission Act indicates that the EQC is not liable to settle any claim where there 
is an identified large risk. Current revisions to the mapping of vulnerable natural 
disaster zones may prevent existing properties from being compensated at all. 
The CDEM Act is the only piece of legislation that requires specific identification of 
hazards by councils. However, the scope of this identification is limited to the 
hazards already identified through the Resource Management Act (RMA) process 
and for which building works have been undertaken in hazard zones. Hazard 
identification can only be inferred from other pieces of legislation such as the 
Building Act and RMA where in the course of discharging council duties, information 
concerning natural hazards is deemed collected.  
The implication of council’s inability to gather information on hazards is that 
development control outside recognised hazard zones are limited, thus the 
provisions of the various acts concerning land use cannot be effectively applied. For 
the incident at Matata, the extents of the flood and debris flow were outside known 
hazard zones.  
CONCLUSION 
The task of reconstruction after a major event can be an onerous challenge. It 
requires deliberate and coordinated efforts of all stakeholders for effective and 
efficient recovery of the affected community. The paper has shown that the issues 
surrounding the implementation of the pieces of legislation concerning reconstruction 
after a major disaster are complex and interrelated. Though the existing regulatory 
framework seems to point to the right direction, more issues have to be addressed in 
practice.  
Legislation cannot be used for purposes other than those for which it is intended and 
there appears to be little provision in several areas of legislation for post-disaster 
situations. These polices need to be revised before hand as hasty revisions during 
the course of reconstruction works do not provide the best solution to major disaster 
problems. 
Should the routine regulatory and legislative processes be followed after a major 
disaster it is unlikely that regulatory bodies would be able to cope with the volume of 
work.  
The conflicts in the interpretation of the different pieces of legislation need to be 
harmonised, whilst the roles and responsibilities of the various CDEM agencies and 
other stakeholders need to be made clear. The apparent division between those 
who, in practice, take responsibility for reconstruction and those who set policy and 
legislation create barriers that need to be overcome. Failing this, implementation of 
reconstruction works will be cumbersome in the event of a major disaster. 
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